

## Experimental fault-tolerant quantum cryptography in a decoherence-free subspace

Qiang Zhang,<sup>1,2</sup> Juan Yin,<sup>1</sup> Teng-Yun Chen,<sup>1</sup> Shan Lu,<sup>1</sup> Jun Zhang,<sup>1</sup> Xiao-Qiang Li,<sup>1</sup> Tao Yang,<sup>1</sup>  
Xiang-Bin Wang,<sup>3</sup> and Jian-Wei Pan<sup>1,2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, People's Republic of China*

<sup>2</sup>*Physikalisches Institut, Universität Heidelberg, Philosophenweg 12, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany*

<sup>3</sup>*Imai Quantum Computation and Information Project, ERATO, JST, Daini Hongo White Building 201,5-28-3, Hongo, Bunkyo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan*

(Received 8 August 2005; published 8 February 2006)

We experimentally implement a fault-tolerant quantum key distribution protocol with two photons in a decoherence-free subspace [Phys. Rev. A 72, 050304(R) (2005)]. It is demonstrated that our protocol can yield a good key rate even with a large bit-flip error rate caused by collective rotation, while the usual realization of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol cannot produce any secure final key given the same channel. Since the experiment is performed in polarization space and does not need the calibration of a reference frame, important applications in free-space quantum communication are expected. Moreover, our method can also be used to robustly transmit an arbitrary two-level quantum state in a type of decoherence-free subspace.

DOI: [10.1103/PhysRevA.73.020301](https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.73.020301)

PACS number(s): 03.67.Pp, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk

Quantum key distribution (QKD) can help two remote parties accomplish unconditionally secure communications, which is an impossible task by any classical method [1]. The security of QKD is guaranteed by known principles of quantum mechanics [2–4] rather than the assumed computational complexity in classical secure communication. Since the first QKD protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84 protocol) [5], much work has been done in the field. In recent years, numerous modified protocols have been proposed and experimentally realized, e.g., the single-photon realizations in either phase coding or polarizations, the realizations with entangled photon pairs and so on [1].

While each protocol or physical realization may have its own advantage, there are still some limitations for QKD in practice. In certain cases, we have no way to use the optical fibers and the task has to be done in free space, for example, if we want to carry out secure communications between a fixed station on the earth and a moving object such as an airplane or satellite in space [6]. Photon polarization is a natural candidate for the QKD in free space, but the communicating parties must share a common reference frame for spatial orientation [7,8] so that they can prepare and measure the photon polarization in the same reference frame. Sometimes it could well be the case that the two parties have a relative instantaneous rotation; for example, during the quantum key distribution between a swinging airplane and the earth. Moreover, in some other cases the channel may also rotate the photon polarization. Consequently, the two parties will no more share the same reference frame from a passive perspective. These practical disadvantages could bring a significant error rate to the protocol if one uses the single-photon polarization as an information carrier, in some extreme cases no secure final key can be distilled.

One possible solution to the above problem is to utilize multiqubit entangled states in a decoherence-free subspace

(DFS) where all the states are immune to some kind rotation of reference frame. According to the informatics, the rotation of the reference system can be seen as a collective noise, that is, the random unitary transformation to each qubit is identical. The idea of DFS [9–11] was proven to be very important in quantum computation and quantum communication.

Very recently, several quantum communication protocols based on DFS have been put forward. Bartlett *et al.* [7] and Boileau *et al.* [12] utilized four photons as a logic qubit to perform quantum key distribution. Yet the four-photon entanglement source based on today's technology is too poor to be used in long distance communication. Recently, some other protocols [13,14] have been also put forward where only two photons are used. Two-photon entanglement sources can be achieved by spontaneous parameter down conversion (SPDC) and it can be bright enough for the mission of quantum key distribution. However, these protocols demand collective measurement of the two photons after the trip through the channel, and this kind of measurement demands that the photons interfere with each other.

Another two-photon protocol suggested by one of us [15] has the following properties: while two photons are requested, and the scheme only needs local individual measurement. Although the protocol has the drawback that it only applies to collective random rotation noise, such a situation can be found in many realistic applications such as in free space quantum communication and communication with a swinging object. In this paper, we report an experimental realization of such a protocol. It is demonstrated that our experimental method can yield good key rate even with large bit-flip error rate caused by collective rotation, while the usual realization of the BB84 protocol cannot produce any secure final key given the same channel.

