

Practical Free-Space Quantum Key Distribution over 1 km

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A working free-space quantum key distribution system has been developed and tested over an outdoor optical path of ~ 1 km at Los Alamos National Laboratory under nighttime conditions. Results show that free-space quantum key distribution can provide secure real-time key distribution between parties who have a need to communicate secretly. Finally, we examine the feasibility of surface to satellite quantum key distribution. [S0031-9007(98)07299-8]

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Quantum cryptography was introduced in the mid-1980s [1] as a new method for generating the shared, secret random number sequences, known as cryptographic keys, that are used in cryptosystems to provide communications security. The appeal of quantum cryptography is that its security is based on laws of Nature, in contrast to existing methods of key distribution that derive their security from the perceived intractability of certain problems in number theory, or from the physical security of the distribution process.

Since the introduction of quantum cryptography, several groups have demonstrated quantum communications [2,3] and key distribution [4–9] over multikilometer distances of optical fiber. Free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) (over an optical path of 32 cm) was first introduced in 1991 [10], and recent advances have led to demonstrations of QKD over free-space indoor optical paths of 205 m [11] and outdoor optical paths of 75 m [12]. These demonstrations increase the utility of QKD by extending it to line-of-site laser communications systems. Indeed there are certain key distribution problems in this category for which free-space QKD would have definite practical advantages (for example, it is impractical to send a courier to a satellite). We are developing such QKD, and here we report our results of free-space QKD over outdoor optical paths of up to 950 m under nighttime conditions.

The success of QKD over free-space optical paths depends on the transmission and detection of single photons against a high background through a turbulent medium. Although this problem is difficult, a combination of subnanosecond timing, narrow filters [13,14], spatial filtering [11], and adaptive optics [15] can render the transmission and detection problems tractable. Furthermore, the essentially nonbirefringent nature of the atmosphere at optical wavelengths allows the faithful transmission of the single-photon polarization states used in the free-space QKD protocol.

A QKD procedure starts with the sender, “Alice,” generating a secret random binary number sequence. For each bit in the sequence, Alice prepares and transmits a single photon to the recipient, “Bob,” who measures each arriv-

ing photon and attempts to identify the bit value Alice has transmitted. Alice’s photon state preparations and Bob’s measurements are chosen from sets of nonorthogonal possibilities. For example, using the B92 protocol [16] Alice agrees with Bob (through public discussion) that she will transmit a horizontal-polarized photon, $|h\rangle$, for each “0” in her sequence, and a right-circular-polarized photon, $|r\rangle$, for each “1” in her sequence. Bob agrees with Alice to randomly test the polarization of each arriving photon with vertical polarization, $|v\rangle$, to reveal “1’s,” or left-circular polarization, $|\ell\rangle$, to reveal “0’s.” In this scheme Bob will never detect a photon for which he and Alice have used a preparation/measurement pair that corresponds to different bit values, such as $|h\rangle$ and $|v\rangle$, which happens for 50% of the bits in Alice’s sequence. However, for the other 50% of Alice’s bits the preparation and measurement protocols use nonorthogonal bases, such as for $|h\rangle$ and $|\ell\rangle$, resulting in a 50% detection probability for Bob. Thus, by detecting single photons Bob identifies a random 25% portion of the bits in Alice’s random bit sequence, assuming a single-photon Fock state with no bit loss in transmission or detection. This 25% efficiency factor, η_Q , is the price that Alice and Bob must pay for secrecy.

Bob and Alice reconcile their common bits through a public discussion by revealing the locations, but not the bit values, in the sequence where Bob detected photons; Alice retains only those detected bits from her initial sequence. The resulting detected bit sequences comprise the raw key material from which a pure key is distilled using classical error detection techniques. The single-photon nature of the transmissions ensures that an eavesdropper, “Eve,” can neither “tap” the key transmissions with a beam splitter (BS), owing to the indivisibility of a photon [17], nor copy them, owing to the quantum “no-cloning” theorem [18]. Furthermore, the nonorthogonal nature of the quantum states ensures that if Eve makes her own measurements she will be detected through the elevated error rate she causes by the irreversible “collapse of the wave function” [19].

