

**Quantifying nonlocality as a resource for device-independent quantum key distribution**

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We introduce, for any bipartite Bell scenario, a measure that quantifies both the amount of nonlocality and the efficiency in device-independent quantum key distribution of a set of measurement outcome probabilities. It is a proper measure of nonlocality as it vanishes when this set is Bell local and does not increase under the allowed transformations of the nonlocality resource theory. This device-independent key rate  $R$  is defined by optimizing over a class of protocols, to generate the raw keys, in which each legitimate party does not use just one preselected measurement but randomly chooses at each round one among all the measurements at its disposal. A common and secret key can certainly be established when  $R$  is positive but not when it is zero. For any continuous proper measure of nonlocality  $N$ ,  $R$  is tightly lower bounded by a nondecreasing function of  $N$  that vanishes when  $N$  does. There can thus be a threshold value for the amount of nonlocality as quantified by  $N$  above which a secret key is surely achievable. A readily computable measure with such a threshold exists for two two-outcome measurements per legitimate party.

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Using a secret sequence of characters, termed a key, for encryption and decryption, allows one to transmit a message in an absolutely confidential way. The aim of quantum key distribution (QKD) studies is to examine whether two distant legitimate users, usually named Alice and Bob, can establish such a key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, within the framework of quantum mechanics [1]. To do so, Alice and Bob need at least to be able to generate, process, and exchange random numbers and each to choose one out of several measurements to perform on quantum systems. The communication channel between them is public. Namely, any message sent over it becomes known to all parties. Moreover, Alice's and Bob's quantum systems in general share a global state with systems that Eve can manipulate as she wishes. On the other hand, Eve does not know which measurements Alice and Bob actually perform, the outcomes they get, and the results of their classical computations. The first security analyses of QKD schemes apply only to specific quantum systems Hilbert spaces and measurement operators on these spaces [1–7]. Consequently, a concrete implementation must follow the ideal model exactly.

Device-independent QKD (DIQKD) protocols, on the contrary, do not require that Alice and Bob know anything about the sizes and states of the quantum systems and about the measurement devices [8,9]. They can only estimate the probabilities of the measurement outcomes. To establish a common and secret key, they first generate raw keys using measurement outcomes. These keys are not fully confidential and not completely identical to each other. Alice and Bob change them into the final key using random number generators, classical processors, and the public channel. In Refs. [8,9], only the so-called collective attacks, during the generation of the raw keys, are considered. Namely, it is assumed that Eve prepares a tripartite quantum system in the same state several times and

that Alice's and Bob's possible measurements are the same each time. But the measurements may actually be performed on a global system which is not necessarily in a product state and the measurement devices may work differently from one round to another [10,11]. Furthermore, these apparatuses may have internal memories [12–14]. The security of a DIQKD protocol, for one execution, against these most general attacks follows from that against collective attacks [14].

Device-dependent QKD is closely related to quantum entanglement. Some proposed protocols rely on entangled Alice's and Bob's quantum systems [3,5]. Moreover, the security of those known as prepare-and-measure protocols, for which such quantum correlations are absent, results from that of corresponding entanglement-based protocols [4,6,7]. Entanglement is a useful resource for many tasks and different measures of the entanglement of quantum states, appropriate for different tasks, have been introduced [15]. In more specific terms, entanglement theory is a resource theory. Entanglement cannot increase under local operations and classical communication and vanishes for separable states [15–20]. Consequently, a proper measure of entanglement, called an entanglement monotone, is nonincreasing under these allowed transformations and is zero for separable states. The distillable key rate, defined for a given legitimate QKD users' state, satisfies these requirements and can be related to more familiar entanglement monotones [15,21,22]. In DIQKD, the necessary resource is not entanglement but Bell nonlocality [3,8–14,23,24] whose relation to entanglement is not straightforward [16,25–27]. A closely related issue which currently attracts much attention and in which Bell nonlocality is also essential is device-independent quantum random-number generation [14,28–33].

Bell nonlocality can also be formulated in terms of a resource theory [34–36]. Proper measures of nonlocality must not increase under the corresponding allowed transformations, recalled in detail below, and vanish for Bell local sets of

probabilities. We name these measures as nonlocality monotones. In this paper, we are interested in Bell nonlocality as a resource for DIQKD from this rigorous perspective. We introduce, for any numbers of choosable measurements and measurement outcomes, a measure  $R$  which is both a nonlocality monotone and a DIQKD efficiency quantifier. This device-independent key rate is defined, under the assumption of collective attacks, by optimizing over a class of protocols, to generate the raw keys, which involve generating, processing, and publicly exchanging random numbers and choosing at each round, for each legitimate user, one among all the possible measurements. Such a raw key protocol is a part of a full DIQKD protocol which also contains, for instance, an error correction part. A confidential key can surely be established when  $R$  is positive but not when it is zero. The specific raw key protocols considered in the literature [8–14] belong to the class used here. We will see that a device-independent key rate defined for a single protocol can increase under the allowed transformations of the nonlocality resource theory. Since the rate  $R$  is a nonlocality monotone, it does not decrease in going from a set of measurement outcome probabilities to a more nonlocal one and vanishes for a Bell local set. Moreover, we show that, for any continuous nonlocality monotone  $N$ ,  $R$  is tightly lower bounded by a nondecreasing function of  $N$  that vanishes when  $N$  does. Thus either this bound is trivial and nothing can be inferred from  $N$  alone about the achievability of a secret key or there is a threshold value for the amount of nonlocality as quantified by  $N$  above which Alice and Bob are certain that such a key can be established, without needing to evaluate any other quantity.

The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec. II A, the allowed transformations of the nonlocality resource theory are recalled and the operations that the legitimate users can perform are specified, in terms of classical random variables. In Sec. III, we introduce the considered class of raw key protocols, which involve only these operations, and give the expression of the quantum state shared by the three parties at the end of such a protocol. In Sec. IV, we define the device-independent key rate  $R$  corresponding to this class of protocols and show that it is a nonlocality monotone. The case of a single protocol is also discussed in Sec. IV. In Sec. V, we consider the continuous nonlocality monotones, derive the above mentioned result, which follows from the fact that  $R$  is a nonlocality monotone, and examine an example. Finally, in Sec. VI, we summarize our results and mention some open questions.

## II. PRELIMINARIES

### A. Alice and Bob's possible operations

The following situation is considered throughout the paper. Alice, Bob, and Eve initially share a quantum system in the state  $\rho$ . Alice (Bob) can choose one of  $m$  ( $n$ ) measurements to perform on her (his) subsystem with Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}_A$  ( $\mathcal{H}_B$ ) which can always be assumed to be infinite dimensional. The legitimate users know nothing about the quantum system, its state, and the measurement devices. In more precise terms, Alice (Bob) can observe one of  $m$  ( $n$ ) classical random variables  $A_x$  ( $B_y$ ). Alice and Bob can only get information on the probability mass functions  $P_{A_x, B_y}$ , denoted  $P_{x,y}$  in the

following. The indices  $x$  and  $y$  are usually termed as inputs and the outcomes of the random variables  $A_x$  and  $B_y$  as outputs. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that all variables  $A_x$  ( $B_y$ ) have the same set  $\mathcal{A}$  ( $\mathcal{B}$ ) of outputs by adding zero probability outcomes. These sets are referred to as alphabets. Obviously,  $m$ ,  $n$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$ , and  $\mathcal{B}$  are known to Alice and Bob. The random variable  $A_x$  ( $B_y$ ) corresponds to a set of positive operators  $M_{x,a}$  ( $N_{y,b}$ ) such that  $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} M_{x,a}$  ( $\sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}} N_{y,b}$ ) is the identity operator on  $\mathcal{H}_A$  ( $\mathcal{H}_B$ ) and

$$P_{x,y}(a, b) = \text{tr}(\rho M_{x,a} \otimes N_{y,b} \otimes I_E), \quad (1)$$

where  $I_E$  is the identity operator on Eve's Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}_E$ . A distribution tuple  $\mathbf{P} = (P_{x,y}(a, b))_{x,y,a,b}$  is said to be quantum if it can be written in this form with appropriate state and measurement operators.

