Hiding Bits in Bell States

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We present a scheme for hiding bits in Bell states that is secure even when the sharers, Alice and Bob, are allowed to carry out local quantum operations and classical communication. We prove that the information that Alice and Bob can gain about a hidden bit is exponentially small in *n*, the number of qubits in each share, and can be made arbitrarily small for hiding multiple bits. We indicate an alternative efficient low-entanglement method for preparing the shared quantum states. We discuss how our scheme can be implemented using present-day quantum optics.

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The protection of a secret by *sharing* it, that is, by apportioning the secret data among two or more parties so that the data only become intelligible as a consequence of their cooperative action, is an important capability in modern information processing. Here we give a method of using particular quantum states to share a secret between two parties (Alice and Bob), in which the data is hidden in a fundamentally stronger way than is possible in any classical scheme. We prove that, even if Alice and Bob can communicate via a classical channel, they can only obtain arbitrarily little information about the hidden data. They can unlock the secret only by joint quantum measurements, which require either a quantum channel, shared quantum entanglement, or direct interaction between them. We show that the creation of these secret shares can be done with just a small expenditure of quantum entanglement: no more than one Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair per secret bit shared.

Our results are part of a larger exploration of the information-theoretic capabilities of quantum mechanics, notable examples of which (quantum key distribution [1] and quantum teleportation [2]) have now begun to be realized in the laboratory. The extent to which quantum states can hide shared data can be viewed as a new information-theoretic characterization of the quantum nonlocality of these states. Other workers have previously identified quantum secret sharing protocols [3,4], in which participants (possibly more than two) receive shares of either quantum or classical data. In this previous work, however, there is no guarantee that the data remains hidden if the parties choose to communicate classically. In fact, recent analysis [5] has shown that, for a single hidden bit, secrecy in the presence of classical communication is impossible if the shares consist of parts of two orthogonal *pure* quantum states. This stronger form of data hiding is nonetheless possible, as we will show, but only when the shares are made up of *mixed* quantum states.

Unlike the usual secret sharing schemes, the security in our scheme does not depend on certain parties being honest or malevolent; we assume that both Alice and Bob are malevolent in the sense that they would go to any length to determine the hidden bit. The security of our scheme relies on the fact that Alice and Bob are restricted in their operations, a condition that could be enforced by a third party. One can imagine, for example, a situation in which the third party (the boss) has a piece of data on which she would like Alice and Bob (some employees) to act without the sensitive data being revealed to them, or, in another scenario, the secret could be given to Alice and Bob and be revealed to them at a later stage determined by the boss. Our scheme is such that, at some later stage, the boss can provide the employees with entanglement that enables the parties to determine the secret with 100% certainty. This last idea can in fact be used to establish a form of conditionally secure quantum bit commitment [6]. For these scenarios to work, we have to assume that the boss controls the (quantum) channel which connects the two parties: Alice and Bob are not allowed to communicate via a quantum channel. This prohibition can be enforced by the boss by putting dephasing or noisy operations in their channel. Furthermore, the boss controls the labs in which the employees operate; for example, she can, prior to operation, sweep those labs clean of any entanglement (again by dephasing).

We present our protocol and prove its security for a one-bit secret *b*; at the end we indicate the proof of the security of its multibit extension. The protocol involves a "hider" (the boss above) who prepares one of two orthogonal bipartite quantum states $\rho_{b=0}^{(n)}$ or $\rho_{b=1}^{(n)}$ based on the value of *b*, and presents the two parts of the state to Alice and Bob. *n* is an integer which determines the degree of security of the protocol. The hider is assumed to have a supply of each of the four Bell states, defined as $|\Phi^{\pm}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle)$ and $|\Psi^{\pm}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle \pm |10\rangle)$. $|\Psi^{-}\rangle$ is a spin singlet while the other three are spin triplets. When $b = 1$, the hider picks at random a set of *n* Bell states with uniform probability, except that the number of singlets must be odd. The $b = 0$ protocol is the same, except that the number of singlets must be even. The hider distributes the *n* Bell states to Alice and Bob; for each Bell state the first qubit goes to Alice and the second to Bob.

