

Insecurity of quantum secure computations

Hoi-Kwong Lo*

*Basic Research Institute in the Mathematical Sciences, Hewlett-Packard Labs, Filton Road, Stoke Gifford,
Bristol BS12 6QZ, United Kingdom*

and Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California 93106-4030

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It had been widely claimed that quantum mechanics can protect private information during public decision in, for example, the so-called two-party secure computation. If this were the case, quantum smart-cards, storing confidential information accessible only to a proper reader, could prevent fake teller machines from learning the PIN (personal identification number) from the customers' input. Although such optimism has been challenged by the recent surprising discovery of the insecurity of the so-called quantum bit commitment, the security of quantum two-party computation itself remains unaddressed. Here I answer this question directly by showing that all *one-sided* two-party computations (which allow only one of the two parties to learn the result) are necessarily insecure. As corollaries to my results, quantum one-way oblivious password identification and the so-called quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer are impossible. I also construct a class of functions that cannot be computed securely in any *two-sided* two-party computation. Nevertheless, quantum cryptography remains useful in key distribution and can still provide partial security in "quantum money" proposed by Wiesner. [S1050-2947(97)01508-4]

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I. INTRODUCTION

Copying of an unknown quantum state (by, for example, an eavesdropper) is strictly forbidden by the linearity of quantum mechanics [1]. Consequently, quantum cryptography¹ (or more precisely quantum key distribution [3–7]) allows two users to share a common random secret string of information which can then be used to make their subsequent communications totally unintelligible to an eavesdropper. In this paper I am, however, concerned with another class of applications of quantum cryptography—the protection of private information during public decision [8,9]. For instance, two millionaires may be interested in knowing who is richer but neither wishes to disclose the precise amount of money that he or she has. More generally, in a *one-sided* two-party computation, Alice has a private input i and Bob a private input j . Alice would like to help Bob to compute a prescribed function $f(i,j)$ without revealing anything about i more than what is logically necessary. (For a precise definition of a one-sided two-party computation, see Sec. II.) In classical cryptography, such two-party computations can be made secure only either (1) through trusted intermediaries or (2) by accepting some unproven computational assumptions.² The impossibility of *unconditionally* secure two-party

computation in *classical* cryptography had led to much interest in *quantum* cryptographic protocols [2,5,11–18] which are supposed to be unconditionally secure [16–18].

An important primitive in secure computation is the so-called bit commitment.³ The optimism in unconditionally secure quantum two-party computation was largely contributed by well-known claims of unconditional secure quantum bit commitment protocols [16] (and also oblivious transfer [17,18]). However, such optimism has recently been put into serious question due to the surprising demonstration of the insecurity of quantum bit commitment (against an [Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)] type of attack with delayed measurements] by Mayers [20,21] and also by Chau and me [22,23]. Yet an important question remains: Other than the quantum key distribution, can quantum cryptographic protocols, in particular, two-party computation, be unconditionally secure at all? This is an important question because, in many cases, quantum bit commitment might be thought of as a means to an end—two-party secure computation. If secure quantum two-party computation is possible, many applications of quantum cryptography, such as the prevention of frauds due to typing the PIN (personal identification number)

unlimited computing power (or with a quantum computer [10]) can defeat such unproven computational assumptions.

³The basic idea of bit commitment is to conceal information and to reveal it later. It might be useful to note that Yao [18] has shown that any secure quantum bit commitment scheme can be used to implement secure quantum oblivious transfer whereas Kilian [19] has shown that, in classical cryptography, oblivious transfer can be used to implement two-party secure computation. Therefore, this chain of argument appears to suggest that, with quantum bit commitment, quantum cryptography could achieve unconditionally secure two-party computation, thus solving a long-standing problem in cryptography.

*Electronic address: hkl@hplb.hpl.hp.com

¹Quantum cryptography was first proposed by Wiesner [2] in about 1970 in a manuscript that remained unpublished until 1983.

²In the first case, if both Alice and Bob trust Charles, they simply tell him their private inputs and let Charles perform the computation on their behalf and tell them the result afterwards. The problem here is that Charles can cheat by telling either Alice or Bob the other party's private input. In the second case, assumptions such as the hardness of factoring can be used. However, an adversary with

to a dishonest teller machine mentioned in the abstract, will still survive.

Amazingly, one possible viewpoint to take is that there is really nothing to prove because the standard reduction theorems⁴ [19,24,25] in classical cryptography immediately imply that quantum one-sided two-party computation is impossible: In classical cryptography, an example of one-sided two party computation is one-out-of-two oblivious transfer, which can be used to implement bit commitment. If bit commitment is impossible, one-sided two-party computations must also generally be impossible. Doubt has been expressed in the literature concerning the validity of this standard reduction in a quantum model [9]. Here I argue that by definition the standard reduction must apply to quantum cryptographic protocols: Bit commitment, oblivious transfer, and two-party computations are classical concepts whose security requirements are defined in a classical probabilistic language. If there is any sense at all in saying that a quantum protocol can achieve say two-party computation, it is a *matter of definition* that the quantum protocol has to satisfy the classical probabilistic security requirements under all circumstances. In particular, one must be allowed to use a quantum cryptographic protocol as a “black box” primitive in building up more sophisticated protocols and to analyze the security of those new protocols with *classical* probability theory.⁵

By adopting this new and, in my opinion, more accurate definition of secure quantum protocols, one sees that the impossibility of quantum bit commitment immediately implies the impossibility of quantum one-sided two-party computations (and one-out-of-two oblivious transfer as well as oblivious transfer) and this is the end of the story.