The QKD transmitter in our experiment (Fig. 1) consisted of a temperature-controlled single-mode fiber-pigtailed diode laser, a fiber to free-space launch system,




FIG. 1. Free-space QKD transmitter (Alice).

a 2.5-nm bandwidth interference filter (IF), a variable optical attenuator, a polarizing beam splitter (PBS), a low-voltage Pockels cell, and a 27 \times beam expander. The diode laser wavelength is temperature adjusted to 772 nm, and the laser is configured to emit a short pulse of approximately 1-ns length, containing $\sim 10^5$ photons.

A computer control system (Alice) starts the QKD protocol by pulsing the diode laser at a rate previously agreed upon between herself and the receiving computer control system (Bob). Each laser pulse is launched into free space through the IF, and the ~ 1 -ns optical pulse is then attenuated to an average of less than one photon per pulse, based on the assumption of a statistical Poisson distribution. (The attenuated pulse only approximates a “single-photon” state; we tested out the system with averages down to $\lesssim 0.1$ photons per pulse. This corresponds to a 2-photon probability of $< 0.5\%$ and implies that less than 6 of every 100 detectable pulses will contain two or more photons.) The photons that are transmitted by the optical attenuator are then polarized by the PBS, which transmits an average of less than one $|h\rangle$ photon to the Pockels cell. The Pockels cell is randomly switched to either pass the light unchanged as $|h\rangle$ (zero-wave retardation) or change it to $|r\rangle$ (quarter-wave retardation). The random switch setting is determined by discriminating the voltage generated by a white noise source.

The QKD receiver (Fig. 2) was comprised of a 8.9 cm Cassegrain telescope followed by the receiver optics and detectors. The receiver optics consisted of a 50/50 BS that randomly directs collected photons onto either of two distinct optical paths. The lower optical path contained a polarization controller (a quarter-wave retarder and a half-wave retarder) followed by a PBS to test collected photons for $|h\rangle$; the upper optical path contained a half-wave retarder followed by a PBS to test for $|r\rangle$. One output port along each optical path was coupled by multimode (MM) fiber to a single-photon counting module (SPCM: EG&G part number SPCM-AQ 142-FL). [Although the receiver did not include IFs, the spatial filtering provided by the MM fibers effectively reduced noise caused by the ambient background during nighttime operations (~ 1.1 kHz) to negligible levels.]

A single $|r\rangle$ photon traveling along the lower path encounters the polarization controller and is converted to $|\nu\rangle$ and reflected away from the SPCM. Conversely, a




FIG. 2. Free-space QKD receiver (Bob).

single $|h\rangle$ photon traveling the same path is converted to $|r\rangle$ and transmitted toward or reflected away from the SPCM in this path with equal probability. Similarly, a single $|h\rangle$ photon traveling the upper path is converted to $|\nu\rangle$ and reflected away from the SPCM in this path, but a single $|r\rangle$ photon traveling this path is converted to $|\ell\rangle$ and transmitted toward or reflected away from the SPCM with equal probability.

The transmitter and receiver optics were operated over 240-, 500-, and 950-m outdoor optical paths under nighttime conditions, with the transmitter and receiver collocated in order to simplify data acquisition. All optical paths were achieved by reflecting the emitted beam from a 25.4-cm mirror positioned at the halfway point of the transmission distance.

The optical coupling efficiency between the transmitter and receiver for the 950-m path was $\eta \sim 14\%$, which accounts for losses between the transmitter and the MM fibers at the receiver. Bob’s detection probability,

$$P_B = e^{-\bar{n}} \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{\bar{n}^n}{n!} [1 - y^n] = 1 - e^{-\bar{n}\eta_B}, \quad (1)$$

is the convolution of the Poisson probability distribution of photons in Alice’s transmitted weak pulse with average photon number \bar{n} , and the probability that Bob detects at least one photon. Here, $y = (1 - \eta_B)$, where $\eta_B = \eta \times \eta_D \times \eta_Q$, and $\eta_D = 65\%$ is Bob’s detector efficiency. When the transmitter was pulsed at a rate of 20 kHz with an average of 0.1 photons per pulse for the 950-m path, Eq. (1) gives $\bar{n} \times \eta_B = 0.1 \times (0.14 \times 0.25 \times 0.65) \sim 2.3 \times 10^{-3}$, and hence a bit rate in agreement with the experimental result of ~ 50 Hz.

The bit error rate (BER, defined as the ratio of the bits received in error to the total number of bits received) for the 950-m path was $\sim 1.5\%$ when the system was operating down to the $\lesssim 0.1$ photons per pulse level. (A BER of $\sim 0.7\%$ was observed over the 240-m optical path and a BER of $\sim 1.5\%$ was also observed over the 500-m optical path.) A sample of raw key material from the 950-m experiment, with errors, is shown in Table I.