To prove the security of this protocol, we must consider what information Alice and Bob can gather about the bit *b*. We assume that Alice and Bob can perform any sequence of local quantum operations supplemented by unlimited two-way classical communication (we abbreviate this class of operations as LOCC). This class of operations does *not* permit measurements in the basis of Bell states, from which the bit could easily be determined: Alice and Bob simply count the number of singlets measured and compute the parity. In fact, we will show that the information that Alice and Bob can learn about the hidden bit is exponentially small in the number *n* of Bell states that the hider uses for the encoding.

Before analyzing the security of our protocol, let us pause and consider the possibility for realizing our scheme in a physical experiment. The protocol that we have described above can be implemented in a present-day quantum optics lab in the following way. The hider needs to be able to make any one of the four Bell states; with an optical downconverter she can make a maximally entangled state between two polarization modes $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\updownarrow, \leftrightarrow\rangle + |\leftrightarrow, \downarrow\rangle)$ [7] and by further single-qubit operations she can map this state onto any of the other three Bell states. The photons can be sent through two optical fibers to the Alice and Bob locations. Then Alice and Bob can attempt to unlock the secret by LOCC (in Ref. [6] we describe an optimal and simple LOCC procedure, involving only onequbit gates). For the complete unlocking of the secret, a quantum channel between Alice and Bob is opened up and Alice's photons are sent to Bob. Finally, Bob will need to do a measurement which distinguishes the singlet state $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\uparrow, \leftrightarrow \rangle - |\leftrightarrow, \downarrow\rangle)$ from the three other Bell states. Such an incomplete measurement has been performed in the lab [7]; a full Bell measurement is not necessary and is also not technologically feasible in current experiments. Our alternative low-entanglement preparation scheme will be somewhat more involved in the lab but is interesting nonetheless. As we will discuss, what is needed are quantum operations in the Clifford group, including some particular one-qubit gates obtainable by linear optics in addition to the CNOT gate which cannot be implemented perfectly by using linear optical elements. However, recent work by Knill *et al.* [8] shows that a CNOT gate can be implemented near-deterministically in linear optics when single-photon sources are available.

Let us now pass to the security proof of our scheme. The LOCC class, even though it plays a fundamental role in the theory of quantum entanglement, is remarkably hard to characterize succinctly [9]. However, our analysis will rely on just one important feature that all LOCC operations share: they cannot create quantum entanglement between Alice and Bob if they are initially disentangled. We consider a general measurement scheme for Alice and Bob that, irrespective of its precise physical implementation, leads to just two final outcomes, "0" or "1." It can thus be described as a POVM (positive operator valued measure) measurement [10], with two POVM elements, $M_0 \ge 0$ and $M_1 \geq 0$, associated with outcomes 0 and 1, respectively. In our case, $M_{0,1}$ operates on a Hilbert space of dimension 2^{2n} , corresponding to the dimension of the input states. For an input density matrix ρ , the outcome *b* occurs with probability $\text{Tr}(\rho M_b)$. Probability conservation implies that $M_0 + M_1 = I$, where *I* is the identity matrix.

A POVM measurement **M** for a bipartite input is depicted in Fig. 1(a). Such a POVM measurement implemented by LOCC cannot create quantum entanglement. This condition translates to two necessary conditions on the measurement, $(\mathbf{1} \otimes T)[M_b] \ge 0$ for $b = 0, 1$. Here, **1** is the identity operation on Alice's system, *T* is the matrix transposition on Bob's system, $T[i\rangle\langle j|] = |j\rangle\langle i|$, and **1 ⊗** *T* is called the *partial transpose* operation. These conditions are proved as follows: Suppose Alice and Bob each prepares a maximally entangled state $|\Psi_{max}\rangle =$ $rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}$ $\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |i\rangle |i\rangle$ in her/his own lab. They then apply the measurement **M**, each on one register of $|\Psi_{\text{max}}\rangle$, as illustrated in Fig. 1(b). When outcome *b* is obtained, the residual state in the two unmeasured halves is proportional to

$$
\rho_f \propto \sum_{i,j,m,n} |i,j\rangle \langle m,n| \text{Tr}[M_b |i,j\rangle \langle m,n|]
$$