Yet such an ending is disappointing in two aspects. While such a viewpoint is conceptually correct, it is a bit formal and nonconstructive. A constructive proof would make things more transparent and convincing. A perhaps more serious objection is that while such an argument rules out one-out-of-two oblivious transfer and the two-party computation of a general function, there remains the possibility that *some* special class of functions (whose two-party computations cannot be used to implement one-out-of-two oblivious transfer⁶) might still be computed securely in one-sided two-party computations. Here I investigate directly the security of one-sided two-party computation without using the formal standard reduction. My main result is that one-sided quantum

two party secure computation is always impossible.⁷ (For its definition, see Sec. II.) That is, as far as one-sided two-party computations are concerned, quantum cryptography is absolutely useless. As a corollary, the so-called quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer is also impossible. I also present a class of functions that *cannot* be computed in any *two-sided* two-party computation. Nevertheless, quantum cryptography remains useful for the key distribution and can still provide partial security in “quantum money” proposed by Wiesner.

II. IDEAL ONE-SIDED TWO-PARTY SECURE COMPUTATION

A. Definition and security requirements

Suppose Alice has a private (i.e., secret) input $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and Bob has a private input $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$. An *ideal* one-sided two-party secure computation is defined as follows: Alice helps Bob to compute a prescribed function $f(i, j) \in \{1, 2, \dots, p\}$ in such a way that, at the end of the protocol, (a) Bob learns $f(i, j)$ unambiguously, (b) Alice learns nothing [about j or $f(i, j)$], and (c) Bob knows nothing about i more than what logically follows from the values of j and $f(i, j)$.

Notice that, for a one-sided two-party computation protocol to be secure, Bob is supposed to input a *particular* value of j and to learn the value of $f(i, j)$ for that particular value of j *only*. I will show that these three security requirements (a), (b), and (c) are incompatible in the following manner: Assuming that the first two security requirements (a) and (b) are satisfied, I will work out a cheating strategy for Bob which would allow him to learn the values of $f(i, j)$ for *all* j 's, thus violating security requirement (c).⁸ I therefore conclude that ideal quantum one-sided two-party computations are impossible. In Sec. IV, I will generalize this result to nonideal protocols [which may violate security requirements (a) and (b) slightly].

B. Bob's cheating strategy

Consider the following cheating strategy by Bob who determines the values of $f(i, j_1), f(i, j_2), \dots, f(i, j_m)$ successively: Bob first inputs a value j_1 for j and goes through the protocol. At the end of the protocol, he determines the value of $f(i, j_1)$. He then applies a unitary transformation to change the value of j from j_1 to j_2 and determines $f(i, j_2)$. After that, Bob applies a unitary transformation to change j from j_2 to j_3 and determines $f(i, j_3)$ and so on.

⁴I thank G. Brassard for helpful discussions about those standard reduction theorems.

⁵One may get the feeling from reading the literature that a quantum protocol should be regarded as secure if it appears to satisfy its security requirements when it is executed *only once* and *in isolation*. This, however, does *not* guarantee that it satisfies the security requirements when it is used as a subroutine of a larger routine because a cheater might defeat the security of the larger routine by performing coherent measurements. Therefore, I think that a more accurate definition of a secure quantum protocol should be much more stringent.

⁶According to Kilian, such functions do exist.

⁷Remarkably, an alternative proof of the impossibility of *ideal* quantum one-sided two-party computation can be made by generalizing Wiesner's [2] early insight on the impossibility of one-way scheme for so-called one-out-of-two oblivious transfer and combining it with the idea of the proof of the impossibility of quantum bit commitment. I omit this alternative proof here because it is not transparent at all.

⁸In other words, instead of the ideal one-sided two-party secure computation protocol, quantum cryptography gives only a protocol that allows Bob to learn $f(i, j)$ for *all* j 's. Such a protocol is uninteresting as it can be achieved in classical cryptography simply by having Alice tell Bob those values. Therefore, quantum cryptography provides no real advantage in this ideal case.

C. Key points of the proof

The above cheating strategy by Bob works for two reasons. First, using the insight gained from the impossibility of quantum bit commitment [20–23], in Sec. III B I will prove the following: The security requirement (b)—that Alice knows nothing about j —implies that at the end of the protocol, Bob can cheat by changing the value of j from j_1 to j_2 by applying a unitary transformation to his own quantum machine.⁹ Consequently, Bob can determine the value of $f(i, j_2)$ instead of $f(i, j_1)$, as long as he has *not* measured $f(i, j_1)$ yet. Of course, Bob would like to learn $f(i, j_1)$ and he *does* measure $f(i, j_1)$ before rotating j_1 to j_2 . At first sight, this seems to be a problem because measurements in quantum mechanics generally disturb a signal. Here comes the second point. Measurement of $f(i, j_1)$ does not disturb Bob's state at all for the following reason. Since by the security requirement (a) of an ideal protocol Bob can input $j = j_1$ and learn the value of $f(i, j_1)$ unambiguously, the density matrix that Bob has must be an eigenstate of the measurement operator that he uses for determining $f(i, j_1)$. Being an eigenstate, the density matrix is, therefore, undisturbed by Bob's measurement. QED

In effect, I am arguing that the density matrix Bob has is a simultaneous eigenstate of the measurement operators $f(i, j_1), f(i, j_2), \dots, f(i, j_m)$. See Sec. III B.

III. DETAILS OF THE PROOF

A. Unitary description

Let me present my result in more detail. It is convenient to use a unitary description of two-party computation [21,23]. Let H_A (H_B) denote the Hilbert space of Alice's (Bob's) quantum machine. Imagine a two-party computation in which both Alice and Bob possess quantum computers and quantum storage devices. By maintaining the quantum coherence of the composite quantum system, $H_A \otimes H_B$ (using external control such as classical computers, assembling of quantum gate arrays, quantum error correction, and fault-tolerant quantum computation), one can avoid dealing with the collapse of the wave function. Alice and Bob's actions on their quantum machines can be summarized¹⁰ as an overall unitary transformation U applied to the initial state $|u\rangle_{\text{in}} \in H_A \otimes H_B$, i.e.,

$$|u\rangle_{\text{fin}} = U|u\rangle_{\text{in}}. \quad (1)$$

The unitary transformation U is known to both Alice and

⁹The impossibility of quantum bit commitment [20–23] essentially states that if Alice does not know something, then Bob can change it. The commitment made by Bob is, therefore, fake.

