

## Quantum Key Distribution in the Holevo Limit

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A theorem by Shannon and the Holevo theorem impose that the efficiency of any protocol for quantum key distribution,  $\mathcal{E}$ , defined as the number of secret (i.e., allowing eavesdropping detection) bits per transmitted bit plus qubit, is  $\mathcal{E} \leq 1$ . The problem addressed here is whether the limit  $\mathcal{E} = 1$  can be achieved. It is showed that it can be done by splitting the secret bits between several qubits and forcing Eve to have only a sequential access to the qubits, as proposed by Goldenberg and Vaidman. A protocol with  $\mathcal{E} = 1$  based on polarized photons and in which Bob's state discrimination can be implemented with linear optical elements is presented.

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In information theory one of the most fundamental questions is how efficiently can one transmit information by means of a given set of resources. If this information is classical (i.e., it can be expressed as a sequence of zeros and ones, or "bits") a crucial theorem of classical information theory states that if a (classical) communication channel has mutual information  $I(X:Y)$  between the input signal  $X$  and the received output  $Y$ , then that channel can be used to send up to, but no more than,  $I(X:Y)$  bits [1]. The mutual information is defined as

$$I(X:Y) = H(X) - H(X|Y), \quad (1)$$

where  $H$  is the Shannon entropy, which is a function of the probabilities  $p(x_i)$  of the possible values of  $X$ , and is given by  $H(X) = -\sum_i p(x_i) \log_2 p(x_i)$ , where the sum is over those  $i$  with  $p(x_i) > 0$ .  $H(X|Y)$  is the expected entropy of  $X$  once one knows the value of  $Y$ , and is given by

$$H(X|Y) = \sum_j p(y_j) \left[ -\sum_i p(x_i|y_j) \log_2 p(x_i|y_j) \right]. \quad (2)$$

A simple application of the above theorem reveals that using a classical two-level system as a communication channel (i.e., if the input signal  $X$  can take only two values  $x_0$  and  $x_1$ ) one is allowed to send up to, but no more than, one bit [and this occurs if  $p(x_0) = p(x_1) = 0.5$ ].

On the other hand, suppose one wishes to convey classical information using a quantum system as a communication channel. The sender (Alice hereafter) prepares the system in one of various quantum states  $\rho_i$  with *a priori* probabilities  $p_i$ , so the input signal is represented by the density matrix  $\rho = \sum_i p_i \rho_i$ . The intended receiver (Bob hereafter) makes a measurement on the quantum system, and from its result he tries to infer which state Alice prepared. A theorem stated by Gordon [2] and Levitin [3], and first proved by Holevo [4], asserts that if Bob is restricted to making separate measurements on the received states, then the average information gain is *bounded* by

$$I(A:B) \leq S(\rho) - \sum_i p_i S(\rho_i), \quad (3)$$

where  $S$  is the von Neumann entropy, given by  $S(\rho) = -\text{Tr}(\rho \log_2 \rho)$ . The equality in (3) holds if, and only if, all the transmitted states  $\rho_i$  commute. Thus the amount of information accessible to Bob is limited by the von Neumann entropy of the ensemble of transmitted states. The maximum von Neumann entropy of an ensemble of quantum states in a Hilbert space of  $n$  dimensions is  $n$ , and can be reached only if the "alphabet" defined by  $\rho$  is a mixture with identical probabilities of  $n$  mutually orthogonal pure quantum states (called "letter" states). Therefore, as a simple application of the Holevo theorem reveals, the maximum classical information accessible to Bob when Alice sends a two-level quantum system ("qubit") is one bit. This is what we will refer to as the *Holevo limit*. Achieving the Holevo limit requires noiseless quantum channels and perfect detectors; therefore we will assume so hereafter.