In addition to the  $A_x$  and  $B_y$ , the legitimate users can create random variables uncorrelated to the  $A_x$  and  $B_y$  and available at first only to one of them. Each can also compute new random variables from preexisting ones and use a classical public communication channel. Any message sent over this channel becomes known to the three parties and it is the only way to get a random variable from another party. It is not necessary to introduce explicitly additional variables for Eve since they can be taken into account by considering suitable system, state  $\rho$ , and measurements on her subsystem. Let us be more specific about how the  $A_x$ , that Alice cannot observe simultaneously, are employed. At some stage, and only at this stage, Alice uses one of the random variables at her disposal, say  $X$ , with alphabet in  $\{1, \dots, m\}$ , to choose which  $A_x$  to observe. More precisely, she generates  $U$  according to  $U = A_x$  when  $X = x$ . Bob uses the  $B_y$  and  $Y$  with alphabet in  $\{1, \dots, n\}$  in a similar way to produce the random variable  $V$ ; see Fig. 1. We remark that the distribution tuple  $\mathbf{P}$  is necessarily Bell local for simultaneously observable random variables  $A_x$  and  $B_y$  [26,37].

### B. Nonlocality resource theory

We recall here the allowed transformations of the nonlocality resource theory [34–36]. They can be performed using shared randomness and local probability transformations. More precisely, consider two distribution tuples  $\mathbf{P}$  and  $\mathbf{P}'$  made up of no-signaling probabilities with the same output alphabets and numbers of inputs. The former is not less nonlocal than the latter if and only if

$$\mathbf{P}' = p_0 \mathbf{L} + \sum_{k \geq 1} p_k \mathcal{T}_k(\mathbf{P}), \quad (2)$$

where the probabilities  $p_k$  obey  $\sum_{k \geq 0} p_k = 1$ ,  $\mathbf{L}$  is a Bell local distribution tuple, and  $\mathcal{T}_k$  are compositions of input and output relabelings, output coarse grainings, and input substitutions [36]. The nonlocality order is partial, i.e., some distribution tuples are not related by Eq. (2). We remark that a similar order can be defined for quantum states [38].

An input substitution acts on any distribution tuple  $\mathbf{P}$  as follows. For some given  $x$  and  $x'$ , every component  $P_{x',y}(a, b)$  is replaced by  $P_{x,y}(a, b)$  and the other ones remain unchanged, and similarly for given inputs  $y$  and  $y'$ . An input relabeling consists in a permutation of the inputs  $x$  or of the inputs  $y$ . It can be decomposed into input transpositions, i.e.,




FIG. 1. Raw key protocol steps used in the proof of Proposition 1. The value  $k$  is produced by a random generator. Eve eavesdrops  $k$  sent by Alice over the public channel. The random numbers  $x'$  and  $y'$  are produced during classical steps, shown as dots, which can use the public channel and generate other random numbers, not shown. Classical computations, shown as ellipses, result in  $x = z(x', k)$ ,  $y = t(y', k)$ ,  $u' = F_{x',k}(u)$ , and  $v' = G_{y',k}(v)$  with the functions given by the Lemma. The measurements performed by Alice and Bob on their quantum systems, shown as boxes, give the outputs  $u$  and  $v$  as functions of the inputs  $x$  and  $y$ , respectively, according to the distributions (1).

transformations that swap every pair of components  $P_{x,y}(a, b)$  and  $P_{x',y}(a, b)$  for some given  $x$  and  $x'$  and leave the other ones unchanged, and similarly for given inputs  $y$  and  $y'$ . The output transformations change only the probabilities  $P_{x,y}(a, b)$  for a given  $x$  or  $y$ . Under an output relabeling for  $x$ , every component  $P_{x,y}(a, b)$  is replaced by  $P_{x,y}(\pi(a), b)$ , where  $\pi$  is a permutation on  $\mathcal{A}$ . An output coarse graining is characterized by an input, a subset of the corresponding output alphabet and an element of this subset, say  $x$ ,  $\mathcal{A}'$ , and  $a'$ , respectively. Such a transformation changes every component  $P_{x,y}(a, b)$  as follows. This probability becomes  $\sum_{a'' \in \mathcal{A}'} P_{x,y}(a'', b)$  for  $a = a'$ , is set to zero for  $a \in \mathcal{A}' \setminus \{a'\}$ , and remains the same for  $a \notin \mathcal{A}'$ .

A nonlocality monotone  $N$  vanishes for Bell local distribution tuples and preserves the nonlocality order, i.e.,  $N(\mathbf{P}') \leq N(\mathbf{P})$  for  $\mathbf{P}$  and  $\mathbf{P}'$  related by Eq. (2). As a simple example, we consider, in the case of numbers of inputs  $m = n = 2$  and alphabets  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  consisting of two outputs, that can always be assumed to be  $-1$  and  $1$ , the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality [39] violation

$$\tilde{N}(\mathbf{P}) = \max \left\{ 0, \max_v \left| \sum_{x,y=1}^2 v(x,y) \langle A_x B_y \rangle \right| - 2 \right\}. \quad (3)$$

In this expression, the maximum is taken over all the maps  $v : \{1, 2\}^2 \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$  assuming the value  $-1$  only once and  $\langle C \rangle$  denotes the expectation of the random variable  $C$ . The measure (3) vanishes for Bell local distribution tuples and only for them [26]. To see that it preserves the nonlocality

order, first note that it is a convex function of its argument. Moreover, the right side of Eq. (3) is not modified by an input relabeling. An output relabeling is equivalent to changing the sign of one of the random variables in Eq. (3), and so also does not alter the value of  $\tilde{N}$ . An input substitution is the same as setting  $A_1 = A_2$  or  $B_1 = B_2$  in Eq. (3), which gives  $\tilde{N} = 0$ . An output coarse graining is equivalent to replacing one of the random variables in Eq. (3) by  $1$ , which also leads to  $\tilde{N} = 0$ .