¹⁰For the basic idea, see [21]. For detailed justification with a concrete model (a variant of Yao's model [18]), see [23]. Of course, in reality the execution of the protocol may not require quantum computers. This is, however, equivalent to a situation when the parties do not make full use of their quantum computers. If one can show that a cheater can cheat successfully against an honest party who has a quantum computer, clearly the cheater can cheat successfully against one without. Therefore, a unitary description is very useful for my purposes.

Bob because they know the procedure of the protocol. When both parties are honest, $|u^h\rangle_{\text{in}} = |i\rangle_A \otimes |j\rangle_B$ and

$$|u^h\rangle_{\text{fin}} = |v_{ij}\rangle \equiv U(|i\rangle_A \otimes |j\rangle_B). \quad (2)$$

Therefore, the density matrix that Bob has at the end of protocol is simply

$$\rho^{i,j} = \text{Tr}_A |v_{ij}\rangle\langle v_{ij}|. \quad (3)$$

B. Changing j from j_1 to j_2

I asserted in the last section that, owing to the security requirement (b), at the end of the protocol Bob can change the value of j from j_1 to j_2 by applying a unitary transformation to the state of his quantum machine. Since the value of Alice's input i is unknown to Bob, for such a cheating strategy to work, I need to prove that this unitary transformation can be chosen to be independent of the value of i .¹¹

Assertion. Given $j_1, j_2 \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$, there exists a unitary transformation U^{j_1, j_2} such that

$$U^{j_1, j_2} \rho^{i, j_1} (U^{j_1, j_2})^{-1} = \rho^{i, j_2} \quad (4)$$

for all i .

Proof. Notice that Bob must allow Alice to choose the value of her input i randomly. But then a dishonest Alice may try to learn about j by an EPR-type of attack; i.e., she entangles the state of her quantum machine A with her quantum dice D and prepares the initial state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_i |i\rangle_D \otimes |i\rangle_A. \quad (5)$$

(Recall that n is the cardinality of i .) Instead of measuring the state of her quantum dice D honestly, she may keep D for herself and use the second register A to execute the two-party protocol honestly from this point on. Suppose Bob's input is j_1 . The initial state is, therefore,

$$|u'\rangle_{\text{in}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_i |i\rangle_D \otimes |i\rangle_A \otimes |j_1\rangle_B. \quad (6)$$

At the end of the protocol, it follows from Eqs. (1) and (6) that the total wave function of the combined system D , A , and B is described by

$$|v_{j_1}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_i |i\rangle_D \otimes U(|i\rangle_A \otimes |j_1\rangle_B). \quad (7)$$

Similarly, if Bob's input is j_2 instead, the total wave function at the end of the protocol will be

¹¹Using the idea of the impossibility of bit commitment [20–23], it is trivial to prove that, for *each* i , a unitary transformation U^{i, j_1, j_2} that rotates j from j_1 to j_2 exists. What is less trivial to prove is the existence of a unitary transformation U^{j_1, j_2} which works for *all* i 's simultaneously. I thank D. Mayers for enlightening discussions. Actually, Bob can choose his unitary transformation according to the outcome of his measurement. This observation will be useful in later discussion just before corollary A in the next section.

$$|v_{j_2}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_i |i\rangle_D \otimes U(|i\rangle_A \otimes |j_2\rangle_B). \quad (8)$$

An ideal protocol should prevent such a dishonest Alice from learning anything about j . Therefore, the reduced density matrices in Alice's hand for the two cases $j=j_1$ and $j=j_2$ must be the same, i.e.,

$$\rho_{j_1}^{\text{Alice}} = \text{Tr}_B |v_{j_1}\rangle \langle v_{j_1}| = \text{Tr}_B |v_{j_2}\rangle \langle v_{j_2}| = \rho_{j_2}^{\text{Alice}}. \quad (9)$$

Equivalently, the two wave functions $|v_{j_1}\rangle$ and $|v_{j_2}\rangle$ have the same Schmidt decomposition [26], i.e.,

$$|v_{j_1}\rangle = \sum_k a_k |\alpha_k\rangle_{AD} \otimes |\beta_k\rangle_B \quad (10)$$

and

$$|v_{j_2}\rangle = \sum_k a_k |\alpha_k\rangle_{AD} \otimes |\beta'_k\rangle_B. \quad (11)$$

Here $|\alpha_k\rangle_{AD}$, $|\beta_k\rangle_B$, and $|\beta'_k\rangle_B$ are eigenvectors of the corresponding density matrices and satisfy $\langle \alpha_{k'} | \alpha_k \rangle_{AD} = \delta_{k,k'}$, etc. Notice that Eqs. (10) and (11) contain the same coefficients a_k and states $|\alpha_k\rangle_{AD}$ and the only difference lies in the state of Bob's quantum machine B . Now, consider the unitary transformation U^{j_1, j_2} that rotates $|\beta_k\rangle_B$ to $|\beta'_k\rangle_B$. Notice that it acts on H_B alone and yet, as can be seen from Eqs. (10) and (11), it rotates $|v_{j_1}\rangle$ to $|v_{j_2}\rangle$, i.e.,

$$|v_{j_2}\rangle = U^{j_1, j_2} |v_{j_1}\rangle. \quad (12)$$

Since

$${}_D \langle i | v_j \rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} |v_{ij}\rangle \quad (13)$$

[see Eqs. (2), (7), and (8)], by multiplying Eq. (12) by ${}_D \langle i |$ on the left, one finds that

$$|v_{ij_2}\rangle = U^{j_1, j_2} |v_{ij_1}\rangle. \quad (14)$$

As one is interested in Bob's reduced density matrix, one takes the trace of $|v_{ij_2}\rangle \langle v_{ij_2}|$ over H_A and uses Eq. (14) to obtain Eq. (4). This completes the proof of my assertion, Eq. (4).