=
$$
\sum_{l,j,m,n} \langle i,j|M_b^T |m,n\rangle |i,j\rangle \langle m,n| = M_b^T,
$$
 (1)

where M_b^T is the matrix transpose of M_b . Thus Fig. 1(b) prescribes a LOCC procedure to create the states M_b^T /Tr (M_b) , since the input maximally entangled states are prepared by Alice and Bob locally. Therefore, the states $M_b^T / \text{Tr}(M_b)$ are necessarily disentangled and, following the Peres criterion [11], they are positive under partial transposition (PPT), meaning that $(\mathbf{1} \otimes T)[M_b^T] \ge$ 0, which in turns implies $(1 \otimes T)[M_b] \ge 0$.

FIG. 1. (a) A bipartite POVM measurement **M** performed on input ρ . The single horizontal lines are quantum registers, and the double lines are classical registers. The box represents a protocol (and circuit) for performing **M**. (b) A LOCC protocol that prepares a state proportional to M_b^T . The two registers of the maximally entangled states $|\Psi_{\text{max}}\rangle$ are represented by the two lines connected in the far left. The output probabilities are given by Tr ρM_b with $\rho = I/4^n$.

We now use the constraints that $M_{0.1}$ are PPT to bound the probability of a successful measurement. In particular we consider the probability $p_{0|0}$ that Alice and Bob decide for outcome 0 when the hider has prepared $\rho_0^{(n)}$ (corresponding to the hidden bit $b = 0$), which is equal to $p_{0|0} = \text{Tr} M_0 \rho_0^{(n)}$. Similarly we define $p_{1|1} = \text{Tr} M_1 \rho_1^{(n)}$, the probability of outcome 1 when $\rho_1^{(n)}$ is prepared by the hider.

We show that it is not necessary to consider the most general pair of PPT operators M_0 and M_1 . If there exists a general pair (M_0, M_1) obeying the PPT constraints, then there is another PPT pair $(\tilde{M}_0, \tilde{M}_1)$ which is *diagonal* in the basis of *n* Bell states, such that the measurement with M_0 and M_1 has the same probabilities of success $p_{0|0}$ and $p_{1|1}$. M_0 and M_1 are related to M_0 and M_1 by an action called *partial twirling* [12] which removes all off-diagonal terms in the Bell basis and leaves the diagonal terms unchanged.

The argument involves three observations. (i) Partial twirling can be implemented by LOCC operations [12] which preserve the PPT property [13]. Thus $(1 \otimes T) [\tilde{M}_{0,1}] \ge 0$. (ii) The trace-preservation condition $M_0 + M_1 = I$ is invariant under twirling, and therefore $\tilde{M}_0 + \tilde{M}_1 = I$. (iii) The states to be measured, $\rho_0^{(n)}$ and $\rho_1^{(n)}$, are mixtures of tensor products of *n* Bell states and thus are Bell diagonal. It follows that $p_{0|0} =$ $\text{Tr}M_0\rho_0^{(n)} = \text{Tr}\tilde{M}_0\rho_0^{(n)}$ and likewise $p_{1|1} = \text{Tr}\tilde{M}_1\rho_1^{(n)}$, because the off-diagonal terms of $M_{0.1}$ do not contribute to the trace. This establishes the argument; we can, without loss of generality, restrict to a measurement with Bell-diagonal POVM elements.

To carry the analysis further we introduce a compact notation [12] that represents each of the four Bell states by two bits, as follows: $|\Phi^+\rangle \rightarrow 00$, $|\Phi^-\rangle \rightarrow 01$, $|\Psi^+\rangle \rightarrow$ 10, and the singlet $|\Psi^{-}\rangle \rightarrow 11$. A product of *n* Bell states is thus represented by a 2*n*-bit string **s**. The four Bell states can be rotated into each other by local Paulimatrix rotations, involving one-half of the entangled state only. In the language of binary strings, we can also associate two bits with each of the Pauli matrices, $\sigma_x \rightarrow 10$, $\sigma_z \rightarrow 01$, $\sigma_y \rightarrow 11$, and $I \rightarrow 00$. This notation is convenient because the Pauli matrices then act on the two bits characterizing the Bell state by a bitwise XOR (addition modulo 2). For example, $(\sigma_z \otimes I) |\Phi^+\rangle = |\Phi^-\rangle$ can be represented as $01 \oplus 00 = 01$. Using the identity