### III. RAW KEY PROTOCOLS

To generate their raw keys, using the  $A_x$  and  $B_y$ , Alice and Bob proceed as follows. First, they create some random variables and send some of them over the public channel. Then, they calculate new ones and subsequently produce the  $U$  and  $V$  as explained above. Finally, they generate  $A$  and  $B$  from all the available random variables. Alice's (Bob's) raw key is a sequence of independent realizations of  $A$  ( $B$ ). All the just mentioned classical random variables but  $U$ ,  $V$ ,  $A$ , and  $B$  are quantum-mechanically described by the state

$$\tilde{\rho} = \sum_{x,y,e} P_{X,Y,E}(x, y, e) \Pi_{x,e}^{\text{Alice}} \otimes \Pi_{y,e}^{\text{Bob}} \otimes \Pi_e^{\text{Eve}}, \quad (4)$$

where  $\mathbf{E}$  is a tuple made up of the public ones and  $\mathbf{X}$  ( $\mathbf{Y}$ ) is made up of Alice's (Bob's) private ones. The choice random variable  $X$  ( $Y$ ) is a component of  $\mathbf{X}$  ( $\mathbf{Y}$ ) or of  $\mathbf{E}$ . From their definitions,  $\mathbf{X}$  and  $\mathbf{Y}$  are conditionally independent given  $\mathbf{E}$ , i.e.,  $P_{X,Y,E} = P_{X|E} P_{Y|E} P_E$ . The  $\Pi_{x,e}^{\text{Alice}}$  ( $\Pi_{y,e}^{\text{Bob}}$ ,  $\Pi_e^{\text{Eve}}$ ) are rank-one projectors whose sum is the identity operator on a Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}'_A$  ( $\mathcal{H}'_B$ ,  $\mathcal{H}'_E$ ). At the end of the raw key protocol, the three parties share the state

$$\rho_{\text{rk}} = \sum_{a,b} \Pi_a \otimes \Pi_b \otimes \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{AB}}(\rho' M_a \otimes N_b \otimes I'_E), \quad (5)$$

where  $\rho' = \tilde{\rho} \otimes \rho$ ,  $I'_E$  is the identity operator on  $\mathcal{H}'_E \otimes \mathcal{H}_E$ ,  $\Pi_a$  ( $\Pi_b$ ) denotes mutually orthogonal rank-one projectors, and  $\text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{AB}}$  the partial trace over the Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}_{AB} = \mathcal{H}'_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}'_B \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$ ; see Appendix A. Observing  $A$  and  $B$  means performing the measurement with operators  $\Pi_a \otimes \Pi_b \otimes I'_E$  on  $\rho_{\text{rk}}$ . The positive operator  $M_a$  reads

$$M_a = \sum_{x,e,u} P_{A|U,X,E}(a|u, x, e) \Pi_{x,e}^{\text{Alice}} \otimes M_{x,u}, \quad (6)$$

where  $x$  corresponds to  $X$  and the conditional probability mass function  $P_{A|U,X,E}$  is determined by the protocol. The operators  $N_b$  are given by similar expressions.

Equation (5) shows that the correlations between Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of the raw key protocol are formally identical to those obtained by performing the measurement with operators  $M_a \otimes N_b \otimes I'_E$  on  $\rho'$ . The simple protocol in which Alice and Bob each just perform a given measurement, corresponding to the inputs, say  $\xi$  and  $\zeta$ , is obviously one of those considered here. In this case, there are no public random variables,  $P_X(x) = \delta_{x,\xi}$ ,  $P_Y(y) = \delta_{y,\zeta}$ ,  $A = U$ , and  $B = V$ , and so the last term of Eq. (5) simplifies to  $\text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}'_A \otimes \mathcal{H}'_B}(\rho M_{\xi,\zeta} \otimes N_{\xi,\zeta} \otimes I_E)$ . Strictly speaking, the above is only valid when Eve merely collects the public information in the course of the raw key protocol. However, any of Eve's measurement during it can equivalently be taken into account as a measurement

on  $\rho_{\text{rk}}$ ; see Appendix A. Thus it can be considered as being performed amid the protocol generating the private key.

#### IV. DEVICE-INDEPENDENT KEY RATE

Let  $\omega$  be a state of the form of Eq. (5),  $l(\omega^{\otimes L})$  the length of the longest secret key that Alice and Bob can achieve when they share  $\omega^{\otimes L}$  with Eve, and  $R'(\omega)$  the large  $L$  limit of  $l(\omega^{\otimes L})/L$  [34,40]. We define, for any quantum distribution tuple  $\mathbf{P}$ , the device-independent key rate

$$R(\mathbf{P}) = \inf_{\rho, (M_{x,a})_a, (N_{y,b})_b} \sup_{\text{rkp}} R'(\rho_{\text{rk}}), \quad (7)$$

where the supremum is taken over all the raw key protocols described above, the infimum is taken over all the  $\rho$ ,  $(M_{x,a})_a$  and  $(N_{y,b})_b$  satisfying Eq. (1) with  $\mathbf{P}$ , and  $\rho_{\text{rk}}$  is given by Eqs. (4)–(6) with the probability mass functions of the protocol rkp. The rate  $R$  is nonnegative by construction. Whenever Alice's and Bob's random variables are described by the distributions  $P_{x,y}$ , they can establish, in the limit of large  $L$ , a secret key of length at least equal to  $LR(\mathbf{P})$  from raw keys of  $L$  characters generated using an appropriate raw key protocol. In particular, a private key can surely be generated as soon as  $R(\mathbf{P}) > 0$ . If  $R(\mathbf{P}) = 0$ , there are states and measurement operators fulfilling Eq. (1) with  $\mathbf{P}$  for which a confidential key cannot be achieved.

##### A. Rate for a single raw key protocol

Let us first discuss the usual approach that considers only one specific protocol to generate the raw keys. The corresponding device-independent key rate is

$$R_0(\mathbf{P}) = \inf_{\rho, (M_{x,a})_a, (N_{y,b})_b} R'(\rho_{\text{rk}}), \quad (8)$$

where the infimum is taken over all the  $\rho$ ,  $(M_{x,a})_a$  and  $(N_{y,b})_b$  satisfying Eq. (1) with  $\mathbf{P}$ , and  $\rho_{\text{rk}}$  is given by Eqs. (4)–(6) with the distributions of the particular protocol employed. As an example, assume that  $m = 3$ ,  $n = 2$ ,  $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{B} = \{-1, 1\}$ ,  $A = EA_3$ , and  $B = EB_1$ , where  $E$  is an equally distributed public random variable with alphabet  $\mathcal{A}$  [8]. The rate  $R'(\rho_{\text{rk}})$  is not larger than the mutual information  $I$  between  $A$  and  $B$  [40], which can be expressed in terms of  $P_{3,1}$  with  $P_{A,B}(a, b) = [P_{3,1}(a, b) + P_{3,1}(-a, -b)]/2$ . Provided that the Bell expression  $S = \sum_{x,y=1}^2 (-1)^{(x-1)(y-1)} \langle A_x B_y \rangle$  is larger than its Bell local maximum of 2,  $R'(\rho_{\text{rk}})$  is not lower than  $I - h(1/2 + \sqrt{S^2/4 - 1}/2)$ , where  $h$  is the binary entropy function [8]. Since these two bounds depend only on  $\mathbf{P}$ , they are also bounds for  $R_0(\mathbf{P})$  given by Eq. (8).