The implication of Eq. (4) is profound. Independent of the value of Alice's private input i , at the end of the protocol Bob can change the value of his own input j simply by applying a unitary transformation to his own quantum machine.¹² Therefore, the index j in Bob's density matrix

¹²A similar idea is used in the proof of the impossibility of bit commitment [20–23]. That Alice knows nothing about Bob's chosen bit automatically implies that Bob can cheat successfully by applying a unitary transformation to change the value of the bit even after the completion of the commitment phase. Thus, the commitment is fake.

$\rho^{i,j}$ is redundant in the sense that different values of j simply correspond to representing the density matrix ρ^i in different bases.

With such a simplification, one can essentially argue that ρ^i is a simultaneous eigenstate of $f(i, j_1), f(i, j_2), \dots, f(i, j_m)$ in the following manner: With an input j_1 , Bob can learn $f(i, j_1)$. This implies that ρ^i is an eigenstate of $f(i, j_1)$. But Bob can cheat by changing the value of j from j_1 to j_2 in the last minute to learn $f(i, j_2)$ instead. This means that ρ^i is also an eigenstate of $f(i, j_2)$. By repeating this argument, one sees clearly that ρ^i is a simultaneous eigenstate of all the measuring operators for $f(i, j_1), f(i, j_2), \dots, f(i, j_m)$. Consequently, Bob can learn the values of $f(i, j)$ for all values of j simultaneously. This is why the cheating strategy that I describe in Sec. II B works. In the next section, I will generalize this attack to nonideal protocols.

IV. NONIDEAL PROTOCOLS

A general nonideal protocol may violate the security requirements (a) and (b) slightly. In relaxing (b), one would expect that the unitary transformations that Bob uses for changing j from j_i to j_{i+1} to be imperfect. In relaxing (a), the density matrix that Bob has at the end of the protocol will now be slightly different from an eigenstate of the measurement operator that he uses. [This is because Bob will generally be unable to determine the value of $f(i, j_1)$ unambiguously in nonideal protocols.] Nonetheless, as long as the deviation from idealness is small, one would expect Bob to learn a substantial amount of information about $f(i, j_2)$ even after his honest determination of $f(i, j_1)$. That Bob can learn something about both $f(i, j_1)$ and $f(i, j_2)$ is already a serious violation of the security requirement (c) and there is no need for one to consider the security for $f(i, j_3)$, etc. In other words, one would expect that, for essentially the same reason as the ideal protocol, even nonideal quantum one-sided two-party computations are impossible. In what follows, I prove that this is indeed the case. Readers who are uninterested in technical details may skip the following and go directly to Sec. IV A.

More concretely, let me relax security requirement (b) to allow Alice to have a small probability to distinguish between different j 's. I mimic the proof of Eq. (4). As before, consider a dishonest Alice who tries to learn about j by preparing an illegal initial state $(1/\sqrt{n}) \sum_i |i\rangle_D \otimes |i\rangle_A$ where n is the cardinality of i . She keeps the first register D for herself and uses the second register A to execute the two-party protocol honestly from this point on. Unlike the ideal case, Eq. (9) is violated for nonideal protocols, i.e., $\rho_{j_1}^{\text{Alice}} \neq \rho_{j_2}^{\text{Alice}}$. Nonetheless, as long as the probability for Alice to distinguish successfully between the two cases remains small, the two density matrices $\rho_{j_1}^{\text{Alice}}$ and $\rho_{j_2}^{\text{Alice}}$ must in some sense be close to each other.

Mathematically, the closeness between two density matrices ρ and ρ' of a system S can be described by the *fidelity* [27]. (See also Ref. [28].) Imagine another system E attached to a given system S . There are many pure states $|\psi\rangle$ and $|\psi'\rangle$

on the composite system that satisfy

$$\text{Tr}_E(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|) = \rho \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Tr}_E(|\psi'\rangle\langle\psi'|) = \rho'. \quad (15)$$

The pure states $|\psi\rangle$ and $|\psi'\rangle$ are called the *purifications* of the density matrices ρ and ρ' . The fidelity $F(\rho, \rho')$ can be defined as

$$F(\rho, \rho') = \max |\langle\psi|\psi'\rangle|, \quad (16)$$

where the maximization is over all possible purifications. I remark that¹³ for any fixed purification ψ of ρ , there exists a maximally parallel purification ψ' of ρ' that satisfies Eq. (16). Notice that $0 \leq F \leq 1$ and $F = 1$ if and only if $\rho = \rho'$.

Returning to the discussion on nonideal protocols, the condition that the two density matrices $\rho_{j_1}^{\text{Alice}}$ and $\rho_{j_2}^{\text{Alice}}$ be close to each other can be specified by the mathematical statement that the fidelity $F(\rho_{j_1}^{\text{Alice}}, \rho_{j_2}^{\text{Alice}})$ is close to 1, say,

$$F(\rho_{j_1}^{\text{Alice}}, \rho_{j_2}^{\text{Alice}}) > 1 - \delta, \quad (17)$$

where $\delta \ll 1$.¹⁴ It follows from the definition of fidelity in Eq. (16) that there exists a unitary transformation $U^{j_1 j_2}$ acting on H_B alone¹⁵ such that

$$|\langle v_{j_2} | U^{j_1 j_2} | v_{j_1} \rangle| > 1 - \delta. \quad (18)$$

Since [from Eqs. (2), (7), and (8)] $|v_j\rangle = (1/\sqrt{n}) \sum_i |i\rangle \otimes |v_{ij}\rangle$,

$$|\langle v_{j_2} | U^{j_1 j_2} | v_{j_1} \rangle| = \frac{1}{n} \left| \sum_i \langle v_{ij_2} | U^{j_1 j_2} | v_{ij_1} \rangle \right| > 1 - \delta. \quad (19)$$

Now

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_i |\langle v_{ij_2} | U^{j_1 j_2} | v_{ij_1} \rangle| \geq \frac{1}{n} \left| \sum_i \langle v_{ij_2} | U^{j_1 j_2} | v_{ij_1} \rangle \right| > 1 - \delta. \quad (20)$$

For a protocol to be one sided, one requires $\delta \ll 1$. Let me consider the two cases (A) $n\delta \ll 1$ and (B) $\delta \ll 1 \leq n\delta$ separately.

