





## Approximate reconstructability of quantum states and noisy quantum secret sharing schemes

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We introduce and analyze approximate quantum secret sharing in a formal cryptographic setting, wherein a dealer encodes and distributes a quantum secret to players such that authorized structures (sets of subsets of players) can approximately reconstruct the quantum secret and omnipotent adversarial agents controlling nonauthorized subsets of players are approximately denied the quantum secret. In particular, viewing the map encoding the quantum secret shares for players in an authorized structure as a quantum channel, we show that approximate reconstructability of the quantum secret by these players is possible if and only if the information leakage, given in terms of a certain entanglement-assisted capacity of the complementary quantum channel to the players outside the structure and the environment, is small.

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### I. INTRODUCTION

Quantum resources enable cryptographic tasks beyond what is classically possible. For instance, quantum key distribution [1,2] provides an information-theoretic means for generating shared classical keys. Secret sharing (SS) is another fundamental cryptographic primitive, wherein a dealer (D) distributes a secret as shares to a set of players,  $\mathcal{P}$ , such that any group in the authorized structure  $\Gamma \subseteq 2^{\mathcal{P}}$  (sets of authorized subsets of the players) reconstructs the secret by combining shares and decoding, whereas groups in the complementary adversarial structure  $\bar{\Gamma} = 2^{\mathcal{P}} \setminus \Gamma$  cannot obtain any information about the secret. SS has been quantized in two ways: quantum-safe classical SS [3] and the version we employ here—quantum secret sharing (QSS) [4] as a special case of quantum error correction [5]—which can be partially unified via quantum graph states for qubits [6] and subsequently for qudits [7]. Quantum secret sharing has applications in quantum Byzantine agreements [8] and distributed quantum computation [9], among others.

Ideal  $(t, n)$ -threshold QSS features perfect reconstructability and perfect secrecy, as elucidated in Fig. 1(a); i.e., any  $t$  out of  $n$  players can reconstruct the secret perfectly, and perfect secrecy means that fewer than  $t$  players do not gain any information about the secret. From this foundation, generalized QSS can be constructed from threshold QSS by evenly or

unevenly distributing shares to players [4,10,11]. In  $(t, n)$ -QSS [3,4,10], a dealer (D) employs an encoding map  $\mathcal{E}$  to encode a quantum secret,  $\rho \in \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{H})$  (trace-class positive density operator), into  $n$   $q$ -dimensional qudits, i.e., onto Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}_q^{\otimes n}$  ( $n$ -fold tensor product of  $q$ -dimensional Hilbert spaces). Each share of one qudit is sent to one of  $n$  players, such that  $\Gamma$  comprises all groups of at least  $t$  players and  $\bar{\Gamma}$  is the complement, namely, all groups of fewer than  $t$  players.

Here, we construct a theory of approximate secrecy and reconstructability by introducing an adversary model, as shown in Fig. 1(b). In our model, the adversary structure comprises omnipotent adversaries who are denied control over  $\Gamma$ , but can collaborate with players in  $\bar{\Gamma}$ . Imperfect SS has been considered, but strong assumptions on the adversary's capability are required [12]. In contrast, the dichotomy between reconstructability and secrecy is quite general and is inherently quantum due to the no-cloning principle [13,14], devoid of any classical analog: classically, the ability to copy a secret allows an authorized set to reconstruct the secret exactly, but cannot provide a guarantee that an adversary who could have intercepted the communication cannot do the same. Approximate QSS relaxes the requirements of perfect reconstructability for  $\Gamma$  and perfect secrecy for  $\bar{\Gamma}$ . Approximate quantum secret sharing schemes derived from quantum Reed-Solomon codes were investigated in [15], but this leaves open the question of how more general approximate quantum secret sharing schemes perform. The dichotomy between approximate recoverability and approximate secrecy has also been investigated [11,16–18], but it remains unclear how these quantities relate to the maximum rate at which the secret is transmitted to the adversary.