Let  $\mathbf{P}$  and  $\mathbf{P}'$  be the distribution tuples defined by  $P_{1,1}(a, b) = P_{2,1}(a, b) = (1 + ab \cos \theta)/4$ ,  $P_{1,2}(a, b) = (1 + ab \sin \theta)/4$ ,  $P_{2,2}(a, b) = (1 - ab \sin \theta)/4$ ,  $P_{3,1} = P_{3,2} = 1/4$ , and  $P'_{x,y} = P_{z(x),y}$ , where  $\theta$  is any real number,  $z(1) = z(3) = 1$ , and  $z(2) = 2$ . They are quantum since  $\mathbf{P}$  ( $\mathbf{P}'$ ) can, for instance, be written as  $P_{x,y}(a, b) = \langle \psi | \Pi_{x,a}^A \otimes \Pi_{y,b}^B | \psi \rangle$  with the two-qubit maximally entangled state  $|\psi\rangle = (|+\rangle \otimes |+\rangle + |-\rangle \otimes |-\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$ , where  $|\pm\rangle$  are orthonormal states of the Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}_2$  of dimension 2 and the projective measurement operators  $\Pi_{x,1}^A = |x\rangle_{AA}\langle x|$  [ $\Pi_{x,1}^A = |z(x)\rangle_{AA}\langle z(x)|$ ],  $\Pi_{y,1}^B = |y\rangle_{BB}\langle y|$ ,  $\Pi_{x,-1}^A =$

$I_2 - \Pi_{x,1}$ , and  $\Pi_{y,-1} = I_2 - \Pi_{y,1}$ , where  $I_2$  is the identity operator on  $\mathcal{H}_2$ ,  $|1\rangle_A = \cos \phi |+\rangle + \sin \phi |-\rangle$ ,  $|2\rangle_A = \cos \phi |+\rangle - \sin \phi |-\rangle$ ,  $|3\rangle_A = (|+\rangle + i|-\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$ ,  $|1\rangle_B = |+\rangle$ , and  $|2\rangle_B = (|+\rangle + |-\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$ , with  $\phi = \theta/2$ . For  $\mathbf{P}$  and  $\mathbf{P}'$ ,  $S = 2\sqrt{2} \cos(\theta - \pi/4)$  increases from its Bell local maximum of 2 to its quantum maximum of  $2\sqrt{2}$  as  $\theta$  varies from 0 to  $\pi/4$ . Using the bounds mentioned above, one finds  $R_0(\mathbf{P}) = 0$  for any value of  $\theta$ , as  $A$  and  $B$  are uncorrelated for  $\mathbf{P}$ , and  $R_0(\mathbf{P}') \geq 1 - h(1/2 + \cos \theta/2) - h[1/2 + \sqrt{\sin(2\theta)/2}]$  for  $\theta \in [0, \pi/2]$ , and hence  $R_0(\mathbf{P}') > R_0(\mathbf{P})$  for  $\theta \in (0, 1.032]$ . On the other hand,  $\mathbf{P}$  is not less nonlocal than  $\mathbf{P}'$  since it can be transformed into  $\mathbf{P}'$  by an input substitution. Consequently,  $R_0$  is not a nonlocality monotone.

In device-independent quantum random-number generation, a raw string is first generated following a given procedure. The corresponding appropriate rate can be lower bounded in terms of one or several Bell expressions [28–33], which shows a clear influence of nonlocality already for a single raw string protocol. In DIQKD, similar bounds on Eve's information on Alice's or Bob's raw key can be derived for a given raw key protocol [8–11,13,14]. But, in order to establish a common secret key, correlations between the two raw keys are also essential. In the example discussed above, for instance, the mutual information between the outcomes of  $A$  (or  $B$ ) and of any of Eve's measurement is lower than  $h(1/2 + \sqrt{S^2/4 - 1}/2)$ , which is zero at  $S = 2\sqrt{2}$  [8]. However, this does not ensure a nonzero rate  $R_0$  since, for any value of  $S$  in  $[2, 2\sqrt{2}]$ , there are distribution tuples  $\mathbf{P}$  for which  $A$  and  $B$  are uncorrelated and hence  $R_0(\mathbf{P})$  vanishes.

##### B. Main result

It can be proved that the rate (7) preserves the Bell nonlocality order using the Lemma below.

*Lemma.* Let  $\mathbf{P}$  and  $\mathbf{P}'$  be two distribution tuples with output alphabets  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  and numbers  $m$  and  $n$  of inputs such that  $\mathbf{P}$  is not less nonlocal than  $\mathbf{P}'$  and  $A_x$  and  $B_y$  be random variables such that  $P_{A_x, B_y} = P_{x,y}$ .

There are a random integer  $K$  and tuples  $\tilde{A} = (\tilde{A}_x)_{x=1}^m$  and  $\tilde{B} = (\tilde{B}_y)_{y=1}^n$  with a joint probability mass function of the form  $P_K P_{\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}}$ , where  $\tilde{A}_x$  and  $\tilde{B}_y$  have alphabets  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ , respectively, self-maps  $F_{x,k}$  and  $G_{y,k}$ , and inputs  $z(x, k)$  and  $t(y, k)$  such that the distributions of

$$\begin{aligned} (A'_x, B'_y) &= (\tilde{A}_x, \tilde{B}_y) \quad \text{if } K = 0, \\ &= (F_{x,k}(A_{z(x,k)}), G_{y,k}(B_{t(y,k)})) \quad \text{if } K = k \geq 1 \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

are given by  $P_{A'_x, B'_y} = P'_{x,y}$ .

If  $\mathbf{P}$  is quantum then also is  $\mathbf{P}'$ .

The proof of the Lemma is given in Appendix B. This Lemma ensures that, from given  $A_x$  and  $B_y$  with distributions  $P_{x,y}$ , the legitimate users have effective access to random variables characterized by any distribution tuple  $\mathbf{P}'$  not more nonlocal than  $\mathbf{P}$ , by proceeding as follows. Alice creates the corresponding  $K$ ,  $\tilde{A}_x$ , and  $\tilde{B}_y$  and sends  $K$  and the  $\tilde{B}_y$  to Bob. Then, Alice and Bob perform any classical operations they want, possibly using the public channel, that produce some random variables, including  $X'$  and  $Y'$  with alphabets in  $\{1, \dots, m\}$  and  $\{1, \dots, n\}$ , respectively. After these classical

steps, Alice generates, in sequence, the random variables  $X$  which is  $X'$  if  $K = 0$  and  $z(X', k)$  if  $K = k \geq 1$ ,  $U$  according to  $U = A_x$  when  $X = x$ . and, finally,  $U'$  which is  $\tilde{A}_{x'}$  if  $(K, X') = (0, x')$  and  $F_{x',k}(U)$  if  $(K, X') = (k, x')$  with  $k \geq 1$ . Bob does similar operations using  $Y'$ ,  $K$ , the  $B_y$ , and the  $\tilde{B}_y$ ; see Fig. 1. In this figure, it is assumed, to simplify, that  $K \geq 1$ . The above produces the same  $U'$  and  $V'$  as  $U' = A'_{x'}$  when  $X' = x'$  and  $V' = B'_{y'}$  when  $Y' = y'$ , where  $A'_{x'}$  and  $B'_{y'}$  are given by Eq. (9). Note that Eve gets  $K$  and the  $\tilde{B}_y$  which are sent over the public channel.

Using the above Lemma, the following can be shown; see Appendix C.

*Proposition 1.* The function  $R$  given by Eq. (7) has the following properties.

- (i)  $R$  preserves the nonlocality order.
- (ii)  $R$  vanishes for Bell local distribution tuples.

