

Resilience of the Internet to Random Breakdowns

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A common property of many large networks, including the Internet, is that the connectivity of the various nodes follows a scale-free power-law distribution, $P(k) = ck^{-\alpha}$. We study the stability of such networks with respect to crashes, such as random removal of sites. Our approach, based on percolation theory, leads to a general condition for the critical fraction of nodes, p_c , that needs to be removed before the network disintegrates. We show analytically and numerically that for $\alpha \leq 3$ the transition never takes place, unless the network is finite. In the special case of the physical structure of the Internet ($\alpha \approx 2.5$), we find that it is impressively robust, with $p_c > 0.99$.

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Recently there has been increasing interest in the formation of random networks and in the connectivity of these networks, especially in the context of the Internet [1–9]. When such networks are subject to random breakdowns—a fraction p of the nodes and their connections are removed randomly—their integrity might be compromised: when p exceeds a certain threshold, $p > p_c$, the network disintegrates into smaller, disconnected parts. Below that critical threshold, there still exists a connected cluster that spans the entire system (its size is proportional to that of the entire system). Random breakdown in networks can be seen as a case of infinite-dimensional percolation. Two cases that have been solved exactly are Cayley trees [10] and Erdős-Rényi (ER) random graphs [11], where the networks collapse at known thresholds p_c . Percolation on small-world networks (i.e., networks where every node is connected to its neighbors, plus some random long-range connections [12]) has also been studied by Moore and Newman [13]. Albert *et al.* have raised the question of random failures and intentional attack on networks [1]. Here we consider random breakdown in the Internet (and similar networks) and introduce an analytical approach to finding the critical point. The site connectivity of the physical structure of the Internet, where each communication node is considered as a site, is power law, to a good approximation [14]. We introduce a new general criterion for the percolation critical threshold of randomly connected networks. Using this criterion, we show analytically that the Internet undergoes no transition under random breakdown of its nodes. In other words, a connected cluster of sites that spans the Internet survives even for arbitrarily large fractions of crashed sites.

We consider networks whose nodes are connected randomly to each other, so that the probability for any two nodes to be connected depends solely on their respective connectivity (the number of connections emanating from a node). We argue that, for randomly connected networks with connectivity distribution $P(k)$, the critical breakdown threshold may be found by the following criterion: if loops

of connected nodes may be neglected, the percolation transition takes place when a node (i), connected to a node (j) in the spanning cluster, is also connected to at least one other node—otherwise the spanning cluster is fragmented. This may be written as

$$\langle k_i | i \leftrightarrow j \rangle = \sum_{k_i} k_i P(k_i | i \leftrightarrow j) = 2, \quad (1)$$

where the angular brackets denote an ensemble average, k_i is the connectivity of node i , and $P(k_i | i \leftrightarrow j)$ is the conditional probability that node i has connectivity k_i , given that it is connected to node j . But, by Bayes rule for conditional probabilities $P(k_i | i \leftrightarrow j) = P(k_i, i \leftrightarrow j) / P(i \leftrightarrow j) = P(i \leftrightarrow j | k_i) P(k_i) / P(i \leftrightarrow j)$, where $P(k_i, i \leftrightarrow j)$ is the *joint* probability that node i has connectivity k_i and that it is connected to node j . For randomly connected networks (neglecting loops) $P(i \leftrightarrow j) = \langle k \rangle / (N - 1)$ and $P(i \leftrightarrow j | k_i) = k_i / (N - 1)$, where N is the total number of nodes in the network. It follows that the criterion (1) is equivalent to

$$\kappa \equiv \frac{\langle k^2 \rangle}{\langle k \rangle} = 2, \quad (2)$$

at criticality.

Loops can be ignored below the percolation transition, $\kappa < 2$, because the probability of a bond to form a loop in an s -nodes cluster is proportional to $(s/N)^2$ (i.e., proportional to the probability of choosing two sites in that cluster). The fraction of loops in the system P_{loop} is

$$P_{\text{loop}} \propto \sum_i \frac{s_i^2}{N^2} < \sum_i \frac{s_i S}{N^2} = \frac{S}{N}, \quad (3)$$

where the sum is taken over all clusters, and s_i is the size of the i th cluster. Thus, the overall fraction of loops in the system is smaller than S/N , where S is the size of the largest existing cluster. Below criticality S is smaller than order N (for ER graphs S is of order $\ln N$ [11]), so the fraction of loops becomes negligible in the limit of $N \rightarrow \infty$. Similar arguments apply at criticality.

Consider now a random breakdown of a fraction p of the nodes. This would generically alter the connectivity distribution of a node. Consider, indeed, a node with initial connectivity k_0 , chosen from an initial distribution $P(k_0)$. After the random breakdown the distribution of the new connectivity of the node becomes $\binom{k_0}{k} (1-p)^k p^{k_0-k}$, and the new distribution is

$$P'(k) = \sum_{k_0=k}^{\infty} P(k_0) \binom{k_0}{k} (1-p)^k p^{k_0-k}. \quad (4)$$

(Quantities after the breakdown are denoted by a prime.) Using this new distribution, one obtains $\langle k' \rangle = \langle k_0 \rangle \times (1-p)$ and $\langle k'^2 \rangle = \langle k_0^2 \rangle (1-p)^2 + \langle k_0 \rangle p (1-p)$, so the criterion (2) for criticality may be reexpressed as

$$\frac{\langle k_0^2 \rangle}{\langle k_0 \rangle} (1-p_c) + p_c = 2 \quad (5)$$

or

$$1-p_c = \frac{1}{\kappa_0 - 1}, \quad (6)$$

where $\kappa_0 = \langle k_0^2 \rangle / \langle k_0 \rangle$ is computed from the original distribution, before the random breakdown.