Our experiment exploits the following four encoded BB84 states [15]

$$\begin{aligned}
|\bar{H}\rangle &= |\phi^+\rangle_{12} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_1|H\rangle_2 + |V\rangle_1|V\rangle_2), \\
|\bar{V}\rangle &= |\psi^-\rangle_{12} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_1|V\rangle_2 - |V\rangle_1|H\rangle_2), \\
|+\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\bar{H}\rangle + |\bar{V}\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_1|+\rangle_2 - |V\rangle_1|-\rangle_2), \\
|-\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\bar{H}\rangle - |\bar{V}\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_1|-\rangle_2 + |V\rangle_1|+\rangle_2). \quad (1)
\end{aligned}$$

Here  $|H\rangle, |V\rangle, |+\rangle, |-\rangle$  have the same meanings as in the BB84 protocol, representing the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal and antidiagonal polarization states, respectively. It is easy to verify; the states  $|\psi^-\rangle_{12}$  and  $|\phi^+\rangle_{12}$  are invariant under the following collective rotation:

$$\begin{aligned}
|H\rangle &\Rightarrow \cos \theta |H\rangle - \sin \theta |V\rangle, \\
|V\rangle &\Rightarrow \sin \theta |H\rangle + \cos \theta |V\rangle. \quad (2)
\end{aligned}$$

Here,  $\theta$  is the collective rotation noise parameter, which is depending on the environment and will fluctuate with time. This invariance implies that all the linear superposition of the two states constitutes a subspace that is decoherence-free to the collective rotation noise.

The experimental setup of the protocol is sketched in Fig. 1. Type II parametric down conversion in  $\beta$ -barium borate (BBO), pumped by a mode-locked femtosecond laser working at wavelength of 394 nm and a power of 600 mW, produces about 4000 polarization entangled photon pairs per second at 788 nm whose state is  $|\psi^-\rangle_{12}$ , i.e., the state  $|\bar{V}\rangle$  in our protocol. The other three states can be obtained by performing a corresponding local unitary transformation on the state  $|\bar{V}\rangle$ .

We use electro-optic modulators controlled by random number generators to realize Alice's encryption. After the bias voltage and half-wave voltage are carefully calibrated and adjusted, the modulators can translate the photon's state properly. When the modulators are turned off, they do nothing to the polarization of the photons to be sent. Once switched on, the modulators will change the polarization of the photons like half-wave plates. Modulator 1 is set to be  $0^\circ$  to its axis; modulators 2 and 3 are set to be  $45^\circ$  and  $22.5^\circ$ , respectively. It is easy to show that when modulators 1 and 2 are turned on together, the state will be changed from  $|\bar{V}\rangle$  to  $|\bar{H}\rangle$ . When modulators 1 and 3 are turned on, the state is  $|+\rangle$ , and when modulators 2 and 3 are turned on,  $|-\rangle$  is produced. Obviously when all the modulators are switched off, the output state is  $|\bar{V}\rangle$ .

Similar to the realization of the BB84 protocol, Alice has two random numbers  $X$  and  $Y$ .  $X$  is used to choose the base and  $Y$  is Alice's bit value. Alice utilizes the two random numbers to control the modulators to randomly prepare one of the four encoded states in the DFS. If  $X=0$ , Alice will choose the base  $\{|\bar{H}\rangle, |\bar{V}\rangle\}$ . When  $X=1$ , she will choose the




FIG. 1. Experimental setup for two photon fault-tolerant quantum key distribution protocol. The 394-nm UV pulses are produced by frequency doubling the 788-nm pulses of the mode-locked laser using a nonlinear LBO crystal ( $\text{LiB}_3\text{O}_5$ ). The UV pulses pass through a 2-mm BBO ( $\beta$ -barium borate) crystal and polarization entangled photon pairs in the state,  $|\psi^-\rangle_{12}$  are created. In order to compensate the birefringence of the BBO crystal, we place a half-wave plate (HWP) and a compensating BBO crystal of 1 mm thickness on each path of the two photons as a compensating system (labeled CS). Three electro-optic modulators controlled by a random number generator are utilized to produce the other three two-photon states requested by the protocol. They are labeled M1–M3, respectively. The channel noise of random rotation is realized by four half-wave plates, two in each path ( $H_C$  and  $H_N$ ). We use an electro-optic modulator M4 controlled by another random number generator to choose the measurement bases. After the modulator, we place polarized beam splitters (PBS), and the raw key is obtained by observing the clicking of detectors behind the PBS. An interference filter (IF) with a full width at half maximum of 2.8 nm is placed before each single photon detector (D1–D4) to improve the visibility of the entangled pair. Each user has a computer to control the random number generator and record the detector's events.

base  $\{|+\rangle, |-\rangle\}$ . If  $Y=1$ , Alice will prepare  $|\bar{H}\rangle$  or  $|+\rangle$ . Otherwise, she will prepare  $|\bar{V}\rangle$  or  $|-\rangle$ . Table I describes the process in detail.

The two random numbers are achieved by the quantum process of splitting a beam of single photons just as Jennewein *et al.* did in their experiment [16]. At first, the two

TABLE I. Summary of the process of encoding.  $X$  denotes the base and  $Y$  is the bit value. They are prepared by the random number generator. The two numbers determine which modulators will be turned on and which state is prepared.