A function fulfilling these two requirements is a nonlocality monotone, i.e., a proper measure of Bell nonlocality [36]. The above Proposition implies that the device-independent key rate (7) is a nonlocality monotone. Property (ii) can be seen as a consequence of the fact that a secret key cannot always be established and of (i) as follows. Any distribution tuple is not less nonlocal than any Bell local one. Thus, due to property (i),  $R$  assumes its minimum value for Bell local distribution tuples. If this minimum were nonzero then a secret key could be produced in any case. Proposition 1 shows that a private key can surely be generated for any distribution tuple not less nonlocal than a given one for which this is possible. Besides, a confidential key can be established with certainty only for nonlocal distribution tuples. Proposition 1 does not ensure that the converse holds. There may be nonlocal distribution tuples  $\mathbf{P}$  such that a private key cannot be achieved for some states and measurement operators fulfilling Eq. (1) with  $\mathbf{P}$ .

### V. CONTINUOUS NONLOCALITY MONOTONES

According to the above Proposition and definition (7), the device-independent key rate  $R$  quantifies both the efficiency in secret key generation and the amount of Bell nonlocality of a distribution tuple. However, it is not straightforward to evaluate. Moreover, one may prefer a measure that provably vanishes only for Bell local distribution tuples. It is then of interest to consider other nonlocality monotones. For that purpose, we use the following result, shown in Appendix D. We remark that the set of quantum distribution tuples depends on the dimensions of the considered Hilbert spaces [41].

*Proposition 2.* Let  $\mathcal{Q}$  and  $\mathcal{L}$  be, respectively, the sets of quantum and Bell local distribution tuples with given output alphabets and numbers of inputs, for given Hilbert space dimensions.

For any nonlocality monotone  $M$  on  $\mathcal{Q}$  and nonnegative continuous function  $N$  on  $\mathcal{Q}$  which vanishes on  $\mathcal{L}$ , there is a nondecreasing function  $f$  on  $J = [0, N_{\text{sup}})$ , where  $N_{\text{sup}}$  is the supremum of  $N$  on  $\mathcal{Q}$ , such that  $f(0) = 0$ ,  $f \circ N \leq M$ , and, for any  $s \in J$  and  $\epsilon > 0$ , there is  $\mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{Q}$  for which  $N(\mathbf{P}) = s$  and  $M(\mathbf{P}) < f(s) + \epsilon$ .

Whenever Alice's and Bob's random variables are described by the distributions  $P_{x,y}$ , they can generate a secret key with a rate not lower than  $f \circ N(\mathbf{P})$ , where  $N$  is any

continuous nonlocality monotone and  $f$  is given by the above Proposition with  $N$  and  $M = R$ . This remains valid if  $f$  is replaced by other nondecreasing functions but  $f$  is the greatest one. If  $f \circ N(\mathbf{P}) = 0$ , there exists, for any  $\epsilon > 0$ , a quantum distribution tuple  $\mathbf{P}'$  such that  $N(\mathbf{P}') = N(\mathbf{P})$  and  $R(\mathbf{P}') < \epsilon$ . So, in this case, nothing can be inferred from the value  $N(\mathbf{P})$  regarding the possibility of establishing a confidential key. On the contrary,  $f \circ N(\mathbf{P}) > 0$  ensures that a private key can be generated. This condition can be rewritten as  $N(\mathbf{P}) > N^*$ , where  $N^* = \sup\{s \in J : f(s) = 0\}$  is set only by the measure  $N$ . By definition,  $N^*$  is not larger than  $N_{\text{sup}}$ . If  $N^* = N_{\text{sup}}$ ,  $f \circ N = 0$  and it cannot be determined whether a secret key can be established by evaluating only  $N$ . By contrast, for a measure  $N$  such that  $N^* < N_{\text{sup}}$ ,  $N^*$  is a threshold value above which a private key can be achieved with certainty. Proposition 2 does not require that  $N$  is a nonlocality monotone but only that it is continuous and vanishes for Bell local tuples. For instance,  $N$  can be defined from a Bell inequality. Proposition 2 applies to such measures though they are not nonlocality monotones in general [36].

As an example, assume that  $m = n = 2$  and  $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{B} = \{-1, 1\}$ . In this case, the measure  $\tilde{N}$ , given by Eq. (3), is a nonlocality monotone. As is well known, the set of the possible values of  $\tilde{N}$  is the interval  $[0, 2(\sqrt{2} - 1)]$  [42]. A nondecreasing function  $g$  such that  $R \geq g \circ \tilde{N}$  can be found; see Appendix E. It results from its expression that there is a threshold value  $\tilde{N}^* \leq 0.652 < 2(\sqrt{2} - 1)$  for the nonlocality monotone (3) above which a private key can surely be generated. The existence of  $\tilde{N}^*$  can be seen as follows. For any  $\mathbf{P}$  such that  $\tilde{N}(\mathbf{P}) > 0$ , there are inputs  $\xi$  and  $\zeta$  for which  $|\langle A_\xi B_\zeta \rangle| > 0$ . Consider a raw key protocol generating  $A = EA_\xi$  and  $B = EB_\zeta$ , where  $E$  is an equally distributed public random variable with alphabet  $\mathcal{A}$ . The resulting rate  $R'(\rho_{\text{rk}})$  in Eq. (7), and hence  $R(\mathbf{P})$ , is not lower than  $I - r \circ \tilde{N}(\mathbf{P})$ , where  $r$  is a continuous nonincreasing function with  $r(2\sqrt{2} - 2) = 0$ , given by  $r(s) = h[1/2 + (s + s^2/4)^{1/2}/2]$ , and  $I = 1 - h(1/2 + |\langle AB \rangle|/2)$  is the mutual information between  $A$  and  $B$  that depends only on  $|\langle AB \rangle| = |\langle A_\xi B_\zeta \rangle|$  and is hence strictly positive for  $\tilde{N}(\mathbf{P}) > 0$  [8]. The function  $g$  can be obtained by noting that there are  $\xi$  and  $\zeta$  such that  $|\langle AB \rangle| \geq 1/2 + \tilde{N}(\mathbf{P})/4$ . Other raw key protocols are used in Appendix E.

### VI. SUMMARY AND OPEN QUESTIONS

In summary, a device-independent key rate has been defined by optimizing over a class of raw key protocols and shown to be a nonlocality monotone. Moreover, it has been proved that there are only two possibilities for any continuous nonlocality monotone. Either it can never be decided whether a secret key can be established by evaluating only this measure, or there is a threshold value for it above which this is surely achievable. A readily computable nonlocality monotone with such a threshold exists for two two-outcome measurements per legitimate user. The defined device-independent key rate may vanish for some nonlocal sets of probabilities. Were this not to be the case, Bell nonlocality would be a necessary and sufficient condition for DIQKD with raw key protocols. This may be correct only for some numbers of choosable measurements and

measurement outcomes. Related to this issue, it would be interesting to improve the upper bound on the threshold value of the aforementioned particular nonlocality monotone. Since this measure vanishes only for Bell local sets of probabilities, a threshold value of zero would prove the above-mentioned equivalence in this case. The answers to these open questions may depend on the considered class of raw key protocols. It can be further enlarged, for instance, by dropping the assumption made here that no information is exchanged after the measurements.

#### APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF EQ. (5)

To simplify, the random variables transmitted over the public channel at the same stage of the raw key protocol are here grouped into one. After receiving the value  $e_1$  of the first one  $E_1$ , Eve performs a measurement on her subsystem. This generates a random variable  $E'_1$  and  $\rho$  is changed into  $\Lambda_{e_1, e'_1}(\rho)/p_{e_1, e'_1}$  when  $E'_1 = e'_1$ , where  $p_{e_1, e'_1} = \text{tr} \Lambda_{e_1, e'_1}(\rho)$ . The Kraus operators of the quantum operation  $\Lambda_{e_1, e'_1}$  are of the form  $I_A \otimes I_B \otimes K_{e_1, e'_1, i}$ , where  $I_A$  ( $I_B$ ) is the identity operator on  $\mathcal{H}_A$  ( $\mathcal{H}_B$ ). The probabilities  $p_{e_1, e'_1}$  satisfy  $\sum_{e'_1} p_{e_1, e'_1} = 1$ . A deterministic operation, e.g., the identity operation, is a measurement with a single outcome  $e'_1$ . Moreover, sequential measurements can be considered as a single one with a properly defined  $E'_1$ . The set of the values  $e'_1$  may depend on  $e_1$ . However, it can be assumed, without loss of generality, that it does not, by adding zero probability outcomes, and hence that there is a unique  $E'_1$  with  $P_{E'_1|E_1}(e'_1|e_1) = p_{e_1, e'_1}$ . Repeating these arguments for all components of  $\mathbf{E}$  leads to the random tuple  $\mathbf{E}'$ , conditional distribution  $P_{\mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{E}}$ , and quantum operations  $\Lambda_{e, e'}$  with Kraus operators  $I_A \otimes I_B \otimes K_{e, e', i}$ .

The probability mass function of  $\mathbf{X}$ ,  $\mathbf{Y}$ ,  $\mathbf{E}$ ,  $\mathbf{E}'$ ,  $\mathbf{U}$ , and  $\mathbf{V}$  is  $P_{\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{E}, \mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{E}} P_{\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{E}, \mathbf{E}'}$ , where the last conditional distribution is given by

$$P(u, v|\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}') = \text{tr}[\Lambda_{e, e'}(\rho) M_{x, u} \otimes N_{y, v} \otimes I_E'] / P(\mathbf{e}'|\mathbf{e}),$$

with the appropriate identity operator  $I_E'$ , and omitting the subscripts for the distributions. For given values of these random variables, Eve's state is proportional to  $\Lambda'_{e, e'}(\text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B}(\rho M_{x, u} \otimes N_{y, v} \otimes I_E))$ , where  $\Lambda'_{e, e'}$  is the quantum operation with Kraus operators  $K_{e, e', i}$ . The marginal distribution  $P_{A, B, E, E'}$  directly follows with the conditional distributions  $P_{A|U, X, E}$  and  $P_{B|V, Y, E}$  of the protocol. Using  $P_{\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V}|\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{E}, \mathbf{E}'}$ , one finds that Eve's state for  $A = a$ ,  $B = b$ ,  $\mathbf{E} = \mathbf{e}$ , and  $\mathbf{E}' = \mathbf{e}'$  is

$$\omega_{a, b, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}'} = \Lambda_{e'} \left( \Pi_e^{\text{Eve}} \otimes \sum_{x, y, u, v} P(a|u, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{e}) P(b|v, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{e}) \right. \\ \left. \times P(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{e}) \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B}(\rho M_{x, u} \otimes N_{y, v} \otimes I_E) \right) / P(a, b, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}'),$$

where  $\Pi_e^{\text{Eve}} = |\mathbf{e}\rangle\langle\mathbf{e}|$  and  $\Lambda_{e'}$  is the quantum operation with Kraus operators  $\langle\mathbf{e}'| \otimes K_{e, e', i}$ . Performing the measurement with operators  $\Pi_a \otimes \Pi_b \otimes \Pi_e^{\text{Eve}} \otimes I_E$  and then that characterized by the  $\Lambda_{e'}$  on the state given by Eq. (5) leads to the same distribution  $P_{A, B, E, E'}$  and Eve's states  $\omega_{a, b, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}'}$ .

#### APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THE LEMMA

The tuples  $\mathbf{P}$  and  $\mathbf{P}'$  are related by Eq. (2). The Bell local distribution tuple  $\mathbf{L}$  can be written as  $\mathbf{L} = \sum_{a, b} q_{a, b} \mathbf{D}_{a, b}$ , where the sum runs over all the  $\mathbf{a} = (a_x)_x \in \mathcal{A}^n$  and  $\mathbf{b} = (b_y)_y \in \mathcal{B}^m$ , the probabilities  $q_{a, b}$  sum to unity, and the only nonvanishing components of  $\mathbf{D}_{a, b}$ , for the inputs  $x$  and  $y$ , are those corresponding to the outputs  $a = a_x$  and  $b = b_y$  [26]. Consider random tuples  $\tilde{\mathbf{A}} = (\tilde{A}_x)_{x=1}^m$  and  $\tilde{\mathbf{B}} = (\tilde{B}_y)_{y=1}^n$ , where  $\tilde{A}_x$  and  $\tilde{B}_y$  have alphabets  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ , respectively, such that  $P_{\tilde{\mathbf{A}}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) = q_{a, b}$ . The components of  $\mathbf{L}$  are equal to the marginal probabilities  $P_{\tilde{\mathbf{A}}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}}(a, b)$ .

We denote an input substitution for  $x$  and  $x'$  as  $\mathcal{I}^{(x, x')}$  and an input transposition for  $x$  and  $x'$ , described in the main text, as  $\mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}}$ , and similarly for given inputs  $y$  and  $y'$ . The input transformations satisfy  $\mathcal{I}^{\{y, y'\}} \circ \mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}} = \mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}} \circ \mathcal{I}^{\{y, y'\}}$  and similar commutation relations with one or both transformations replaced by an input substitution. We denote the output transformations as  $\mathcal{O}^x$  and  $\mathcal{O}^y$ . They obey  $\mathcal{O}^y \circ \mathcal{O}^x = \mathcal{O}^x \circ \mathcal{O}^y$ . We have also  $\mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}} \circ \mathcal{O}^z = \mathcal{O}^z \circ \mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}}$  for  $z \neq x, x'$ ,  $\mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}} \circ \mathcal{O}^{x'} = \mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}}$ ,  $\mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}} \circ \mathcal{O}^x = \mathcal{O}^x \circ \mathcal{O}^{x'} \circ \mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}}$ , and  $\mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}} \circ \mathcal{O}^z = \mathcal{O}^z \circ \mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}}$  for  $z \neq x, x'$ , and  $\mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}} \circ \mathcal{O}^x = \mathcal{O}^{x'} \circ \mathcal{I}^{\{x, x'\}}$  and similar relations with the inputs  $x$  and  $x'$  replaced by inputs  $y$  and  $y'$ . Consequently, any transformation  $\mathcal{T}_k$  appearing in Eq. (2) can be written as  $\mathcal{T}_k = \mathcal{O}_k^A \circ \mathcal{O}_k^B \circ \mathcal{I}_k^A \circ \mathcal{I}_k^B$ , where  $\mathcal{O}_k^A$  ( $\mathcal{O}_k^B$ ) consists of output transformations for given inputs  $x$  ( $y$ ) and  $\mathcal{I}_k^A$  ( $\mathcal{I}_k^B$ ) of transformations on the inputs  $x$  ( $y$ ). Moreover, the component of  $\mathcal{I}_k^A \circ \mathcal{I}_k^B(\mathbf{P})$  for the inputs  $x$  and  $y$  and outputs  $a$  and  $b$  can be expressed as  $P_{A_{z(x, k)}, B_{t(y, k)}}(a, b)$  with  $z(x, k)$  and  $t(y, k)$  determined by  $\mathcal{I}_k^A$  and  $\mathcal{I}_k^B$ , respectively.