Case (A): $n\delta \ll 1$. It is a common requirement in computer science that $n\delta \ll 1$. In this case, for each i ,

$$|\langle v_{ij_2} | U^{j_1 j_2} | v_{ij_1} \rangle| > 1 - n\delta \quad (21)$$

is still close to 1. I now come to the relaxation of security requirement (a). Bob still chooses a j , say, j_1 , and performs a measurement on his quantum state in order to learn the value of $f(i, j_1)$. However, for a nonideal protocol, Bob's measurement result will not give him full information on $f(i, j_1)$. Nonetheless, for a protocol that is only slightly non-

ideal, one may demand that, for each i , Bob's ignorance about $f(i, j_1)$ after his measurement would be much less than one bit. That is to say that Bob's measurement can extract the value of $f(i, j_1)$ from the density matrix ρ^{i, j_1} with a probability close to 1. Therefore, ρ^{i, j_1} can be made to be almost an eigenstate of Bob's measurement and thus the disturbance caused by such measurement is small. Consequently, one must have

$$F(\rho^{i, j_1}, \mathcal{E}(\rho^{i, j_1})) \geq 1 - \epsilon, \quad (22)$$

where $\epsilon \ll 1$ and \mathcal{E} is a linear operator (the so-called super-operator [29]) which represents the action of the (imperfect) measurement of $f(i, j_1)$ by Bob. Since fidelity is preserved by unitary transformations, one finds that

$$F(U^{j_1 j_2} \rho^{i, j_1} (U^{j_1 j_2})^{-1}, U^{j_1 j_2} \mathcal{E}(\rho^{i, j_1}) (U^{j_1 j_2})^{-1}) \geq 1 - \epsilon. \quad (23)$$

From Eqs. (21) and (23), one deduces¹⁶ that

$$F(U^{j_1 j_2} \mathcal{E}(\rho^{i, j_1}) (U^{j_1 j_2})^{-1}, \rho^{i, j_2}) > 1 - O(n\delta) - O(\epsilon). \quad (24)$$

Now the high fidelity of Eq. (24) implies that Bob's cheating strategy—of determining $f(i, j_1)$ approximately first, applying a rotation to his state to change j from j_1 to j_2 , and then determining $f(i, j_2)$ —will allow him to defeat the security requirement (c) of the protocol by learning substantial information about $f(i, j_2)$. Therefore, even nonideal protocols are unsafe if $n\delta \ll 1$.

Case (B): $\delta \ll 1 \leq n\delta$. I now separate the discussion further into two cases: “typical” and “atypical” functions. A typical function $f(i, j)$ is defined to be such that, even if the value of $f(i, j_2)$ is determined inaccurately by Bob for a small fraction, say, $1/10$ of the i 's, Bob can still gain a considerable amount of information about the value i . With such a definition, I now argue that, for a typical function, the assumption $\delta \ll 1$ necessarily leads to a fatal violation of security requirement (c), thus showing the insecurity of nonideal protocols. My point is the following: Since each of the n terms $|\langle v_{ij_2} | U^{j_1 j_2} | v_{ij_1} \rangle|$ in Eq. (20) has a value less than or equal to 1, Eq. (20) implies that, for at least nine out of ten of the i 's, the following is true:

$$|\langle v_{ij_2} | U^{j_1 j_2} | v_{ij_1} \rangle| > 1 - 10\delta. \quad (25)$$

Since I am interested in Bob's density matrix, I take the trace over Alice's quantum machine A and find that for each of those i 's,

$$F(U^{j_1 j_2} \rho^{i, j_1} (U^{j_1 j_2})^{-1}, \rho^{i, j_2}) > 1 - 10\delta. \quad (26)$$

In relaxing the security requirement (a), Eqs. (22) and (23) are still valid. Combining Eqs. (23) with (26), one finds that for at least nine out of ten of the possible i 's to be chosen by Alice,

¹⁶This follows from the fact that the fidelity is closely related [27] to the Bures metric.

¹³I thank R. Jozsa for a discussion about this point.

¹⁴One might imagine a situation when Alice has been informed by her spy that Bob's input is either j_1 or j_2 . In this case, her task is to distinguish between these two remaining possibilities. To prevent Alice from succeeding, it is crucial that Eq. (17) holds.

¹⁵A similar idea was used by Mayers [20] in the discussion of nonideal bit commitment schemes. See also [21–23].

$$F(U^{j_1, j_2} \mathcal{E}(\rho^{i, j_1})(U^{j_1, j_2})^{-1}, \rho^{i, j_2}) > 1 - O(10\delta) - O(\epsilon). \quad (27)$$

Hence, Bob can determine the value of $f(i, j_2)$ with high accuracy at least nine out of ten times. Since the function is assumed to be typical, this implies that Bob can get a substantial amount of information about the value of i . Consequently, the nonideal protocol is insecure.