Either a classical or quantum  $n$ -level system can convey  $\log_2 n$  bits at the most. In this sense, quantum communication is as efficient as classical communication. However, there is a task that cannot be achieved by classical means: secure key distribution. Now suppose Alice wishes to convey a sequence of random classical bits to Bob while preventing that any third unauthorized party (Eve hereafter) acquires information without being detected. This problem, known as the *key distribution problem*, was first solved by Bennett and Brassard [5] using quantum mechanics. In recent years many different protocols for quantum key distribution (QKD) have been proposed [6–12]. Most of them share the following features: (i) They need two communication channels between Alice and Bob: a *classical channel* which is assumed to be public but which cannot be altered. Its tasks are to allow Alice and Bob to share a code and information to prevent some kinds of eavesdropping, to transmit the classical information required for each step of the protocol, and to check for possible eavesdropping. A *quantum channel* (usually an optical fiber or free space), which must be a transmission medium

that preserves the quantum signals (usually the phase or the polarization of photons) by isolating them from undesirable interactions with the environment. It is an “insecure” channel in the sense that Eve can manipulate the quantum signals. (ii) A sequence of  $m$  steps. A *step* is defined as the minimum part of the protocol after which one can compute the *expected number of secret bits received by Bob*,  $b_s$ . Each step consists of an interchange of a number  $q_t$  of qubits (using the quantum channel) and a number  $b_t$  of bits (using the classical channel) between Alice and Bob. (iii) A test for detecting eavesdropping. Alice and Bob can detect Eve’s intervention by publicly comparing (using the classical channel) a sufficiently large random subset of their sequences of bits, which they subsequently discard. If they find that the tested subset is identical, they can infer that the remaining untested subset is also identical and secret. Only when eavesdropping is not found, the transmission is assumed to be secure.

From the point of view of information theory, a natural definition of *efficiency of a QKD protocol*,  $\mathcal{E}$  is [13]

$$\mathcal{E} = \frac{b_s}{q_t + b_t}, \quad (4)$$

where  $b_s$ ,  $q_t$ , and  $b_t$  were described above. This definition omits the classical information required for establishing the code or preventing and detecting eavesdropping, because it is assumed to be a constant, negligible when compared with the number of transmitted secret bits,  $mb_s$ . The combination of classical information theory plus the Holevo theorem imposes an upper limit to the efficiency of any transmission of classical information (secret or not) between Alice and Bob. In particular, they imply that the efficiency of any QKD protocol is  $\mathcal{E} \leq 1$ . The problem addressed in this paper is whether the limit  $\mathcal{E} = 1$  can be achieved. Or, more generally, how efficiently random classical information can be distributed between Alice and Bob (who initially share no information), while preventing Eve from acquiring information without being detected. As a close inspection of some of the most representative QKD protocols reveals, so far none of them reaches the limit  $\mathcal{E} = 1$  (see Table I) [14]. A QKD protocol with  $\mathcal{E} = 1$  requires that Bob can identify with certainty  $n$  different states, where  $n$  is the dimensionality of the Hilbert space of the quantum channel,  $\mathcal{H}_n$ . Bob can only distinguish  $n$  states with certainty if all of them are mutually orthogonal. Since there are no  $n$  mutually orthogonal mixed states in  $\mathcal{H}_n$ , then the letter states will be necessarily an *orthogonal basis of pure states*. If the quantum channel is a *single* quantum  $n$ -level system, the requirements  $b_t = 0$  and  $b_s = q_t = \log_2 n$  are impossible to achieve, because then Eve could use the cloning process [15,16] to find out the state sent by Alice without being detected. This problem can be avoided if the quantum channel is a *composed* quantum system. Then, as was first discovered by Goldenberg and Vaidman [9], the secret information can be split between the subsystems, so

TABLE I. Efficiency  $\mathcal{E}$  of different QKD protocols. In Goldenberg and Vaidman’s protocol,  $b_t$  contains the sending time of the qubits. In Ekert’s protocol the values refer to a more efficient version, suggested by Ekert to the authors of Ref. [8], in which Alice tells Bob her choice before Bob’s measurement. Both in Goldenberg and Vaidman’s, and in Koashi and Imoto’s protocols,  $q_t$  is taken to be 2 because their quantum channel is a photonic state in *two* paths, which is a four-dimensional Hilbert space, although their letter states do not span the whole Hilbert space.

Scheme	$b_s$	$q_t$	$b_t$	$\mathcal{E}$
Bennett, 1992 [7]	<0.5	1	1	<0.25
Bennett and Brassard, 1984 [5]	0.5	1	1	0.25
Goldenberg and Vaidman, 1995 [9]	1	2	$\geq 1$	$\leq 0.33$
Ekert, 1991 [6,8]	1	1	1	0.5
Koashi and Imoto, 1997 [10]	1	2	0	0.5
Cabello, 2000 [12]	2	2	1	0.67

that if Eve has no access to all the parts at the same time, she cannot recover the information without being detected. Goldenberg and Vaidman’s protocol was extended and improved by Koashi and Imoto [10].

