

Long-Distance Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution in Optical Fiber

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The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultralow-noise, high-efficiency transition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.

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Quantum key distribution (QKD), which enables users to create a shared key with secrecy guaranteed by the laws of physics [1], is arguably the most advanced application in the growing field of quantum information science. Since the first demonstration in 1992 [2], the field has advanced sufficiently that commercial systems are now available. Most current QKD implementations use “prepare and measure” protocols that involve the sender (Alice) preparing a single photon in a quantum state and sending it to the receiver (Bob), who then measures the photon. Attempts by an eavesdropper (Eve) to obtain information about the state of the single photon will introduce an error rate in the transmission, which alerts the users to Eve’s presence.

For example, to implement the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [3], Alice randomly encodes a single photon with either a 0 or a 1 in one of two conjugate bases and sends the photon to Bob. Bob performs a measurement in one of the two bases, and communicates the time slots for which he obtained detection events. Alice and Bob then create a sifted key by only retaining events where they used the same basis. Ideally, Alice’s sifted bits should be perfectly correlated with Bob’s if Eve did not attack the transmission, but any real system has error rates due to experimental imperfections. Error correction [4] removes these errors, leaving Alice and Bob with a perfectly correlated key. However, this key is not yet completely secret because, in principle, the errors may have arisen from Eve attacking the system. Therefore, a final step of privacy amplification [5] is used to obtain a shorter, secret key about which Eve has negligible information.

The lack of readily available single-photon sources, especially at telecom wavelengths where most fiber-based QKD systems operate, modifies the simple picture outlined above considerably. If the source emits more than one photon, Eve could remove one of the photons and store it until Bob announces his basis choice, at which time she would measure the photon in the correct basis and learn the bit value without introducing any errors. Therefore, in

addition to assuming that all errors arise from Eve’s interaction with single photons, it is also necessary to assume that Eve can gain full information about any sifted bits that arose from multiphoton events. To determine the number of sifted bits that were encoded in single photons, it is often assumed that the transmission channel acts as a simple beam splitter [2]. However, an eavesdropper with unlimited technological capabilities may modify the channel properties so that this is no longer valid. For instance, she may perform a photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack by replacing the link with a lossless channel, blocking as many single photons at the output of Alice that she can, while keeping the rate of photons that Bob receives constant, and removing one photon from each multiphoton pulse [6]. Protection against such attacks requires far more privacy amplification than the case where a beam-splitter channel is assumed, and if the rate of multiphotons present at the output of Alice is greater than the rate of detection events recorded by Bob, then Eve could have full knowledge of every sifted bit.

QKD systems often use heavily attenuated laser sources, which results in a Poisson distribution of photon number. The fraction of nonvacuum pulses that contain more than one photon is approximately $\mu/2$ when the laser is pulsed with a mean photon number $\mu < 1$. To keep the rate of multiphotons sufficiently low for PNS security, it is necessary to operate with μ on the order of the channel transmittance η , yielding a sifted bit rate that is proportional to η^2 [7]. As the transmission loss increases and the sifted bit rate decreases, detector dark counts play an increasingly important role, eventually leading to such high error rates that secret key generation is impossible. For fiber QKD, where the channel transmittance drops off exponentially with distance, the requirement of PNS security was until recently thought to severely limit the link length for weak coherent pulse QKD [8,9].

The recent development of decoy-state protocols [10–13] has drastically improved the outlook for the security of weak laser based QKD. Decoy-state QKD allows users to

place a rigorous lower bound on the single-photon channel transmittance, including receiver losses, and therefore the number of detections at Bob that originated from single photons. Because no assumptions are made about modifications to the channel transmittance by an eavesdropper, a PNS attack would easily be detected. Decoy-state QKD has previously been demonstrated over link lengths of 15 and 60 km [14,15], with a suggested maximum range of about 140 km if InGaAs avalanche photodiodes with the best-reported parameters for QKD in the literature are used [16]. However, those experiments employed a two-way system that has been shown to be susceptible to Trojan horse attacks [17], negating the purpose of QKD to create unconditionally secure keys. In contrast, the present work was performed with a one-way system which is much less susceptible to Trojan horse attacks [18]. In this Letter, we report on the first experimental decoy-state QKD demonstration in a one-way QKD system that can create unconditionally secure quantum key.

The simplest decoy-state protocol requires Alice to emit signals whose μ values are randomly toggled between two values μ_1 and μ_0 . For a given signal, Eve does not know whether Alice used μ_0 or μ_1 , so she must treat single-photon signals from either mean photon number identically. Because the fraction of single-photon signals depends on μ , it is impossible for Eve to perform a PNS attack by simultaneously modifying the channel transmission correctly for more than one value of μ . By comparing the number of detection events from μ_0 and μ_1 transmissions, Alice and Bob are able to place strict bounds on the single-photon transmittance of the channel.