$$
(1 \otimes T)[|\Phi^+\rangle\langle\Phi^+|] = \frac{1}{2}(|\Phi^+\rangle\langle\Phi^+| + |\Phi^-\rangle\langle\Phi^-| + |\Psi^+\rangle\langle\Psi^+| - |\Psi^-\rangle\langle\Psi^-|)
$$
\n
$$
(2)
$$

permits the operators $(1 \otimes T)^{\otimes n} [M_{0,1}]$ to be written very compactly in the binary-string notation. We denote the diagonal matrix elements of M_0 and M_1 in the basis of products of *n* Bell states (labeled by the 2*n*-bit string **s**) by α_s and β_s , respectively. Using the fact that strings of Bell states can be converted to each other by local Pauli operations, we can compute the diagonal matrix elements of the equation $(1 \otimes T)^{\otimes n}[M_0] \ge 0$ in the binary-string notation. We obtain the condition

$$
\sum_{s} \alpha_{s \oplus m} (-1)^{N_{11}(s)} \ge 0, \qquad (3)
$$

for all $2n$ -bit strings **m**, where N_{11} (s) is the number of times that an 11 pair appears in the binary string **s**. Through the association of Bell states with 2*n*-bit strings, $N_{11}(\mathbf{s})$ is precisely the number of singlets $|\Psi^{-}\rangle$ among the set of *n* Bell states. The same calculation for *M*¹ gives $\sum_{s} \beta_{s \oplus m} (-1)^{N_{11}(s)} \ge 0$ for all **m**. With the relation $\alpha_s = 1 - \beta_s$, resulting directly from $M_0 + M_1 = I$, and the identity $\sum_s (-1)^{N_{11}(s)} = 2^n$ (which can be shown by evaluating a simple binomial sum), we obtain that, for all 2*n*-bit strings **m**

$$
0 \le \sum_{s} \alpha_{s \oplus m} (-1)^{N_{11}(s)} \le 2^{n}.
$$
 (4)

By setting $\mathbf{m} = 00, \ldots, 00$ in this equation, we can express the probabilities of success, $p_{0|0} = 2/(2^{2n} + 2^n) \times$ $\sum_{s} |N_{11}(s)|$ is even α_s and $p_{11} = 2/(2^{2n} - 2^n) \times$ $s|N_{11}(s)$ is odd β_s , in terms of these two inequalities. This result bounds the sum $p_{0|0} + p_{1|1} - 1$ in both ways

$$
-\delta \le p_{0|0} + p_{1|1} - 1 \le \delta, \tag{5}
$$

where $\delta = 1/2^{n-1}$. This result establishes the hiding property: for $\delta = 0$ (corresponding to $n \to \infty$), Alice and Bob's measurement outcomes can be faithfully simulated by a coin flip with bias $p_{0|0}$, and so give no information about the identity of the state. There is also an informationtheoretic interpretation of this result; we can show [6] that, as a consequence of these inequalities, the mutual information [14] $I(B:M)$ is bounded by $\delta H(B)$, where *B* is the bit value and *M* is the outcome of *any* LOCC measurement by Alice and Bob, not just a two-outcome one. Here $H(B)$ [14] is the Shannon information of the hidden bit, which equals one in the case of equal prior probabilities for $b = 0$ and $b = 1$.

We now return to the question of how the hider can produce the states $\rho_0^{(n)}$ and $\rho_1^{(n)}$ using minimal entanglement between the two shares. We will demand that the procedure to create $\rho_0^{(n)}$ and $\rho_1^{(n)}$ be efficient as a quantum computation, that is, since each hiding state consists of 2*n* qubits, we seek a procedure to create these states with little entanglement, using a number of quantum computation steps polynomial in *n*.