$X$	$Y$	Modulator 1	Modulator 2	Modulator 3	State
0	0	0	0	0	$ \bar{V}\rangle$
0	1	1	1	0	$ \bar{H}\rangle$
1	0	0	1	1	$ -\rangle$
1	1	1	0	1	$ +\rangle$

random numbers are stored in a first-in, first-out (FIFO) memory. Then they will be read out and encoded according to Table I triggered by a 100 kHz clock. In our experiment, the encoding frequency of 100 kHz is so high that the probability of more than one pair appearing in the same encoding period is small enough to guarantee the security of quantum key distribution.

We use two half-wave plates (HWPs) to simulate the collective random rotation of the noise channel. Here, the unitary transformation introduced by the HWPs is slightly different from the noise of collective random rotations as assumed in the original protocol. Instead of the unitary transformation of Eq. (2), if we set the HWP at the angle  $\theta/2$  to its optical axis, the function is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} |H\rangle &\Rightarrow \cos \theta|H\rangle - \sin \theta|V\rangle, \\ |V\rangle &\Rightarrow -(\sin \theta|H\rangle + \cos \theta|V\rangle). \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

In order to realize the rotation noise as in Eq. (2), we further insert an additional HWP ( $H_C$ ), which is set at  $0^\circ$ , in front of the  $H_N$  to correct the minus phase shift in each path.

Since the four encoded states as shown in Eq. (1) are invariant under the collective rotation described above, Bob only needs to use an electro-optic modulator to choose his measurement bases and then let each photon, respectively, pass through a polarized beam splitter (PBS) to perform a polarization measurement (see Fig. 1). In this way, our protocol avoids the collective measurement that needs the two-photon interference [13,14]. The entangled photon pairs are detected by fiber-coupled single photon detectors. Bob uses another random number generator  $Z$  to control the electro-optic modulator that is set at  $22.5^\circ$ . If  $Z=0$ , he measures photon 1 in the  $\{|H\rangle, |V\rangle\}$  basis. Otherwise he chooses the  $\{|+\rangle, |-\rangle\}$  basis. For photon 2, as there is no modulator, it is measured in the  $\{|H\rangle, |V\rangle\}$  basis.

The photons are detected by silicon avalanche photon diodes. When Bob finds that photon 1 (D1 or D2) and photon 2 (D3 or D4) are simultaneously detected in a coincidence window of 5 ns, he will record it as a successful detection event. If D1 and D4, or D2 and D3 fire simultaneously, he will record the bit as "0." Otherwise he will record it as "1."

The encoding clock can also give a timing signal in a measurement turn. The computer on Bob's side registers all detection events as time stamps together with measure base information and the detection result. After the key distribution, Bob will declare at what time he gets a detection event and his measurement base. And Alice will tell Bob to discard those bits in the wrong bases to produce the raw key. Then, they can do error tests and final key distillations. As it has been shown in [15], the protocol here can actually be regarded as the BB84 protocol with encoding and decoding. Therefore, we only need to check its quantum bit error rate (QBER) after decoding for the security issue, i.e., if the QBER after decoding is less than 11%, then we conclude that we can distill some unconditionally secure final key [4,17].

Figure 2 provides QBERs of each state with the same collective random rotation channel and the total error rates. In our two-photon encoding experiment, the rate of the raw




FIG. 2. (Color online) (a) Experimental result of the quantum bit error rates of all the states in our protocol and the BB84 protocol in the rotation noise. (b) Experimental result of the total quantum bit error rate of our protocol and the BB84 protocol. It can be seen at any angle that our protocol is below the line of 11%, which is the security bound of the BB84-type protocol. The error rates of our protocol are due to the imperfection of the entanglement resource, the detectors, and the electro-optic modulators. The error rates of the BB84 protocol are sinusoidal and are the same to our protocol at  $0^\circ$  angle rotation noise, which are in agreement with theoretical prediction.

keys is about 2000/s. Under different random rotation noise, the QBERs are all observed to be less than 11%, which is sufficient to guarantee the absolute security of the protocol. For each experimental point, we spend 50 s to collect the raw keys to measure the QBERs, which leads to an error bar of the QBERs of 0.1%. Therefore our protocol indeed always works given whatever unknown collective random rotation noise.