What about the case of atypical functions? An example of atypical functions is $f(i, j) = 1$ if $i = j$ and $f(i, j) = 0$ otherwise (as in quantum one-way oblivious identification in corollary 2 below). For those functions, it might be fatal if there exists a *single* i such that $|\langle v_{ij_2} | U^{j_1, j_2} | v_{ij_1} \rangle|$ is close to 0. In the above example, if $|\langle v_{ij_2} | U^{j_1, j_2} | v_{ij_1} \rangle| = 0$ for $i = j_2$, it might be the case that a cheating Bob [after determining $f(i, j_1)$ honestly] finds $f(i, j_2) = 0$ for all values of i . Therefore, Bob gains no information about the value of i despite the high fidelity in Eq. (20).

I now argue that even atypical functions *cannot* be computed securely in nonideal one-sided secure computations whenever $\delta \ll 1$. It is easiest to understand my reasoning by working with an example. (I will present the general case in two paragraphs below.) Consider a situation in which a cheating Alice prepares an unequally weighted (i.e., non-maximally entangled) state instead of an equally weighted (i.e., maximally entangled) state in Eq. (5). For the function discussed above [$f(i, j) = 1$ if $i = j$ and $f(i, j) = 0$ otherwise], suppose a cheating Alice prepares the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |j_2\rangle_D \otimes |j_2\rangle_A + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2(n-1)}} \sum_{i \neq j_2} |i\rangle_D \otimes |i\rangle_A \quad (28)$$

in her EPR attack [instead of Eq. (5)]. Since Alice is not supposed to learn much about Bob's input j , one must still have $F(\rho_{j_1}^{\text{Alice}}, \rho_{j_2}^{\text{Alice}}) > 1 - \delta$. This now implies that

$$|\langle v_{j_2 j_2} | U^{j_1, j_2} | v_{j_2 j_1} \rangle| > 1 - 2\delta \quad (29)$$

and

$$\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{i \neq j_2} |\langle v_{ij_2} | U^{j_1, j_2} | v_{ij_1} \rangle| > 1 - 2\delta. \quad (30)$$

Notice that the various i 's fall into two classes [for $i = j_2$, $f(i, j_2) = 1$; for $i \neq j_2$, $f(i, j_2) = 0$] which are to be distinguished by Bob. Equation (29) ensures that Bob will find the value of $f(j_2, j_2)$ to be 1 with high probability. Similarly, Eq. (30) ensures that Bob finds that $f(i, j_2)$ to be zero with a high probability whenever $i \neq j_2$. Therefore, Bob can determine with some confidence whether $i = j_2$ and it is clear that, for this particular example of $f(i, j)$, even a nonideal one-sided secure computation is impossible.

Are secure one-sided computations impossible for *all* functions? I now prove rigorously that they are impossible for the case $\epsilon = 0$ in Eq. (22). The discussion for the case $\epsilon \neq 0$ will be postponed to the very end of this paragraph. When $\epsilon = 0$, Bob determines the value of $f(i, j_1)$ accurately

with certainty. Suppose he finds $f(i, j_1)$ to be c . He can restrict his attention to the set S of i 's that satisfy this constraint. If, for all pairs $i, i' \in S$, $f(i, j) = f(i', j)$ for all j 's, then Bob has nothing to gain in learning the value of $f(i, j_2)$. Suppose the contrary. Then there exists a j , say, j_2 , such that $f(i, j_2)$ is not a constant function in S . Let me partition the set S further into two or more subsets S_k 's according to the value of $f(i, j_2)$. Imagine a cheating Alice prepares a state

$$\sum_k |S_k|^{-1/2} \sum_{i \in S_k} |i\rangle \otimes |i\rangle. \quad (31)$$

Notice also that, with the above normalization factor $|S_k|^{-1/2}$, each set S_k in the partition is assigned equal weight by Alice. (Here we ignore the obvious overall normalization factor.) Such an assignment of weights maximizes the information gain by Bob in performing his measurement. It is then easy to see that as long as $\delta \ll 1$, Bob can determine with some confidence to which set S_k i belongs. This seriously violates the security requirement (c). In conclusion, I have shown rigorously that secure one-sided computations are always impossible for *any* function when $\epsilon = 0$. What about the general case when $\epsilon \neq 0$? Since there is no obvious singularity in the problem, provided that ϵ is sufficiently small, one-sided two-party secure computations should remain impossible.

Notice that in the above proof, I allow Bob's choice of the unitary transformation to be dependent on the value $f(i, j_1)$ that he has obtained. This is perfectly all right.

Finally, I remark that it is a matter of definition that a *one-sided* protocol must have $\delta \ll 1$ in Eq. (17). This is because a protocol with δ of order 1 in Eq. (17) is two sided rather than one sided. For discussions on two-sided protocols, see the next section.

A. Corollaries

Definition. *One-out-of-two oblivious transfer* is an example of one-sided two-party secure computation in which the sender sends two messages and the receiver chooses to receive either message but cannot read both. Besides, the sender, Alice, should not learn which message is read by the receiver, Bob. More precisely, Alice's input i is a pair of messages (m_0, m_1) and Bob's input j is a bit 0 or 1. At the end of the protocol, Bob learns about the message m_j , but not the other message $m_{\bar{j}}$, i.e., $f(m_0, m_1, j=0) = m_0$ and $f(m_0, m_1, j=1) = m_1$.

Corollary 1. Quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer is impossible.

Remark. As noted in the Introduction, one-out-of-two oblivious transfer is an important primitive for building up secure computations. The impossibility of one-out-of-two oblivious transfer itself is a major setback to quantum cryptography. Also, this corollary is a generalization of Wiesner's insight [2] which showed that it is impossible to achieve *ideal* quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer using only *one-way* communications.