A three-level decoy-state protocol ($[\mu_0, \mu_1, \mu_2 = 0]$) with $\mu_1 \ll \mu_0$ enables even better characterization of the channel parameters, which can be illustrated as follows. Bob's count of detection events when Alice sent vacuum (μ_2) provides an estimate of the background and dark count detection probability, y_0 , per clock cycle of the system. From this estimate, they can develop upper and lower bounds on y_0 with a user-defined level of confidence $1 - \epsilon$, with $\epsilon \ll 1$. The confidence interval calculations in our case were computed numerically as opposed to making a Gaussian approximation, which may be a poor fit far out in the tails of the binomial distribution governing both the transmission and error probabilities. Next, they consider how many detection events Bob received when Alice prepared mean photon number $\mu_1 \ll 1$. After subtracting off background and dark counts, most of the remaining events are from single-photon signals, providing an estimate and confidence levels for the single-photon transmittance y_1 . Finally, they can utilize the lower bound on y_1 to determine the number of the stronger μ_0 detection events that originated as single-photon signals at Alice. While this outline is helpful for gaining intuition, it does not explain the specific values of mean photon numbers that should be chosen for an experiment such as ours.

More generally, the channel analysis is carried out by simultaneously solving for the n -photon signal transmittance

variables y_n under a set of linear inequalities formed by confidence intervals $[Y_j^-, Y_j^+]$ on the detection probabilities per clock cycle Y_j for each μ_j [13]: $Y_j^- \leq e^{-\mu_j} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{(\mu_j)^n}{n!} y_n \leq Y_j^+$. The region of consistent solutions forms a convex polyhedron, and a lower bound $y_1^- \leq y_1$ can easily be found by linear programming. A similar set of inequalities relate the confidence intervals on the observed bit error rates for each μ_j to the y_n and the n -photon bit error rates b_n . While simultaneously solving both sets of inequalities could in principle yield a tight bound on the single-photon bit error rate b_1 , we chose to instead use a conservative upper bound b_1^+ by treating all observed sifted bit errors as having come from single-photon signals. Details on channel estimation and optimization of experimental parameters for fiber decoy-state QKD will be published separately [20].

The switched interferometer QKD system used in this work was identical to that described in detail elsewhere [9,21], except for the addition of an amplitude modulator in Alice, which was used to produce the different decoy-state signal strengths. As shown in Fig. 1, the system was composed of a phase encoding switched interferometer and low-noise, high efficiency single-photon sensitive superconducting transition-edge sensors (TESs) [22,23]. Synchronization for both Alice and Bob was achieved through the use of a single clock, making the system impractical for use outside the laboratory, but straightforward modifications will yield a system with separate clocks using quantum clock recovery techniques [24]. A pattern generator preloaded with a random bit file provided bit and basis selection for Alice, but in a practical system cryptographically strong random number generators would provide the selection [24]. These two relatively minor modifications to the system will be implemented in the near future. In contrast to our previous work using TESs in a phase encoded system [9,21,25], in which we used one




FIG. 1. QKD system used in this work. DFB, distributed feedback laser; VOA, variable optical attenuator; AM, amplitude modulator; LP, linear polarizer; RNG, random number generator.

detector and time multiplexed the signals at Bob's phase decoder, here we used two detectors to enable operation at a higher clock rate (2.5 MHz for this experiment). The detectors had fiber-coupled system efficiencies of 33% and 50%, which were lowered from the detector value of 89% by the inclusion of filters to reduce the rate of blackbody radiation reaching the detectors. This imbalance between the two detectors reduces the entropy of the raw key, which must be accounted for during privacy amplification. The background rate of detection events, set by blackbody radiation, was 3 counts/s. The timing jitter of the detectors was 100 ns FWHM, and the thermal recovery time was 4 μ s. The system transmitted over a 202 km link of dark optical fiber, and shorter distances were obtained by redefining Alice's enclave to include some length of the optical fiber [9]. Redefining the system in this way simply means that Alice has an extra attenuator composed of fiber that lowers the mean photon number exiting her enclave. Therefore, our mapping to shorter distances is completely equivalent to using a shorter length of fiber.

We implemented a decoy-state BB84 protocol using three levels of μ : a high μ_0 , a moderate μ_1 , and a low μ_2 that approximates the vacuum state. The probabilities of sending μ_0 , μ_1 , or μ_2 were 83.1%, 12.3%, and 4.6%, respectively. Near-optimal μ values and probabilities were obtained by performing simulations to maximize the secret bit rate for various channel parameters. Because of the finite extinction ratio of the amplitude modulator, μ_2 was not zero but was instead less than 1.0% of μ_0 . Use of a small nonzero value for μ_2 results in slightly worse bounds on the single-photon transmission, and this effect was included in our analysis. The user-defined confidence parameter for each bound was chosen to be $\epsilon = 10^{-7}$, resulting in a final key of which, with probability greater than $1 - 6 \times 10^{-7}$, Eve knows less than one bit.