In our experiment, we want to see whether the protocol has an advantage to the standard realization of BB84; therefore we only need to compare the QBERs of two protocols with the same collective random noise channel. Experimentally, we project photon 2 into the state  $|+\rangle$  as a trigger. Then photon 1 can be treated as a single photon source to be in the




FIG. 3. (Color online) Coincidence fringes for the entangled photon source in our experiment whose state is  $|\psi^-\rangle_{12}$ . When varying the polarizer angle  $\theta_1$ , the two complementary sine curves with a visibility of 88%, will bring a 6% error rate to the QKD protocol, which is the main reason of the QBER of our experiment.

state  $|-\rangle$ . We use modulators 1 and 2 to prepare the four encoded single-photon states in the standard BB84 protocol. Modulator 4 and the PBS behind are used to perform the necessary polarization measurement on photon 1. The obtained QBERs under different rotation noise are also shown in Fig. 2. The figure shows that as long as  $|\theta| \geq \pi/18$ , the QBERs of the standard realization of BB84 are larger than 11%, which consequently leads to the failure of quantum key distribution [4].

It is important to note that, given a perfect source of entangled photon source, modulator and detector, the QBERs of our protocol should approach 0 at any random collective rotation noise. However, in our two-photon quantum key distribution experiment a significant average QBER of 6% is observed. This is mainly due to the imperfection of our en-

tangled photon source from type II parameter down conversion. As shown in Fig. 3, the visibility of our entangled photon source has a limited visibility of about 88%, which is in good agreement with our observed QBER of 6%

In summary, we have experimentally realized a fault tolerant quantum key distribution protocol in a DFS. As far as we have known, this is the first result of two photon quantum cryptography experiment that conquers the rotation noise with a decoherence-free subspace [18]. We have verified the advantage of quantum key distribution in DFS over a random collective rotation noise.

The experiment also has an extensive application background in practice. Free space quantum communication is thought as a good choice to realize global quantum communication [6]. In free space, the main noise is the rotational type and the dispersion noise can be neglected. Our protocol can be useful in this situation. Also, in the cases when QKD between Earth and swinging objects is needed, our protocol has an advantage. The bit rate of our protocol is 2000/s and it can be significantly improved by raising the laser power and improving the detection efficiency. We believe it is potentially rather useful for practical QKD in free space in the future.

Moreover, the experiment is completed in a DFS that plays an important role in quantum computation and quantum communication. As is known, there are two methods for robust quantum communication, the quantum error correction codes (QECC) and the decoherence-free subspace. So far, QECC codes have not been demonstrated by real qubits because they need at least five qubits. Here we demonstrate robust quantum communication of an arbitrary two-level quantum state in a type of decoherence-free subspace and we can transmit quantum information robustly [11].

We thank Yu-Ao Chen for his useful help. This work was supported by the NNSF of China, the CAS, the PCSIRT, and the National Fundamental Research Program. This work was also supported by the Marie Curie Excellent Grant of the EU, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

- 
- [1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, *Rev. Mod. Phys.* **74**, 145 (2002).
- [2] W. K. Wootters and W. H. Zurek, *Nature (London)* **299**, 802 (1982).
- [3] A. K. Ekert, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **67**, 661 (1991).
- [4] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **85**, 441 (2000).
- [5] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in *Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing* (Bangalore, India, 1984), p. 175.
- [6] M. Aspelmeyer *et al.*, *Science* **301**, 621 (2003); C. Z. Peng *et al.*, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **94**, 150501 (2005).
- [7] S. D. Bartlett, T. Rudolph, and R. W. Spekkens, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **91**, 027901 (2003).
- [8] T. Rudolph and L. Grover, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **91**, 217905 (2003).
- [9] G. M. Palma, K. A. Suominen, and A. K. Ekert, *Proc. R. Soc. London, Ser. A* **452**, 567 (1996).
- [10] P. G. Kwiat, A. J. Berglund, J. B. Altepeter, and A. G. White, *Science* **290**, 498 (2000); J. B. Altepeter, P. G. Hadley, S. M. Wendelken, A. J. Berglund, and P. G. Kwiat, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **92**, 147901 (2004).
- [11] J. Kempe, D. Bacon, D. A. Lidar, and K. B. Whaley, *Phys. Rev. A* **63**, 042307 (2001).
- [12] J.-C. Boileau, D. Gottesman, R. Laflamme, D. Poulin, and R. W. Spekkens, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **92**, 017901 (2004).
- [13] Z. D. Walton, A. F. Abouraddy, A. V. Sergienko, B. E. A. Saleh, and M. C. Teich, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **91**, 087901 (2004).
- [14] J.-C. Boileau, R. Laflamme, M. Laforest, and C. R. Myers, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **93**, 220501 (2004).
- [15] X. B. Wang, *Phys. Rev. A* **72**, 050304(R) (2005).
- [16] T. Jennewein, C. Simon, G. Weihs, H. Weinfurter, and A. Zeilinger, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* **84**, 4729 (2000).
- [17] D. Mayers, *J. ACM* **48**, 351 (2001).
- [18] Recently, we became aware that a different protocol for fault tolerant QKD has been realized by Y.-K. Jiang, X.-B. Wang, B.-S. Shi, and A. Tomita, *Opt. Express* **13**, 9415 (2005).