We use a convenient alternative representation of these two density matrices:

$$
\rho_0^{(n)} = q_n \rho_1^{(n-1)} \otimes \rho_1^{(1)} + (1 - q_n) \rho_0^{(n-1)} \otimes \rho_0^{(1)},
$$

\n
$$
\rho_1^{(n)} = p_n \rho_0^{(n-1)} \otimes \rho_1^{(1)} + (1 - p_n) \rho_1^{(n-1)} \otimes \rho_0^{(1)}.
$$
 (6)

The mixing coefficients are determined by the uniformity of the Bell mixtures and proper normalization:

$$
q_n = \frac{2^{n-1} - 1}{2(2^n + 1)}, \qquad p_n = \frac{2^{n-1} + 1}{2(2^n - 1)}.
$$
 (6)

This representation can be easily understood by realizing that in order to make, say, a mixture of *n* Bell states with an even number of singlets, we can take a mixture of $n - 1$ Bell states with an odd number of singlets and an additional singlet *or* (with the appropriate probability) a mixture of $n - 1$ Bell states with an even number of singlets and another Bell state which is not a singlet.

Solving the recurrence relations for these two density matrices, we find that $\rho_0^{(n)}$ and $\rho_1^{(n)}$ are both so-called Werner density matrices [15]: linear combinations of the identity matrix *I* and the matrix $H = (1 \otimes T)^{\otimes n}[\Phi^+ \rangle \langle \Phi^+ |^{\otimes n}]$. In particular, $\rho_0^{(n)} \propto I +$ $2^n H$ and $\rho_1^{(n)} \propto I - 2^n H$. It is known from previous work that the Werner state $\rho_0^{(n)}$ is disentangled [16]. In fact, we can show [6] that it is possible to make $\rho_0^{(n)}$ $\boldsymbol{0}$ by first choosing a random element *U* of the Clifford group C_n [17] and then applying $U \otimes U$ on the state $\ket{0}^{\otimes n}$ \otimes $\ket{0}^{\otimes n}$, i.e., the hider applies the same rotation *U* on both *n*-qubit shares of the state. It can be shown that this procedure takes $O(n^2)$ one-qubit and two-qubit gates [17] and polynomial classical computation [6]. On the other hand, the Werner state $\rho_1^{(n)}$ is entangled; its entanglement of formation is known to be one ebit [18]. Using Eq. (6) for $\rho_1^{(n)}$ and the fact that $\rho_0^{(n)}$ is disentangled, we show explicitly how the hider can recursively create $\rho_1^{(n)}$ using just one singlet: (i) The hider flips a coin with bias p_n for 0, and bias $1 - p_n$ for 1. (ii) If the outcome is 0, then the hider prepares a tensor product of $\rho_0^{(n-1)}$ and one singlet $|\Psi^{-}\rangle \langle \Psi^{-}|$. This costs one ebit, since $\rho_0^{(n-1)}$ is disentangled. If the outcome is 1, then she prepares $\rho_1^{(n-1)}$ $\otimes \rho_0^{(1)}$. Here $\rho_0^{(1)}$ again requires no entanglement, and $\rho_1^{(n-1)}$ can similarly be prepared by the process just described.

Finally, we note that the obvious extension of the protocol presented here permits the sharing of an arbitrary number of bits. The hider simply encodes every bit in a different block of Bell states as discussed above. The security analysis is more involved, since it cannot be excluded that joint measurements on all tensor product components provide more information than a measurement on each component separately. By exploiting the symmetry of the hiding states as expressed by their representation as Werner states, we are able to bound the mutual information $I(\mathbf{B}:M) = I(B_1B_2,\ldots,B_k:M) \leq \epsilon$, where *M* is now any multistate random variable obtained from a measurement scheme on the *k* encoded bits, provided that *n*, the number of Bell states in each block encoding *Bi*, scales as $n(k) \rightarrow 2k + \log k + \log \log e + \log 1/\epsilon$ in the large *k* limit. This result has been derived [6] for the case of equal prior probabilities $1/2^k$ for all *k*-bit strings.

In conclusion, we have shown how to share bits in a pair of quantum states such that an Alice and a Bob who do not share quantum entanglement and cannot communicate quantum data can learn arbitrarily little information about the bits, whereas Alice and Bob can obtain the bits reliably if they are given these resources.

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