In this Letter we will present a protocol  $\mathcal{E} = 1$  based on [9,10] and on the idea of using a larger alphabet that saturates the capacity of the quantum channel. Suppose that the quantum channel is composed of two qubits (1 and 2) prepared with equal probabilities in one of four orthogonal pure states  $\{|\psi_i\rangle\}$ , and that Eve cannot access qubit 2 while she still holds qubit 1. To obtain this “sequential” access for Eve, we can use the configuration in Fig. 1 [9,10]: there are two paths between Alice and Bob, one for qubit 1 and the other for qubit 2, and both have the same length  $L$ . Alice sends out the two qubits at the same time. Qubit 1 flies to Bob while qubit 2 is still in a storage ring (protected against Eve’s intervention) of length  $l > L/2$ . The aim of this storage ring is to delay qubit 2 until qubit 1 has reached the protected part of the channel near Bob. In that protected part there is another storage ring of length  $l$ , so both qubits arrive at the same time to Bob’s analyzer. To guarantee that Eve has a true sequential access to the two qubits, Alice and Bob (using the classical channel) must know when qubit 1 of the first pair will arrive to Bob and which will be the delay between pairs [10].

Any QKD protocol must fulfill the fact that Eve cannot learn the bits without disturbing the system in a detectable way. In addition, for practical purposes, it would be




FIG. 1. Scheme to force that Eve has only a sequential access to the two qubits.

interesting if Bob could easily read the letter states. In our protocol, the choice of letter states will be strongly limited by these requirements. Let us denote as  $pnm$  those orthogonal basis of letter states composed of  $p$  product states,  $n$  nonmaximally entangled states, and  $m$  maximally entangled states. It can be easily seen that the letter states cannot be a 400 basis, because then Eve can learn at least one bit without being detected. For instance, if the basis was  $\{|00\rangle, |10\rangle, |+1\rangle, |-1\rangle\}$ , then Eve can learn one bit just by performing a local measurement on the second qubit and allowing the first one to pass by. In addition, the letter states cannot be a 004 basis, because then Eve can learn the two bits without being detected just by preparing a pair of ancillary qubits (3 and 4) in a maximally entangled state, replacing qubit 1 with qubit 3, reading the state of the combined system 1,2 after receiving qubit 2, and finally changing the maximally entangled state of the combined system 3,4 by a simple unitary transformation on particle 4. Other possible strategies for eavesdropping in the context of sequential access, like broadcasting [17], have been investigated by Mor [18]. Mor's requirement to avoid eavesdropping (reduced density matrices of the first subsystem must be nonorthogonal and nonidentical, and reduced density matrices of the second subsystem must be nonorthogonal [18]) applies to the case when *two* (pure or mixed) letter states are used. As can be easily checked, Mor's condition is satisfied by at least two pairs of states if one uses an orthogonal basis of four pure states different than 400 and 004. This means that Eve must use at least two different strategies to obtain information of the key. If for a particular state she uses the wrong strategy, Alice and Bob will have a high probability to detect Eve. Therefore, we conclude that an orthogonal basis of a type different than 400 or 004 can be used as letter states in a QKD protocol with sequential access. However, these bases present different advantages and disadvantages. On one side, it will be interesting to use the higher dimension of the quantum channel to improve the probability of detecting Eve from those protocols using lower dimensional quantum channels or smaller alphabets. For instance, in a protocol based on two letters with the same probability as [5], for each bit tested by Alice and Bob, the probability of that test revealing Eve (given that she is present) is  $\frac{1}{4}$ . Thus, if  $N$  bits are tested, the probability of detecting Eve is  $1 - (\frac{3}{4})^N$ . However, in a protocol using two qubits as a quantum channel, if Alice and Bob compare a *pair* of bits generated in the same step, the probability for that test to reveal Eve can be  $\frac{3}{4}$ . Thus if  $n$  pairs ( $N = 2n$  bits) are tested, the probability of Eve's detection is  $1 - (\frac{1}{2})^N$ . However, this improvement is possible only if Eve cannot use the same strategy to (try to) read two of the four states. This scenario can be achieved with bases such as 121, 130, or 040. However, using these bases has a bigger (from an experimental point of view) disadvantage: as the analysis of some particular cases suggests, if the qubits are polarized photons, then Bob cannot discriminate with 100%