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


FIG. 1. (a) Ideal threshold QSS scheme. The dealer encodes the secret with channel  $\mathcal{E}$  and distributes the shares to players 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Players in the set  $A = \{3, 4, 5\}$  collaborate in the decoding using the map  $\mathcal{R}_A$  and reconstruct the secret. We label the players outside  $A$  as  $\bar{A} = \{1, 2\}$ . (b) Adversarial attack on a threshold QSS scheme. The adversary colludes with players 1 and 2. They apply the map  $\mathcal{Z}_A$  on the players’ qudits, potentially adding noise to the systems of any player. Depending on the attack, the legitimate players can still approximately recover the secret  $|\psi\rangle$ .

**II. MAIN RESULT**

Consider now a  $(t, n)$ -threshold QSS scheme where a  $q$ -dimensional secret is shared with players holding qudits ( $d$ -dimensional quantum systems). In our model, given any  $A \in \Gamma$ , the adversary can attack all qudits after the dealer applies the encoding map  $\mathcal{E}$  and prior to reconstruction. The effect of the adversary’s action amounts to applying an effective channel  $\mathcal{Z}_A$ . Thus, the quantum channel mapping the quantum secret to the quantum state on  $A$  just before reconstruction is

$$\mathcal{N}_A = \text{tr}_{\bar{A}} \circ \mathcal{Z}_A \circ \mathcal{E}, \tag{1}$$

with  $\text{tr}_{\bar{A}}$  denoting the partial trace that removes the players in  $\bar{A} = \{1, \dots, n\} \setminus A$ . The  $|A|$  authorized players then apply a recovery channel  $\mathcal{R}_A$  that maps the qudits labeled by  $A$  to a single  $q$ -dimensional system.

We then define our  $(t, n)$ -threshold QSS scheme to be  $\delta$ -reconstructable if

$$\delta = \max_{A:|A|\geq t} \min_{\mathcal{R}_A} D_\diamond(\mathcal{R}_A \circ \mathcal{N}_A, \mathcal{I}), \tag{2}$$

where the reconstruction channels  $\mathcal{R}_A$  are of the form above,  $\mathcal{I}$  denotes the identity channel, and  $D_\diamond$  denotes the diamond (or stabilized) norm distance between quantum channels (see below). Here the maximization is over all authorized groups, but without loss of generality we can restrict to structures with  $|A| = t$ . The diamond norm distance between two channels  $\mathcal{E}$  and  $\mathcal{F}$  is defined as

$$D_\diamond(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}) = \max_{|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H} \otimes \mathcal{H}'} \frac{1}{2} \|\mathcal{E} \otimes \mathcal{I}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|) - \mathcal{F} \otimes \mathcal{I}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)\|_1, \tag{3}$$

where  $\|\cdot\|_1$  is the Schatten 1-norm and the optimization goes over all auxiliary Hilbert spaces  $\mathcal{H}'$ . The use of a stabilized distance here is crucial as it ensures that arbitrary secrets can be restored, inclusive of their correlations with a quantum memory held by a third party.

Alternatively, we can replace  $D_\diamond$  with a fidelity-based stabilized distance, namely,

$$F_\diamond(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}) = \min_{|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H} \otimes \mathcal{H}'} F[\mathcal{E} \otimes \mathcal{I}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|), \mathcal{F} \otimes \mathcal{I}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)], \tag{4}$$

where  $F$  is the Uhlmann fidelity,  $F(\rho, \tau) = \|\sqrt{\rho}\sqrt{\tau}\|_1^2$ . We say that the scheme is  $\epsilon$ -reconstructable in fidelity if

$$\epsilon = 1 - \min_{A:t \leq |A|} \max_{\mathcal{R}_A} F_\diamond(\mathcal{R}_A \circ \mathcal{N}_A, \mathcal{I}). \tag{5}$$

We can relate the two notions of recoverability using Fuchs–van de Graaf inequalities, namely, for any quantum channel  $\mathcal{F}$ , we show in the Appendix that

$$D_\diamond(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{I}) \geq 1 - F_\diamond(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{I}) \geq D_\diamond(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{I})^2. \tag{6}$$

From this, we can immediately conclude that  $\gamma$ -recoverability in fidelity implies  $\sqrt{\gamma}$ -recoverability in the diamond norm and, conversely,  $\delta$ -recoverability in the diamond norm implies  $\delta$ -recoverability in fidelity also.