Our discussion up to this point is general and applicable to all randomly connected networks, regardless of the specific form of the connectivity distribution (and provided that loops may be neglected). For example, for random (ER) networks, which possess a Poisson connectivity distribution, the criterion (2) reduces to a known result [11] that the transition takes place at $\langle k \rangle = 1$. In this case, random breakdown does not alter the Poisson character of the distribution, but merely shifts its mean. Thus, the new system is again an ER network, but with new *effective* parameters: $k_{\text{eff}} = k(1-p)$, $N_{\text{eff}} = N(1-p)$. In the case of Cayley trees, the criteria (2) and (6) also yield the known exact results [10].

The case of the Internet is thought to be different. It is widely believed that, to a good approximation, the connectivity distribution of the Internet nodes follows a power law [14]:

$$P(k) = ck^{-\alpha}, \quad k = m, m+1, \dots, K, \quad (7)$$

where $\alpha \approx 5/2$, c is an appropriate normalization constant, and m is the smallest possible connectivity. In a finite network, the largest connectivity, K , can be estimated from

$$\int_K^{\infty} P(k) dk = \frac{1}{N}, \quad (8)$$

yielding $K \approx mN^{1/(\alpha-1)}$. (For the Internet, $m = 1$ and $K \approx N^{2/3}$.) For the sake of generality, below we consider a range of variables, $\alpha \geq 1$ and $1 \leq m \ll K$. The key parameter, according to (6), is the ratio of second to first moment, κ_0 , which we compute by approximating the distribution (7) to a continuum (this approximation becomes exact for $1 \ll m \ll K$, and it preserves the essential fea-

tures of the transition even for small m):

$$\kappa_0 = \left(\frac{2-\alpha}{3-\alpha} \right) \frac{K^{3-\alpha} - m^{3-\alpha}}{K^{2-\alpha} - m^{2-\alpha}}. \quad (9)$$

When $K \gg m$, this may be approximated as

$$\kappa_0 \rightarrow \left| \frac{2-\alpha}{3-\alpha} \right| \times \begin{cases} m, & \text{if } \alpha > 3; \\ m^{\alpha-2} K^{3-\alpha}, & \text{if } 2 < \alpha < 3; \\ K, & \text{if } 1 < \alpha < 2. \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

We see that for $\alpha > 3$ the ratio κ_0 is finite and there is a percolation transition at $1-p_c = (\frac{\alpha-2}{\alpha-3}m - 1)^{-1}$: for $p > p_c$ the spanning cluster is fragmented and the network is destroyed. However, for $\alpha < 3$ the ratio κ_0 diverges with K and so $p_c \rightarrow 1$ when $K \rightarrow \infty$ (or $N \rightarrow \infty$). The percolation transition does not take place: a spanning cluster exists for arbitrarily large fractions of breakdown, $p < 1$. In *finite* systems a transition is always observed, though for $\alpha < 3$ the transition threshold is exceedingly high. For the case of the Internet ($\alpha \approx 5/2$), we have $\kappa_0 \approx K^{1/2} \approx N^{1/3}$. Considering the enormous size of the Internet, $N > 10^6$, one needs to destroy over 99% of the nodes before the spanning cluster collapses.

The transition is illustrated by the computer simulation results shown in Fig. 1, where we plot the fraction of nodes which remain in the spanning cluster, $P_{\infty}(p)/P_{\infty}(0)$, as a function of the fraction of random breakdown, p , for networks with the distribution (7). For $\alpha = 3.5$, the transition is clearly visible: beyond $p_c \approx 0.5$ the spanning




FIG. 1. Percolation transition for networks with power-law connectivity distribution. Plotted is the fraction of nodes that remain in the spanning cluster after breakdown of a fraction p of all nodes, $P_{\infty}(p)/P_{\infty}(0)$, as a function of p , for $\alpha = 3.5$ (crosses) and $\alpha = 2.5$ (other symbols), as obtained from computer simulations of up to $N = 10^6$. In the former case, it can be seen that for $p > p_c \approx 0.5$ the spanning cluster disintegrates and the network becomes fragmented. However, for $\alpha = 2.5$ (the case of the Internet), the spanning cluster persists up to nearly 100% breakdown. The different curves for $K = 25$ (circles), 100 (squares), and 400 (triangles) illustrate the finite size effect: the transition exists only for finite networks, while the critical threshold p_c approaches 100% as the networks grow in size.

cluster collapses and $P_\infty(p)/P_\infty(0)$ is nearly zero. On the other hand, the plots for $\alpha = 2.5$ (the case of the Internet) show that although the spanning cluster is diluted as p increases [$P_\infty(p)/P_\infty(0)$ becomes smaller], it remains connected even at near 100% breakdown. Data for several system sizes illustrate the finite-size effect: the transition occurs at higher values of p the larger the simulated network. The Internet size is comparable to our largest simulation, making it remarkably resilient to random breakdown.

We have introduced a general criterion for the collapse of randomly connected networks under random removal of their nodes. This criterion, when applied to the Internet, shows that the Internet is resilient to random breakdown of its nodes: a cluster of interconnected sites which spans the whole Internet becomes more dilute with increasing breakdowns, but it remains essentially connected even for nearly 100% breakdown. The same is true for other networks whose connectivity distribution is approximately described by a power law, as in Eq. (7), as long as $\alpha < 3$.

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Note added.—After completing this manuscript we learned that Eqs. (1) and (2) have been derived earlier using a different approach by Molloy and Reed [15]. We thank Dr. Mark E. J. Newman for bringing this reference to our attention.

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