Let  $\hat{\mathbf{P}}$  be any distribution tuple with alphabets  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $C_x$  and  $D_y$  random variables such that  $P_{C_x, D_y} = \hat{P}_{x, y}$ . An output relabeling for  $x$  acts on  $\hat{\mathbf{P}}$  as follows. Every component  $\hat{P}_{x, y}(a, b)$  is replaced by  $\hat{P}_{x, y}(\pi(a), b) = P_{\pi^{-1}(C_x), D_y}(a, b)$ , where  $\pi$  is a permutation on  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\pi^{-1}$  is its inverse and the other ones remain unchanged, and similarly for a given input  $y$ . Under an output coarse graining characterized by  $x$ ,  $\mathcal{A}' \subset \mathcal{A}$ , and  $a' \in \mathcal{A}'$ , every component  $\hat{P}_{x, y}(a, b)$  becomes  $\sum_{a'' \in \mathcal{A}'} \hat{P}_{x, y}(a'', b)$  for  $a = a'$ , vanishes for  $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a'\}$ , and does not change for  $a \notin \mathcal{A}'$  and the other ones remain the same, and similarly for given  $y$ ,  $\mathcal{B}' \subset \mathcal{B}$ , and  $b' \in \mathcal{B}'$ . The components for  $x$  of the resulting distribution tuple can be written as  $P_{F(C_x), D_y}(a, b)$ , where the self-map  $F$  on  $\mathcal{A}$  is given by  $F(a) = a$  for  $a \notin \mathcal{A}'$  and  $F(a) = a'$  for  $a \in \mathcal{A}'$ . Consequently, the component for the inputs  $x$  and  $y$  and outputs  $a$  and  $b$  of  $\mathcal{T}_k(\mathbf{P})$  in Eq. (2) can be expressed as  $P_{F_{x, k}(A_{z(x, k)}), G_{y, k}(B_{t(y, k)})}(a, b)$  with self-maps  $F_{x, k}$  and  $G_{y, k}$  on  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ , respectively, determined by  $\mathcal{O}_k^A$  and  $\mathcal{O}_k^B$ , respectively.

The above shows that

$$P'_{x, y} = p_0 P_{\tilde{\mathbf{A}}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}} + \sum_{k \geq 1} p_k P_{F_{x, k}(A_{z(x, k)}), G_{y, k}(B_{t(y, k)})}.$$

It remains to introduce a random non-negative integer  $K$  with distribution  $P_K(k) = p_k$  and the random variables  $A'_x$  and  $B'_y$  given in the Lemma. The probability mass function of  $K$ ,  $A'_x$ ,

and  $B'_y$  is  $P_K P_{A'_x, B'_y|K}$  with

$$\begin{aligned} P_{A'_x, B'_y|K}(a, b|k) &= P_{\tilde{A}_x, \tilde{B}_y}(a, b) \quad \text{for } k = 0, \\ &= P_{F_{x,k}(A_{z(x,k)}), G_{y,k}(B_{t(y,k)})}(a, b) \quad \text{for } k \geq 1. \end{aligned}$$

Summing over  $k$  gives the marginal distribution  $P_{A'_x, B'_y} = P'_{x,y}$ .

For a quantum  $\mathbf{P}$ , the distributions of the  $A_x$  and  $B_y$  can be written as

$$P_{A_x, B_y}(a, b) = \text{tr}(\rho_{\text{lu}} M_{x,a} \otimes N_{y,b}), \quad (\text{B1})$$

where  $\rho_{\text{lu}}$  is a density operator on  $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$  and  $M_{x,a}$  ( $N_{y,b}$ ) are positive operators such that  $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} M_{x,a} = I_A$  ( $\sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}} N_{y,b} = I_B$ ). For any self-maps  $F$  on  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $G$  on  $\mathcal{B}$ , one has

$$P_{F(A_x), G(B_y)}(a, b) = \sum_{\substack{a' \in F^{-1}(\{a\}) \\ b' \in G^{-1}(\{b\})}} P_{A_x, B_y}(a', b').$$

This expression can be recast into the form of Eq. (B1) with  $M_{x,a}$  and  $N_{y,b}$  replaced, respectively, by the operators  $M_{F,x,a} = \sum_{a' \in F^{-1}(\{a\})} M_{x,a'}$  and  $N_{G,y,b}$  defined similarly and so

$$\begin{aligned} P_{F_{x,k}(A_{z(x,k)}), G_{y,k}(B_{t(y,k)})}(a, b) \\ = \text{tr}(\rho_{\text{lu}} M_{F_{x,k}, z(x,k), a} \otimes N_{G_{y,k}, t(y,k), b}). \end{aligned}$$

The Bell local distribution tuple  $\mathbf{L}$  is also given by Eq. (B1) with  $\rho_{\text{lu}}$ ,  $M_{x,a}$ , and  $N_{y,b}$  replaced by

$$\tilde{\rho}'_{\text{lu}} = \sum_{k,a,b} P_K(k) P_{\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) \Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Alice}} \otimes \Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Bob}}, \quad (\text{B2})$$

$\sum_{k,a,b} \delta_{a_x, a} \Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Alice}}$ , and  $\sum_{k,a,b} \delta_{b_y, b} \Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Bob}}$ , respectively, where the  $\Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Alice}}$  ( $\Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Bob}}$ ) are mutually orthogonal rank-one projectors. Finally, Eq. (B1) with  $\rho_{\text{lu}}$ ,  $M_{x,a}$ , and  $N_{y,b}$  replaced by  $\tilde{\rho}'_{\text{lu}} \otimes \rho_{\text{lu}}$ ,

$$M'_{x,a} = \sum_{k,a,b} \Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Alice}} \otimes [\delta_{k,0} \delta_{a_x, a} I_A + (1 - \delta_{k,0}) M_{F_{x,k}, z(x,k), a}], \quad (\text{B3})$$

and  $N'_{y,b}$  defined similarly, leads to  $\mathbf{P}'$ , which is hence quantum.

### APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1

(i) Let  $\mathbf{P}$  and  $\mathbf{P}'$  be two quantum distribution tuples with numbers  $m$  and  $n$  of inputs that the former is not less nonlocal than the latter. For these tuples, the Lemma gives the random variables  $K$ ,  $\tilde{A}_x$ , and  $\tilde{B}_y$ , the self-maps  $F_{x,k}$  and  $G_{y,k}$ , and the input maps  $z$  and  $t$ . At some stage of any raw key protocol rkp, a random variable  $U$  ( $V$ ) is produced according to  $U = A_x$  ( $V = B_y$ ) when  $X = x$  ( $Y = y$ ), where the  $A_x$  ( $B_y$ ) are the random variables among which Alice (Bob) can choose and  $X$  ( $Y$ ) is a random variable with alphabet in  $\{1, \dots, m\}$  ( $\{1, \dots, n\}$ ). We name rkp<sub>1</sub> the part of rkp before the generation of  $U$  and  $V$  and rkp<sub>2</sub> that after it.