Next, we establish the notion of approximate secrecy. For this, we need to introduce *complementary channels* [19] for the channels  $\mathcal{N}_A$ , which intuitively model how much information the adversary retains after the attack. In particular, for a channel  $\mathcal{N}_A$ , we introduce its Stinespring isometry  $\mathcal{U}$  and define  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A = \text{tr}_A \circ \mathcal{U}$ , where  $\text{tr}_A$  is the partial trace removing the authorized set. Here, if  $\mathcal{E}$  has Kraus operators  $E_i$ ,  $\mathcal{Z}_A$  has Kraus operators  $Z_{A,j}$ , and the partial trace on  $\bar{A}$  has Kraus operators  $\langle k_{\bar{A}} | \otimes I_A$ , where  $I_A$  is the identity operator on the authorized set  $A$ , then  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A$  has Kraus operators  $(\langle k_{\bar{A}} | \otimes I_A) Z_{A,j} E_i$ . Then, define the operator  $W = \sum_{i,j,k} |i, j, k\rangle \otimes [(\langle k_{\bar{A}} | \otimes I_A) Z_{A,j} E_i]$ . The map  $\mathcal{U}$  is then defined as  $\mathcal{U}(\rho) = W \rho W^\dagger$ .

With this, we say that a  $(t, n)$ -threshold QSS scheme has  $\epsilon$ -secrecy if

$$\epsilon = 1 - \min_{A:|A|\geq t} \max_{\sigma} F_\diamond(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A, \mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}), \tag{7}$$

where  $\mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}$  is a preparation channel that prepares a fixed density matrix  $\sigma$ . Namely,  $\mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}$  traces out the qudits of the players in  $A$  and prepares a quantum state described by the density matrix  $\sigma$ , where the output  $\sigma$  does not contain any information about the input state, i.e., the input state is completely hidden. Hence, when  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A = \mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}$  for some  $\sigma$ , we have  $\epsilon = 0$ : a condition for perfect secrecy. The other extreme case is when  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A = \mathcal{I}$ , i.e., all the information is leaking through  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A$ . In this case, it can be seen that  $\epsilon = 1$ .

Finally, we define the strength  $C$  of the adversarial model for a  $(t, n)$ -threshold QSS scheme,

$$C = \max_{A:|A|\geq t} C(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A), \tag{8}$$

where  $C(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A)$  is the entanglement-assisted classical capacity of  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A$ , which is defined for a channel  $\mathcal{N}$  with input labeled by  $X$  and output labeled by  $Y$  as

$$C(\mathcal{N}) = \max_{|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_X \otimes \mathcal{H}_X} I(X : Y)_\tau, \tag{9}$$

where  $\tau = \mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{N}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)$  and  $I(X : Y)_\tau$  is the quantum mutual information evaluated for the state  $\tau$ . The mutual information itself can be expressed in terms of the Umegaki relative entropy, denoted  $D(\cdot\|\cdot)$ , namely,

$$I(X : Y)_\tau = \min_{\rho_Y} D(\tau\|\rho_X \otimes \rho_Y), \tag{10}$$

where  $\rho_X$  and  $\rho_Y$  are the marginals of  $\tau$ . Using this, we can introduce a modified entanglement-assisted capacity, where  $I(X : Y)_\tau$  is replaced by

$$\tilde{I}(X : Y)_\tau = -\max_{\rho_Y} \ln F(\tau, \rho_X \otimes \rho_Y), \tag{11}$$