success a basis such as 121, 130, or 040, using an analyzer with only linear elements (such as beam splitters, phase shifters, etc.) [19]. A general proof of this statement for any kind of basis is still an open problem. Such proof exists for the 004 bases [20,21]. However, bases such as 202 or 220, although they do not improve the probability of Eve detection, can be used for QKD in the Holevo limit, and allow Bob to completely discriminate between the four states *without* requiring conditional logical gates, like CNOT gates between the two qubits, or even electronics to control conditional measurements on the second qubit depending on the result of the measurement on the first qubit. I will present an example of a QKD protocol in the Holevo limit of this last case. Consider the following 202 basis:

$$|\psi_0\rangle = |HH\rangle, \quad (5)$$

$$|\psi_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|HV\rangle + |VH\rangle), \quad (6)$$

$$|\psi_2\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|HV\rangle - |VH\rangle), \quad (7)$$

$$|\psi_3\rangle = |VV\rangle, \quad (8)$$

where  $|H\rangle_i$  means photon  $i$  linearly polarized along a horizontal axis, and  $|V\rangle_i$  means photon  $i$  linearly polarized along a vertical axis, and symmetrization is not written explicitly [for instance,  $|HV\rangle$  means  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_1|V\rangle_2 + |V\rangle_1|H\rangle_2)$ ]. Alice prepares one of the four states (5)–(8) and sends them out to Bob using a setup to guarantee Eve's sequential access (Fig. 1). The two qubits arrive at Bob's state analyzer at the same time. In the case of the four photon polarization states (5)–(8), Bob's analyzer to discriminate with 100% (theoretical) success between the four states can be realized in a laboratory using a 50/50 beam splitter, followed by two polarization beam splitters (which transmit horizontal polarized photons and reflect vertical polarized photons), and four detectors [22,23]; see Fig. 2. After the polarization beam splitters, as a simple calculation (up to irrelevant phases) reveals, the four states (5)–(8) have evolved into

$$|\psi_0\rangle \rightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|D_1D_1\rangle - |D_3D_3\rangle), \quad (9)$$

$$|\psi_1\rangle \rightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|D_1D_2\rangle - |D_3D_4\rangle), \quad (10)$$

$$|\psi_2\rangle \rightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|D_2D_3\rangle - |D_1D_4\rangle), \quad (11)$$

$$|\psi_3\rangle \rightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|D_2D_2\rangle - |D_4D_4\rangle), \quad (12)$$

where  $|D_iD_j\rangle$  means one photon in detector  $D_i$  and the other photon in detector  $D_j$ , again symmetrization is not written explicitly [for instance,  $|D_1D_2\rangle$  means  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|D_1\rangle_1|D_2\rangle_2 + |D_2\rangle_1|D_1\rangle_2)$ ]. Thus, a single click on detectors  $D_1$  or  $D_3$  ( $D_2$  or  $D_4$ ) signifies detection of  $|\psi_0\rangle$  ( $|\psi_3\rangle$ ), while two clicks, one on  $D_1$  and the other on  $D_2$ , or one on  $D_3$  and the other on  $D_4$  (one on  $D_2$  and the




FIG. 2. Scheme of Bob's analyzer to discriminate unambiguously between the four states (5)–(8).

other on  $D_3$ , or one on  $D_1$  and other on  $D_4$ ) signifies detection of  $|\psi_1\rangle$  ( $|\psi_2\rangle$ ).

Long storage rings have a low efficiency for the transmission of polarized photons, so other methods to achieve sequential access must be developed in order to perform QKD in the Holevo limit for long distances. For instance, Weinfurter has suggested [24] using momentum-time entangled photons and a Franson-type device [25]. On the other hand, QKD protocols with  $\mathcal{E} = 1$  can be extended to quantum channels composed of  $n \geq 2$  subsystems with  $m \geq 2$  levels, supposing Eve has only a sequential access to the subsystems. If  $nm \geq 6$  Alice could use even a basis with only product states [26], although then Bob would need some quantum interaction between the subsystems in order to achieve a complete discrimination of the letter states [27].

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