

Comment on “Quantum Key Distribution with Classical Bob”

M. Boyer *et al.* [1] recently proposed an interesting quantum key distribution scheme (BKM07). It claimed that Bob does not need quantum capacity to ensure the protocol’s security. That is to say, a “classical” Bob can ensure the security of the key. This work is conceptually novel and interesting. However, in this Comment, we will show that classical Bob is not good enough for detecting a powerful Eve’s eavesdropping.

In BKM07, when Alice’s photons fly into Bob’s lab, Bob measures about half of the incoming photons to generate the key and reflects back the others. Among the registered photons on Bob’s detectors, Alice and Bob drop the results prepared on the X basis and keep the left as their raw key. Then Alice’s and Bob’s photons can be classified into two categories: the CTRL photons which are reflected back to Alice and the SIFT photons which are used to generate the key. If Eve has tagged all of Alice’s photons before they enter Bob’s realm, she can differentiate Bob’s SIFT photons from CTRL photons: Bob consumed all the SIFT photons during the course of his measurement, so he has to send fresh photons which are not tagged in the SIFT mode. Therefore, Eve can distinguish the SIFT photons from the CTRL photons in the return line, and she can thus obtain the information of the INFO bits by using the method in the *mock protocol* presented in [1].

In fact, Eve’s tag can be finished with practical technology. Suppose Eve has an optical wavelength converter which can provide a very small wavelength change to the aim photons [2]. In practice, the information may be encoded on the photon’s polarization. (If the phase encoding was used, Eve can select to tag the polarization of the travel photons.) Since the polarization is communicative with the wavelength, Eve’s operation does not affect the information encoded on the photons. A practical eavesdropping scheme can hence be depicted as the following. (1) Alice prepares a string of photons randomly in the X basis or in the Z basis. Let the wavelength of Alice’s photons be λ . (2) Eve performs a CNOT from the incoming photons into a $|0\rangle_{\text{blank}}$ ancilla before they enter the wavelength converter. The wavelength becomes $\lambda + \delta\lambda$ after the photons passed through Eve’s lab. Eve forwards the tagged photons to Bob. (3) Bob randomly operates the incoming photons in the CTRL mode or in the SIFT mode. In the former case, Bob just reflects Alice’s photons back to Alice. In the latter case, he measures the photons in the Z basis to read out the information, then he makes a copy of the information he obtained on a string of fresh photons and sends them to Alice. (4a) Eve operates a CNOT con-

versely on the tagged photons as that in step 2, which can reset her ancilla and erase the interaction on the initial photon prepared by Alice. (4b) If Bob’s photons are not tagged, Eve measures her ancilla on the Z basis to extract its information. It is the same as the information Bob read from Alice’s photons. (5) Alice and Bob declare which mode the photons are operated in. If the quantum bit error rate is below a tolerant threshold, they will use the information obtained from the Z -SIFT mode as their raw key. Or else, they discard the protocol.

In Eve’s eavesdropping, if $\delta\lambda$ is chosen appropriately, the tagged photons can register on Bob’s detectors correctly. With the above eavesdropping scheme, Eve may obtain all Alice’s and Bob’s information without being detected.

Thus we have showed the classical Bob is not good enough to discover a powerful Eve. Furthermore, the practical apparatuses of Alice and Bob cannot be the same. The photons prepared by Bob may have different characters with that of Alice’s and then a powerful Eve can distinguish Alice’s photons from that of Bob’s. In this case, Eve even does not need to tag Alice’s photon but Bob himself tags the travel photons.

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Yong-gang Tan*

Physics and Information Engineering College
Luoyang Normal College
Luoyang 471022, Henan, People’s Republic of China

Hua Lu

Department of Physics
Hubei University of Technology
Wuhan 430068, People’s Republic of China

Qing-yu Cai†

State Key Lab of Magnetics Resonance and Atom and Molecular Physics
Wuhan Institute of Physics and Mathematics
Wuhan 430071, People’s Republic of China

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*ygtan@lynu.edu.cn

†qyc@wipm.ac.cn

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