which is a variant of the mutual information based on the sandwiched Rényi relative entropy of order  $1/2$  [20,21], given by

$$\tilde{D}_\alpha(\rho\|\sigma) = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \ln \text{tr} \left[ \left( \sigma^{\frac{1-\alpha}{2\alpha}} \right)^\alpha \rho \left( \sigma^{\frac{1-\alpha}{2\alpha}} \right)^\alpha \right]^\alpha, \tag{12}$$

where  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$  are quantum states and  $\alpha \neq 1$ . The corresponding generalized mutual information is  $\tilde{I}_\alpha(X : Y)_\tau = \min_{\rho_Y} \tilde{D}_\alpha(\tau\|\rho_X \otimes \rho_Y)$  [22], and  $\tilde{I}(X : Y)_\tau = \tilde{I}_{1/2}(X : Y)_\tau$ . The quantity  $C_\alpha(\mathcal{N}) = \max_\tau \tilde{I}_\alpha(X : Y)_\tau$  is a generalized entanglement-assisted capacity because  $C(\mathcal{N}) = \lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} C_\alpha(\mathcal{N})$ . Next, we define the modified strength of the adversarial model as  $\tilde{C} = \max_{|A| \geq t} C_{1/2}(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A)$ , which corresponds to setting  $\alpha = 1/2$ . The value of  $\alpha = 1/2$  is chosen to express the generalized mutual information in terms of fidelity. Since  $\tilde{D}_\alpha$  is monotone nondecreasing in  $\alpha$  [20], we can deduce that  $C \geq \tilde{C}$ .

With all this preparation in hand, we can now state our main result.

*Theorem 1.* Consider any  $(t, n)$  QSS scheme with an adversarial model. The following are equivalent:

- (i) The adversarial model has modified strength  $\tilde{C}$ .
- (ii) The scheme has  $\epsilon$ -secrecy with  $\epsilon = 1 - \exp(-\tilde{C})$ .
- (iii) The secret is  $\epsilon$ -reconstructable in terms of fidelity.

An immediate corollary of this, given the relations discussed above, is that if the adversarial model has strength at most  $C$ , then the secret is  $\delta$ -recoverable in diamond distance with  $\delta \leq \sqrt{1 - \exp(-C)}$ .

*Proof of Theorem 1.* From Beny-Oreshkov duality [23] between channels and complementary channels, we have

$$\max_{\mathcal{R}} F_\diamond(\mathcal{R} \circ \mathcal{N}, \mathcal{M}) = \max_{\mathcal{S}} F_\diamond(\hat{\mathcal{N}}, \mathcal{S} \circ \hat{\mathcal{M}}), \tag{13}$$

where optimizations are over all quantum channels with appropriate input and output dimensions. Suppose that our scheme is  $\epsilon$ -reconstructable in fidelity. By applying Beny-Oreshkov duality, we get that for any  $A \subset \{1, \dots, n\}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon &= 1 - \min_{A:|A| \geq t} \max_{\mathcal{R}_A} F_\diamond(\mathcal{R}_A \circ \mathcal{N}_A, \mathcal{I}) \\ &= 1 - \min_{A:|A| \geq t} \max_{\mathcal{S}_A} F_\diamond(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A, \mathcal{S}_A \circ \hat{\mathcal{I}}). \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

As  $\hat{\mathcal{I}}$  is the trace channel,  $\mathcal{S}_A \circ \hat{\mathcal{I}}$  is, without loss of generality, a preparation channel  $\mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}$  which prepares a state  $\sigma$ . Since this applies for all  $A$  such that  $|A| \geq t$ , it follows that the QSS scheme also has  $\epsilon$ -secrecy.

The crucial step in our proof relates  $\max_\sigma F_\diamond(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A, \mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma})$  to the entanglement-assisted capacity of  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A$  using the following lemma.

*Lemma 1.* For any  $A \subset \{1, \dots, n\}$ ,

$$\max_\sigma F_\diamond(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A, \mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}) = e^{-\tilde{C}_A}, \tag{15}$$

where  $\tilde{C}_A = C_{1/2}(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A)$ .