Bit errors caused by the ambient background were minimized to less than ~ 1 every 9 s by narrow gated coincidence timing windows (~ 5 ns) and spatial filtering.

TABLE I. A 100-bit sample of Alice's (a) and Bob's (b) raw key material generated by free-space QKD over 1 km.

a	10010010100010000011000001011100001111111111000000
b	1001001010001000001100000101110000111111111101000000
a	1010101101111110011111011110101001101001011101111
b	10101011011111100011111011110101001101001011101111

Further, because detector dark noise (~ 80 Hz) contributed only about one dark count every 125 s, we believe that the observed BER was mostly caused by misalignment and imperfections in the optical elements (wave plates and Pockels cell).

This experiment implemented a two-dimensional parity check scheme that allowed the generation of error-free key material. A further stage of "privacy amplification" [20] is necessary to reduce any partial knowledge gained by an eavesdropper to less than 1 bit of information; we have not implemented such a privacy amplification protocol at this time. Our free-space QKD system does incorporate "one time pad" [21] encryption—also known as the Vernam Cipher: the only provably secure encryption method—and could also support any other symmetric key system.

The original form of the B92 protocol has a weakness to an opaque attack by Eve. For example, Eve could measure Alice's photons in Bob's basis and send only a dim photon pulse when she identifies a bit. However, if Eve retransmits each observed bit as a single photon she will noticeably lower Bob's bit rate. To compensate for the additional attenuation to Bob's bit rate, Eve could send on a dim photon pulse of an intensity appropriate to raise Bob's bit rate to a level similar to her own bit rate with Alice. [In fact, if Eve sends a bright classical pulse (a pulse of a large average photon number) she guarantees that Bob's bit rate is close to her own bit rate with Alice.] However, this type of attack would be revealed by our two SPCM system through an increase in "dual-fire" errors, which occur when both SPCMs fire simultaneously. In a perfect system dual-fire errors would not exist, regardless of the average photon number per pulse, but in a real experimental system, where bit errors occur, dual-fire errors will occur. (We have used the dual-fire information to estimate the average number of photons per pulse reaching the SPCMs.) Our system could also be modified to operate under the BB84 protocol [1] which also protects against an opaque attack.

Eve could also passively, or translucently, attack the system using a BS and a receiver identical to Bob's (perhaps of even higher efficiency) to identify some of the bits for which Alice's weak pulses contain more than one photon, i.e., Eve receives pulses reflected her way by the BS which has reflection probability R , whereas Bob receives the transmitted pulses, and the BS has transmission probability $T = 1 - R$. Introducing a coupling and detec-

tion efficiency factor η_E , for Eve, analogous to Bob's η_B , we find that Eve's photon detection probability is $P_E = 1 - e^{-\bar{n}\eta_E R}$, whereas Bob's detection probability becomes $P_B = 1 - e^{-\bar{n}\eta_B T}$. (Note: We do not explicitly consider any eavesdropping strategy, with or without guessing, in which Eve might use more than two detectors.)

The important quantity in a BS attack is the ratio of the number of bits Eve shares with Bob to the number of bits Bob and Alice share. We find that the probability that Eve and Bob will both observe a photon on the same pulse from Alice is [22,23]

$$P_{B\wedge E} = [1 - e^{-\bar{n}\eta_E R}][1 - e^{-\bar{n}\eta_B T}]. \quad (2)$$

To take an extreme case, if Eve's BS has $R = 0.9999$, her efficiency is perfect (i.e., $\eta_E = 0.25$), and Alice transmits pulses of $\bar{n} = 0.1$, then Eve's knowledge $P_{B\wedge E}/P_B$ of Bob and Alice's common key will never be more than 2.5%. Thus, Alice and Bob have an upper bound on the amount of privacy amplification needed to protect against a BS attack. Of course, such an attack would cause Bob's bit rate to drop to near zero; for smaller reflection coefficients, R , Eve's information on Bob and Alice's key is reduced. For example, if Alice transmits pulses of $\bar{n} = 0.1$, and $R = T = 0.5$, then for every 250 key bits Alice and Bob acquire, Eve will know ~ 3 bits.