Incidentally, there have been claims that quantum cryptography is useful for *one-way* oblivious identification [14,15]. Such a protocol would allow the first user Alice to

identify herself in front of a second user, Bob, by means of a password, known only to both. The safety requirement is that somebody, ignorant of the password, impersonating Bob shall not be able to obtain much information on the password from the identification process. One-way oblivious identification is an example of one-sided two-party secure computation in which the prescribed function $f(i,j) = 1$ if $i = j$ and $f(i,j) = 0$ otherwise. In other words, $f(i,j)$ gives a yes or no answer to the question whether the two persons have the same password. Such oblivious identification scheme is, therefore, very useful for preventing frauds from typing a PIN (personal identification number) to a dishonest teller machine that steals passwords. Hrubý is working on implementing a quantum Smart-card for identification purposes [30].

Corollary 2. Smart-card quantum one-way oblivious identification is impossible.

Remark. This result applies only to *one-sided* schemes for quantum oblivious identification, a subject that earlier papers [14,15] have focused on and wrongly claimed to achieve. However, one should note that in practical applications, assumption (b) in Sec. II can be relaxed. For example, it is conceivable that one can allow the customer, Alice, to learn substantial information about the input of Bob (the cash machine). When Bob finds out in the computation that someone is disguising herself as Alice (the answer is “no” in the computation), he can cancel Alice’s password and ask Alice to go to the bank in person to get a new password. Such a protocol is much less powerful than what the original protocols intend to achieve, but it is still somewhat useful. Also notice that the possibility of *two-sided* schemes for oblivious identification remains open. However, the following section shows that there exists a class of functions that cannot be computed securely in any two-sided two-party secure computation.

V. SECURITY OF TWO-SIDED TWO-PARTY COMPUTATIONS

Definition. Suppose Alice has a private input i and Bob a private input j . A *two-sided two-party secure computation* of a prescribed function $f(i,j)$ is a protocol such that, at the end, (a) both Alice and Bob learn $f(i,j)$, (b) Alice learns nothing about j more than what logically follows from $f(i,j)$ and her private input i , and (c) Bob learns nothing about i more than what logically follows from $f(i,j)$ and his private input j .

Notice that in classical cryptography, a one-sided two-party computation of a function $f(i,j)$ can be reduced to a two-sided two-party computation of a function $F(i,j,r) = f(i,j) \text{ XOR } r$ where r is a random string of input chosen by Bob and the XOR (exclusive OR) is taken bitwise.¹⁷ At the end of the protocol, both Alice and Bob learn $F(i,j,r)$. While Bob can invert the function to find $f(i,j) = F(i,j,r) \text{ XOR } r$, Alice, being ignorant of Bob’s input r , has absolutely no information about $f(i,j)$.

Here I demonstrate explicitly that the quantum two-sided

two-party computation of $F(i,j,r)$ is insecure. Alice’s density matrix at the end of the protocol should only be a function of i and $F(i,j,r)$. This is because $F(i,j,r)$ is the only piece of information that Alice is supposed to know about Bob’s inputs j and r . Let me therefore denote Alice’s density matrix by $\rho_{\text{Alice}}^{i,F(i,j,r)}$. Suppose a dishonest Bob inputs

$$|j_1\rangle \otimes 1 p^{-1/2} \sum_r |r\rangle \otimes |r\rangle_D \quad (32)$$

and keeps the system D for himself. [Here p is the cardinality of $f(i,j)$, as $f(i,j) \in \{1,2, \dots, p\}$.] In other words, he entangles the state of r with a quantum dice D and performs an EPR-type of cheating. Suppose further that an honest Alice inputs i . The density matrix that Alice has at the end of the protocol will simply be a normalized direct sum

$$\frac{1}{p} \sum_r \rho_{\text{Alice}}^{i,F(i,j_1,r)} \quad (33)$$

of the individual density matrices. For *any* fixed but arbitrary j , as r changes, $F(i,j,r)$ runs over all the p values $\{1,2, \dots, p\}$. [Recall that $F(i,j,r) = f(i,j) \text{ XOR } r$.] Consequently,

$$\frac{1}{p} \sum_r \rho_{\text{Alice}}^{i,F(i,j_1,r)} = \frac{1}{p} \sum_r \rho_{\text{Alice}}^{i,F(i,j_2,r)}; \quad (34)$$

i.e., Alice’s density matrix is *independent* of the value of j . But then by precisely the same attack as in the one-sided case—by determining the value of $f(i,j_1)$, changing j from j_1 to j_2 by a unitary transformation, determining the value of $f(i,j_2)$, and so on, Bob can determine the value of $f(i,j)$ for all values of j . This violates the security requirement (c) for the two-sided protocol. In conclusion, there are functions, namely, $F(i,j_1,r) = f(i,j) \text{ XOR } r$, that cannot be computed securely by any two-sided protocol.

VI. SUMMARIES AND DISCUSSIONS

This paper deals with the applications of quantum cryptography in the protection of private information during public decision (rather than with the most well-known application—so-called quantum key distribution). As an important example, in a one-sided two-party secure computation, a party Alice has a private input i and the other party Bob who has a private input j . Alice helps Bob to compute a prescribed function $f(i,j)$ in such a way that, at the end of

¹⁷I thank R. Cleve for enlightening discussions about this point.

the protocol, (a) Bob learns $f(i, j)$, (b) Alice learns nothing (or almost nothing) about j , and (c) Bob knows essentially nothing about i other than what logically follows from the value of j and $f(i, j)$. [For example, in password identification $f(i, j) = 1$ if $i = j$ and $= 0$ otherwise.] Notice that Bob is supposed to choose a j (say, j_1) and learn $f(i, j)$ for that particular value of j only. However, I prove that quantum one-sided two-party computation is always insecure because Bob can learn $f(i, j)$ for *all* values of j . In the cheating strategy that I consider, Bob determines the values of $f(i, j)$ for the various values of j 's successively.¹⁸ That is, Bob inputs $j = j_1$, determines the value of $f(i, j_1)$, changes j to j_2 , determines $f(i, j_2)$, and so on.