In essence, Lemma 1 connects the worst-case entanglement fidelity with a variant of the entanglement-assisted capacity that arises from generalized sandwiched Rényi divergences.

The first step in proving Lemma 1 is to show that

$$F_\diamond(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A, \mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}) = \min_\rho q(\rho, \sigma)^2, \tag{16}$$

where

$$q(\rho, \sigma) = F[(\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I)J(\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I), \rho \otimes \sigma]^{1/2}. \tag{17}$$

Here,

$$J = (\mathbb{1} \otimes \hat{\mathcal{N}}_A) \sum_{i,j} |\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i| \langle\psi_j| \langle\psi_j| \tag{18}$$

is the Choi-Jamiolkowski matrix [24,25] of the channel  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A$ , and  $I$  denotes an identity matrix. To show (16), we initially write the spectral decomposition of any density matrix  $\rho$  as  $\rho = \sum_i \lambda_i |\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i|$ , where  $|\psi_i\rangle$  denotes an orthonormal basis. Since  $\lambda_i$  are non-negative, we can write  $\sqrt{\rho} = \sum_i \sqrt{\lambda_i} |\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i|$ . Next, the purification of  $\rho$  is  $|\psi_\rho\rangle = \sum_i \sqrt{\lambda_i} |\psi_i\rangle |\psi_i\rangle$ . If we trace out either the first or second part of the system of the purified state  $|\psi_\rho\rangle$ , we will reconstruct the state  $\rho$ . Using this notation, note that when  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A$  takes as input the state  $\rho$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \tau &= (\mathbb{1} \otimes \hat{\mathcal{N}}_A)(|\psi_\rho\rangle\langle\psi_\rho|) \\ &= \sum_{i,j} \sqrt{\lambda_i} \sqrt{\lambda_j} (\mathbb{1} \otimes \hat{\mathcal{N}}_A)(|\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i| \langle\psi_j| \langle\psi_j|) \\ &= (\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I)(\mathbb{1} \otimes \hat{\mathcal{N}}_A) \left( \sum_{i,j} |\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i| \langle\psi_j| \langle\psi_j| \right) (\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I) \\ &= (\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I)J(\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I). \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

Hence we can see that

$$\begin{aligned} F_\diamond(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A, \mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}) &= F[(\mathbb{1} \otimes \hat{\mathcal{N}}_A)(|\psi_\rho\rangle\langle\psi_\rho|), \rho \otimes \sigma] \\ &= F[(\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I)J(\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I), \rho \otimes \sigma] \\ &= [\text{tr} \sqrt{(\sqrt{\rho} \otimes \sqrt{\sigma})(\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I)J(\sqrt{\rho} \otimes I)(\sqrt{\rho} \otimes \sqrt{\sigma})}]^2 \\ &= [\text{tr} \sqrt{(\rho \otimes \sqrt{\sigma})J(\rho \otimes \sqrt{\sigma})}]^2. \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

Using the definition of the fidelity, we note that

$$q(\rho, \sigma) = \text{tr} \sqrt{(\rho \otimes \sigma^{1/2})J(\rho \otimes \sigma^{1/2})} \tag{21}$$

$$= \text{tr} \sqrt{J^{1/2}(\rho^2 \otimes \sigma)J^{1/2}} \tag{22}$$

$$= \|J^{1/2}(\rho \otimes \sqrt{\sigma})\|_1. \tag{23}$$

Here, in the penultimate equality, we use the fact  $\text{tr}(XJX)^{1/2} = \text{tr}(J^{1/2}X^2J^{1/2})^{1/2}$  for positive semidefinite  $X$  and  $J$ . From (20) and (21), we can establish (16).