As a final discussion, we consider the feasibility to transmit the quantum states required in QKD between a ground station and a satellite in a low-earth orbit. To that end, we designed our QKD system to operate at 772 nm where the atmospheric transmission from surface to space can be as high as 80%, and where single-photon detectors with efficiencies as high as 65% are commercially available; at these optical wavelengths atmospheric depolarizing effects are negligible, as is the amount of Faraday rotation experienced on a surface to satellite path.

To detect a single QKD photon it is necessary to know when it will arrive. The photon arrival time can be communicated to the receiver by using a bright precursor reference pulse. Received bright pulses allow the receiver to set a 1-ns time window within which to look for the QKD photon. This short time window reduces background photon counts dramatically, and the background can be further reduced by using narrow bandwidth filters.

Atmospheric turbulence impacts the rate at which QKD photons would arrive at a satellite from a ground station transmitter. Assuming 30-cm diameter optics at both the transmitter and satellite receiver, the diffraction-limited spot size would be ~ 1.2 -m diameter at a 300-km altitude satellite. However, turbulence induced beam wander can vary from ~ 2.5 – 10 arc sec leading to a photon collection efficiency at the satellite of 10^{-3} – 10^{-4} . Thus, with a laser pulse rate of 10 MHz, an average of one photon per pulse, and atmospheric transmission of $\sim 80\%$, photons would arrive at the collection optic at a rate of 800–10 000 Hz. Then, with a 65% detector efficiency, the

25% intrinsic efficiency of the B92 protocol, IFs with transmission efficiencies of $\sim 70\%$, and a MM fiber collection efficiency of $\sim 40\%$, we find a key generation rate of 35–450 Hz is feasible. With an adaptive beam tilt corrector the key rate could be increased by about a factor of 100 leading to a key rate of 3.5–45 kHz; these rates will double using the BB84 protocol.

Errors would arise from background photons collected at the satellite. The nighttime earth radiance observed at 300 km altitude at the transmission wavelength is $\sim 1 \text{ mW m}^{-2} \text{ str}^{-1} \mu\text{m}^{-1}$, or $\sim 4 \times 10^{16} \text{ photons s}^{-1} \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ str}^{-1} \mu\text{m}^{-1}$, during a full moon, dropping to $\sim 10^{15} \text{ photons s}^{-1} \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ str}^{-1} \mu\text{m}^{-1}$ during a new moon. Assuming a 5 arc sec receiver field of view, and 1-nm IFs preceding the detectors, a background rate of ~ 800 Hz (full moon), and ~ 20 Hz (new moon) would be observed (with a detector dark count rate of ~ 50 Hz, the error rate will be dominated by background photons during full moon periods, and by detector noise during a new moon). We infer a BER from background photons of $\sim 9 \times 10^{-5}$ – 10^{-3} (full moon), and $\sim 2 \times 10^{-6}$ – 3×10^{-5} (new moon).

During daytime orbits the background radiance would be much larger ($\sim 10^{22} \text{ photons s}^{-1} \text{ m}^{-2} \text{ str}^{-1} \mu\text{m}^{-1}$), leading to a BER of $\sim 2 \times 10^{-2}$ – 3×10^{-1} , if an atomic vapor filter [24] of $\sim 10^{-3}$ nm bandwidth was used instead of the IF. (Note: It would also be possible to place the transmitter on the satellite. In this situation, the beam wander is similar, but it is only over the lowest ~ 2 km of the atmosphere. In this situation, the bit rate would improve by ~ 150 , decreasing the BER by the same amount.)

Because the optical influence of turbulence is dominated by the lowest ~ 2 km of the atmosphere, our experimental results and this simple analysis show that QKD between a ground station and a low-earth orbit satellite should be possible on nighttime orbits and possibly even in full daylight. During the several minutes that a satellite would be in view of the ground station there would be adequate time to generate tens of thousands of raw key bits, from which a shorter error-free key stream of several thousand bits would be produced after error correction and privacy amplification.

This Letter demonstrates practical free-space QKD over 1 km through a turbulent medium under nighttime conditions. We have described a system that provides two parties a secure method to secretly communicate with a simple system based on the B92 protocol. We presented two attacks on this protocol and demonstrated the protocol's built-in protections against them. This system was operated at a variety of average photon numbers per pulse down to $\bar{n} \lesssim 0.1$. The results were achieved with low BERs, and the 240-m experiment

demonstrated that BERs of 0.7% or less are achievable with this system. From these results we believe that it will be feasible to use free-space QKD for rekeying satellites in low-earth orbit from a ground station.

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