After sufficient data were collected, the bits arising from pulses at μ_0 were sifted, error corrected, and privacy amplified. After sifting, the bits were shuffled to permute the errors and make error correction more efficient. In addition, half of the bits, randomly chosen, were flipped by both Alice and Bob to ensure that the final key had an equal distribution of zeros and ones. Error correction was performed using the modified CASCADE algorithm [26], which has an efficiency of 7%–13% over the Shannon limit. We performed privacy amplification using Toeplitz matrix universal hash functions [27] to provide protection against arbitrary basis-independent attacks [28], yielding a total of N_{sec} secret bits:

$$N_{\text{sec}} = s[1 - H_2(b_1^+)] - N_{\text{sift}}\{f_{\text{ec}}H_2(B) + [1 - H_2(z)]\},$$

where N_{sift} is the number of sifted bits, s is the calculated lower bound on the number of single photons present in the sifted key, b_1^+ is the calculated upper bound on the single-photon error rate, f_{ec} is the efficiency of the error correction protocol relative to the Shannon limit, B is the observed error rate for all signals that enter the sifted key, z is

the fraction of zeros in the sifted key before half the bits were flipped, and H_2 is Shannon entropy.

We collected data at two different sets of values of μ , one selected for transmission at 85 km (corresponding to 117 km of fiber being defined as residing within Alice) and the other for 100 km (corresponding to 102 km of fiber residing within Alice's enclave). For each data set, timing windows for accepting detected events were chosen to maximize the secret bit rate [21,25]. From the first data set, using mean photon numbers at the exit of Alice's enclave of $[\mu_0, \mu_1, \mu_2] = [0.487, 0.0639, 1.05 \times 10^{-3}]$ at 85 km, we created 9.9×10^3 secret bits in 351 s from 2.2×10^5 sifted bits using 120 ns windows. From the second data set, which used mean photon numbers $[0.297, 0.099, 2.75 \times 10^{-3}]$ at 100 km, we generated 1.2×10^4 secret bits from 1.9×10^5 sifted bits collected over 828 s with 220 ns windows. The observed error rates at μ_0 for the two data sets were 3.3% and 4%, consistent with the expected error rate due to interferometer visibility and background counts. The lower bounds on the fraction of sifted bits that originated as single photons were 0.46 and 0.55, compared to 0.61 and 0.74 for a beam-splitter channel. The number of secret bits generated is less than the number of non-PNS-secure bits that would have been generated at μ_0 by assuming a random deletion channel (4.4×10^4 and 4.9×10^4 at 85 and 100 km, respectively), but those numbers assume that Eve is unable to modify the channel properties. Consequently, the secret bits generated using our decoy-state protocol are immune to PNS attacks, whereas they would not be PNS secure under the beam-splitter channel assumption.

Even though the μ values were chosen to be near optimal for particular link lengths, we can analyze the results over other distances by redefining the system so that Alice's enclave includes a different amount of the 202 km optical fiber link [9]. Figure 2 shows the secret bit rate as a function of the transmission distance. For the data set optimized for 100 km, we find that a secret key can be exchanged over 107 km of optical fiber. Considerably longer ranges of 150–200 km should be possible in this system by using different μ values.

Because the extent to which the single-photon transmittance can be bounded is dependent on the photocount statistics, acquiring data for longer times will result in not only more secret bits, but also a higher *rate* of secret bit production. Figure 3 displays the results of a simulation of longer acquisition times. In general, the bound on single-photon transmittance does not depend on whether the quantum channel is stationary, but for the simulation we assume that Eve does not vary her attack. For a given confidence parameter, longer acquisition times result in a tighter lower bound on the single-photon transmittance and a tighter upper bound on the single-photon sifted bit error rate, leading to a higher secret bit rate. For this simulation, we have not adjusted the mean photon numbers used when the data acquisition time is increased; reoptimization of the




FIG. 2. Secret bit rate (bps denotes bits per second) vs transmission distance for the two experimental data sets. The asterisks mark the transmission distances quoted in the text. Longer distances could be achieved in this system if different mean photon numbers are used.

mean photon numbers for longer times is expected to increase the secret bit rate even further.

By incorporating low-noise transition-edge sensors into a one-way QKD system and implementing a three-level decoy protocol, we were able to generate a key secure against PNS attacks and with only very limited susceptibility to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber. This distance far surpasses the previous maximum PNS-secure transmission distance of 67.5 km that used very weak mean photon numbers rather than the decoy-state protocol in essentially the same system [9]. In contrast to other work, this demonstration was the first to implement a finite-statistics protocol to bound the channel transmittances without resorting to Gaussian approximations. We used a conservative method to estimate the error rate on single-photon signals, but future work may incorporate tighter bounds on the single-photon error rate, resulting in higher secret bit rates and longer ranges. System clock rates as much as 5 times higher are expected to be achieved with




FIG. 3 (color online). Single-photon transmittance y_1^- , error rate b_1^+ , and secret bit rate dependence on data acquisition time at 100 km. The dashed line indicates the actual data acquisition time of 828 s at which secret bits were generated; the other points on the graph are estimates based on the data.

improvements in the detector readout electronics, leading to higher secret bit rates. Based on the results of simulations, we expect that this system is capable of PNS-secure decoy-state QKD over 150–200 km of optical fiber, and improvements in filtering of blackbody photons could increase this distance even further to 250 km or more.

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Note added.—Recently, we became aware of similar work performed elsewhere [29].

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