The second step in the proof of Lemma 1 is to show that the function  $q(\rho, \sigma)$  is convex in the density matrix  $\rho$  and concave in the density matrix  $\sigma$ . Concavity of  $q(\rho, \sigma)$  in  $\sigma$

is immediate from the fact that the expression in (22),  $\omega \mapsto \text{tr}\sqrt{\omega}$ , is concave and the linearity of the expression under the square root in  $\sigma$ . To show convexity in  $\rho$ , we simply note that any norm as in (23) is convex, and the expression inside the norm is linear in  $\rho$ . Since  $q(\rho, \sigma)$  is convex in  $\rho$  and concave in  $\sigma$ , we can apply the minimax theorem [26] to interchange the maximization and minimization, in the sense that

$$\max_{\sigma} \min_{\rho} q(\rho, \sigma) = \min_{\rho} \max_{\sigma} q(\rho, \sigma). \quad (24)$$

Third, we use (24) along with the identity (16) to establish the equivalence between a fidelity and Rényi mutual information.

Denoting the input and output registers of  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A$  as  $X$  and  $Y$ , respectively, we see that

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{I}(X : Y)_{\tau} &= \min_{\sigma} \tilde{D}_{1/2}[(\mathbb{1} \otimes \hat{\mathcal{N}}_A)(|\psi_{\rho}\rangle\langle\psi_{\rho}| \otimes \sigma)] \\ &= \min_{\sigma} \{-\ln F[(\mathbb{1} \otimes \hat{\mathcal{N}}_A)(|\psi_{\rho}\rangle\langle\psi_{\rho}|, \rho \otimes \sigma)]\} \\ &= \min_{\sigma} [-\ln q(\rho, \sigma)^2]. \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

Because  $-\ln$  is a monotone decreasing function, we deduce that  $\tilde{I}(X : Y)_{\tau} = -\ln[\max_{\sigma} q(\rho, \sigma)^2]$ . Applying the definition of the generalized entanglement-assisted capacity, we get  $\tilde{C}_A = -\ln[\min_{\rho} \max_{\sigma} q(\rho, \sigma)^2]$ . Next, the minimax result (24) implies that

$$\tilde{C}_A = -\ln[\max_{\sigma} \min_{\rho} q(\rho, \sigma)^2]. \quad (26)$$

Next, from (16), we can see that  $\max_{\sigma} F_{\diamond}(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A, \mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}) = \max_{\sigma} \min_{\rho} q(\rho, \sigma)^2$ . Hence,

$$\exp(-\tilde{C}_A) = \max_{\sigma} F_{\diamond}(\hat{\mathcal{N}}_A, \mathcal{V}_{A,\sigma}), \quad (27)$$

and the proof of Lemma 1 follows. Putting Lemma 1 and (14) together, we complete the proof of Theorem 1.  $\blacksquare$

### III. CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND OPEN QUESTIONS

We have established that the entanglement-assisted capacity of a channel connecting the quantum secret to the quantum systems of the adversary determines both the approximate reconstructability and the approximate secrecy of a threshold QSS scheme. In some sense, our result can be intuitively understood from the mantra ‘‘Quantum information cannot be learnt without disturbing it.’’ This mantra can be used to obtain interpretations of a multitude of topics in quantum theory, such as approximate quantum error correction [27–31], monogamy of entanglement [32], and the quantum information of black-hole evaporation [33]. Particularly for quantum error correction, the encoding map in a QSS scheme takes the quantum secret to a quantum error correction code, and the approximate reconstructability of the secret is precisely the approximate reconstructability of the code. In this regard, our theorem implies that if the adversaries trying to learn the secret have access to a channel with entanglement-assisted capacity of  $C$ , then there exists a decoding operation that reconstructs the secret up to an error of  $\delta$ , quantified in terms of the diamond distance, where  $\delta \leq \sqrt{1 - \exp(-C)}$ . It remains an open question as to how different types of capacities other

than the entanglement-assisted capacity influences the theory of approximate QSS.