Such a cheating strategy works for two reasons. For simplicity, let me first consider the ideal protocol. Let Bob input $j = j_1$ initially. Using the insight from the impossibility of bit commitment [20–23], I prove that, owing to the security requirement (b), Bob can cheat at the end of the protocol by changing the value of j from j_1 to j_2 . Thus he can determine the value of $f(i, j_2)$ instead of $f(i, j_1)$ as long as he has *not* performed a measurement to determine $f(i, j_1)$ yet. Of course, Bob is interested in learning $f(i, j_1)$ as well. So he must first measure the value of $f(i, j_1)$ before rotating j from j_1 to j_2 . If I can show that his measurement of $f(i, j_1)$ does not disturb the quantum state he possesses, it is clear that this cheating strategy will work. This is precisely what I do: Since in an ideal protocol with an input $j = j_1$ Bob can unambiguously determine the value of $f(i, j_1)$ [security requirement (a)], the density matrix that Bob has must be an eigenstate of the measurement operator that he uses. Consequently, he can measure the value of $f(i, j_1)$ *without* disturbing the quantum state of the signal at all. [Notice that, in effect, I have shown that, owing to the security requirements (a) and (b), the density matrix that Bob has is a simultaneous eigenstate of $f(i, j_1), f(i, j_2), \dots, f(i, j_m)$. This contradicts security requirement (c).]

These two points taken together mean that this cheating strategy beats an ideal protocol for one-sided two-party computation.¹⁹ In Sec. IV, I generalized my result to show that a similar attack defeats nonideal protocols as well. In conclusion, I have shown that quantum one-sided two-party secure computation (ideal or nonideal) is always impossible.

As corollaries to my results, contrary to popular belief in earlier literature, quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer and one-way oblivious identification are also impossible. As argued in the Introduction, the reduction theorem in classical cryptography must remain valid in a quantum model. There-

fore, it can be used to show that quantum (ordinary) oblivious transfer is impossible. In the future, it would be interesting to work out a direct attack that defeats quantum oblivious transfer.

Since a one-sided two-party computation of a function can be reduced to a two-sided two-party computation of a related function, there are functions that cannot be computed securely in two-sided two-party computations as well. Can *any* function be computed securely in a quantum two-sided two-party computation? While I do not have a definite answer, the argument for impossibility of ideal quantum coin tossing [23] can be used to prove the impossibility of *ideal* two-sided two-party secure computation (and also ideal so-called zero-knowledge proof). Furthermore, Sec. IV of Ref. [23] shows that quantum two-sided two-party secure computation can never be done *efficiently*.²⁰ In conclusion, these results rule out the perfect or nearly perfect protection of private information in one-sided two-party computations by quantum mechanics. The security of the quantum two-sided two-party computation is also shown to be in very serious trouble.

In retrospect, there were good reasons for the reexamination of the foundations of quantum cryptographic protocols such as secure computation: While the security of quantum key distribution can intuitively be attributed to the quantum no-cloning theorem, no simple physical reason has ever been given to the security of other quantum cryptographic protocols such as bit commitment. This is a highly unsatisfactory situation. Besides, most proposed quantum protocols are highly inefficient. From both theoretical and practical points of view, a more fundamental understanding of the issues of security and efficiency of those protocols would therefore be most welcome. In the claimed “secure” quantum bit commitment protocol [16], researchers have implicitly assumed that measurements are made by the two parties. However, what researchers including myself [20–23] have recently shown is that by using a quantum computer and performing an EPR-type of attack, the party, Bob, can defeat the security requirement of the protocol. This is remarkable because the basic idea of the EPR attack can be found in [5]. Moreover, the attack against two-party secure computations presented here is identical in spirit to the one considered by Wiesner [2]. Quantum protocols such as bit commitment and secure computations are broken because their foundation has been shaky in the first place.

I emphasize that the cheating strategy proposed in this paper generally requires a quantum computer to implement. Before a quantum computer is ever built, quantum one-sided two-party secure computations may still be secure in practice. Besides, apart from the quantum key distribution (which

¹⁸See footnote 8.

¹⁹As discussed in the Introduction, one may also use the classical reduction theorem from bit commitment to one-out-of-two oblivious transfer to argue the impossibility of quantum one-sided two-party computations. Such proof is, however, not transparent at all. Yet another alternative proof of the insecurity of *ideal* quantum one-sided two-party computation can be made by combining the idea of the proof of the impossibility of quantum bit commitment with a generalization of Wiesner’s early insight [2] on the insecurity of a subclass of quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer schemes. Such proof is, however, nonconstructive and does not apply directly to nonideal protocols. I shall, therefore, omit it here.

²⁰Let me normalize everything so that Alice and Bob both learn one bit of information from executing a two-sided two-party computation. If both parties are shameless enough to stop running the protocol whenever one of them has an amount of information that is ϵ greater than his or her opponent, it is easy to show [23] that the number N of rounds of communications needed for the protocol to be successful has to satisfy $N\epsilon \geq 1$. An exponentially small ϵ requires an exponentially large N and the scheme is necessarily inefficient.

is widely accepted to be secure), partial security provided by applications such as quantum money may still be very useful.

On the positive side, the impossibility of quantum one-sided two-party computation together with the impossibility of quantum bit commitment [20–23] constitutes a major victory of cryptanalysis against *quantum* cryptography. On the one hand, the quantum key distribution is secure because, heuristically, of the quantum no-cloning theorem. On the other hand, quantum bit commitment and quantum one-sided two-party computation are impossible essentially because of the EPR paradox. Therefore, there are now solid foundations to both quantum cryptography and quantum cryptanalysis—the two sides of the coin in quantum cryptology. A key question remains as to the exact boundary to the power of quantum cryptography. For instance, what is the power of quantum cryptography in providing partial security in applications such as quantum money? Perhaps, new physical insights can be gained in the attempts to answer this question.

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