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### APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

First we define some notation. Given a Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}$ , let  $|\mathcal{H}|$  denote its dimension. We restrict our attention to finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Let  $\mathbf{M}(\mathcal{H})$  denote the set of matrix representations of linear operators on Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}$ . Let  $\mathbf{D}(\mathcal{H})$  denote the set of operators in  $\mathbf{M}(\mathcal{H})$  that have unit trace and are positive semidefinite. A quantum channel is a completely positive and trace-preserving map from  $\mathbf{M}(\mathcal{H})$  to  $\mathbf{M}(\mathcal{K})$ , where  $\mathcal{H}$  and  $\mathcal{K}$  are Hilbert spaces. We use the shorthand ( $\mathcal{N}$  CPT) to indicate that  $\mathcal{N}$  is a quantum channel.

*Proof of Eq. (6).* Note that for a channel  $\mathcal{F} : \mathbf{M}(\mathcal{H}) \rightarrow \mathbf{M}(\mathcal{K})$ ,

$$F(\mathcal{F}, \mathbb{1}) = \min_{\substack{|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H} \otimes \mathcal{H} \\ \|\psi\rangle = 1}} F[|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|, (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{F})(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)]. \quad (A1)$$

Now, for any pure state  $|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$  and mixed state  $\sigma$ , we have

$$F(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|, \sigma) = \langle\psi|\sigma|\psi\rangle. \quad (A2)$$

From the Fuchs–van de Graaf inequalities, we have

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - \frac{1}{2}\| |\psi\rangle\langle\psi| - \sigma \|_1)^2 &\leq F(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|, \sigma), \\ F(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|, \sigma) &\leq 1 - \frac{1}{4}\| |\psi\rangle\langle\psi| - \sigma \|_1^2. \end{aligned} \quad (A3)$$

We thereby deduce that

$$\begin{aligned} F(\mathcal{F}, \mathbb{1}) &\leq 1 - \max_{\substack{|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H} \otimes \mathcal{H} \\ \|\psi\rangle = 1}} \frac{1}{4}\| |\psi\rangle\langle\psi| - (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{F})(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|) \|_1^2 \\ &= 1 - \frac{1}{4}\| \mathbb{1} - \mathcal{F} \|_{\diamond}^2 \\ &= 1 - D_{\diamond}(\mathbb{1}, \mathcal{F})^2 \end{aligned} \quad (A4)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} F(\mathcal{F}, \mathbb{1}) &\geq [1 - \max_{\substack{|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H} \otimes \mathcal{H} \\ \|\psi\rangle = 1}} \frac{1}{2}\| |\psi\rangle\langle\psi| - (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{F})(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|) \|_1]^2 \\ &= (1 - \frac{1}{2}\| \mathbb{1} - \mathcal{F} \|_{\diamond})^2 \\ &= [1 - D_{\diamond}(\mathbb{1}, \mathcal{F})]^2. \end{aligned} \quad (A5)$$

Hence,

$$[1 - D_{\diamond}(\mathbb{1}, \mathcal{F})]^2 \leq F(\mathcal{F}, \mathbb{1}) \leq 1 - D_{\diamond}(\mathbb{1}, \mathcal{F})^2. \quad (\text{A6})$$

For a tighter lower bound, note that [[34], Lemma 9.1.1]

$$\frac{1}{2} \|\psi\rangle\langle\psi| - \sigma\|_1 = \max_{0 \leq P \leq I} \text{tr} P(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi| - \sigma), \quad (\text{A7})$$

and by picking  $P = |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$ , we get

$$\frac{1}{2} \|\psi\rangle\langle\psi| - \sigma\|_1 \geq 1 - \langle\psi|\sigma|\psi\rangle = 1 - F(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|, \sigma), \quad (\text{A8})$$

and hence

$$1 - D_{\diamond}(\mathbb{1}, \mathcal{F}) \leq F(\mathcal{F}, \mathbb{1}) \leq 1 - D_{\diamond}(\mathbb{1}, \mathcal{F})^2, \quad (\text{A9})$$

which proves Eq. (6) in the main manuscript. ■

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