From any rkp, we define the protocol rkp' as follows. First, Alice creates  $K$ , the  $\tilde{A}_x$  and  $\tilde{B}_y$ , and sends all of them over the public channel. Then, Alice and Bob execute rkp<sub>1</sub> and, instead of producing  $U$  and  $V$  as explained above, they proceed as follows. Alice generates, in sequence,  $X'$  which is  $X$  if  $K = 0$  and  $z(X, k)$  if  $K = k \geq 1$ ,  $U'$  according to  $U' = A_{x'}$  when  $X' = x'$ , and  $U$  which is  $\tilde{A}_x$  if  $(K, X) = (0, x)$  and  $F_{x,k}(U')$

if  $(K, X) = (k, x)$  with  $k \geq 1$ . Similarly, Bob generates  $Y'$ , which is  $Y$  if  $K = 0$  and  $t(Y, k)$  if  $K = k \geq 1$ ,  $V'$  according to  $V' = B_{y'}$  when  $Y' = y'$ , and  $V$  which is  $\tilde{B}_y$  if  $(K, Y) = (0, y)$  and  $G_{y,k}(V')$  if  $(K, Y) = (k, y)$  with  $k \geq 1$ . Finally, Alice and Bob discard  $X'$ ,  $U'$ ,  $Y'$ ,  $V'$ ,  $K$ , the  $\tilde{A}_x$ , and the  $\tilde{B}_y$  which do not play any role in rkp<sub>2</sub> and complete rkp<sub>2</sub>. One has  $S \leq R(\mathbf{P})$ , where  $S$  is defined similarly as  $R(\mathbf{P})$  but taking the supremum only over the raw key protocols of the particular form just described.

Consider any such protocol rkp', initial tripartite state  $\rho$ , and measurement operators  $M_{x,a}$  and  $N_{y,b}$  on  $\mathcal{H}_A$  and  $\mathcal{H}_B$ , respectively, and assume that Alice and Bob perform rkp'. After the creation and transmission of  $K$ , the  $\tilde{A}_x$  and the  $\tilde{B}_y$ , and the execution of rkp<sub>1</sub>, Alice, Bob, and Eve share the state  $\tilde{\rho}' \otimes \tilde{\rho} \otimes \rho$ , where  $\tilde{\rho}$  is given by Eq. (4) with the distribution  $P_{X,Y,E}$  of rkp<sub>1</sub> and

$$\tilde{\rho}' = \sum_{k,a,b} P_K(k) P_{\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) \Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Alice}} \otimes \Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Bob}} \otimes \Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Eve}}, \quad (\text{C1})$$

with the same notations as in Eq. (B2). The sum of the projectors  $\Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Alice}}$  ( $\Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Bob}}$ ,  $\Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Eve}}$ ) is the identity operator on a Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}'_A$  ( $\mathcal{H}''_B$ ,  $\mathcal{H}''_E$ ). Alice and Bob then generate  $U$  and  $V$  according to rkp' and discard  $X'$ ,  $U'$ ,  $Y'$ ,  $V'$ ,  $K$ , the  $\tilde{A}_x$ , and the  $\tilde{B}_y$ , which leads to

$$\begin{aligned} \omega &= \sum_{a,b,x,y} P_{\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) O_{x,y} \otimes \left[ p_0 \Pi_{a_x, b_y}^{U,V} \otimes \Pi_{0,a,b}^{\text{Eve}} \otimes \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}} \rho \right. \\ &+ \sum_{k \geq 1, u', v'} P_k \Pi_{F_{x,k}(u'), G_{y,k}(v')}^{U,V} \otimes \Pi_{k,a,b}^{\text{Eve}} \\ &\left. \otimes \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}}(\rho M_{z(x,k), u'} \otimes N_{t(y,k), v'} \otimes I_E) \right], \end{aligned}$$

where  $x$  and  $y$  correspond to  $X$  and  $Y$ , respectively,  $\Pi_{u',v}^{U,V}$  denotes mutually orthogonal rank-one projectors, and the notations  $O_{x,y} = \sum_e P_{X,Y,E}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{e}) \Pi_{x,e}^{\text{Alice}} \otimes \Pi_{y,e}^{\text{Bob}} \otimes \Pi_e^{\text{Eve}}$ ,  $p_k = P_K(k)$ , and  $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$  are used. The state  $\omega$  can be rewritten as

$$\omega = \sum_{x,y,u,v} O_{x,y} \otimes \Pi_{u,v}^{U,V} \otimes \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}'}[(\tilde{\rho}' \otimes \rho)(M'_{x,u} \otimes N'_{y,v} \otimes I''_E)], \quad (\text{C2})$$

where  $M'_{x,u}$  is given by Eq. (B3),  $N'_{y,v}$  by a similar expression,  $I''_E$  is the identity operator on  $\mathcal{H}_E \otimes \mathcal{H}''_E$ , and  $\mathcal{H}' = \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}''_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B \otimes \mathcal{H}''_B$ .

As soon as  $\text{tr}(\rho M_{x,a} \otimes N_{y,b} \otimes I_E) = P_{x,y}(a, b)$ , the state  $\tilde{\rho}' \otimes \rho$ , the operators  $M'_{x,a}$  and  $N'_{y,b}$  given by Eq. (B3), and the distributions  $P'_{x,y}$  are related in the same way; see the proof of the Lemma. Thus one has  $R(\mathbf{P}') \leq S'$ , where  $S'$  is defined similarly as  $R(\mathbf{P}')$  but taking the infimum only over such particular states and measurement operators. When the state initially shared by the three parties is  $\tilde{\rho}' \otimes \rho$  and Alice's and Bob's measurements are characterized by the operators  $M'_{x,a}$  and  $N'_{y,b}$ , respectively, performing rkp<sub>1</sub> and generating  $U$  and  $V$  according to rkp gives the state (C2); see the derivation of Eq. (5). So, in this case, the tripartite state obtained at the end of rkp is identical to that resulting from the execution of the protocol rkp' with  $\rho$ ,  $M_{x,a}$ , and  $N_{y,b}$ . Consequently,  $S$  and  $S'$  are equal to each other, which finishes the proof of property (i).

(ii) Any Bell local distribution tuple can be written in quantum form with the state given by Eq. (C1) without  $K$  and measurement operators  $\sum_{a,b} \delta_{a_x,a} \Pi_{a,b}^{\text{Alice}}$  and  $\sum_{a,b} \delta_{b_y,b} \Pi_{a,b}^{\text{Bob}}$ ; see the proof of the Lemma. Performing any raw key protocol with this initial state and Alice's and Bob's measurements described by these operators leads to the state

$$\rho_{\text{rk}} = \sum_{\substack{a,b,x,y, \\ e,a,b}} P_{A|U,X,E}(a|a_x, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{e}) P_{B|V,Y,E}(b|b_y, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{e}) \\ \times P_{X,Y,E}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{e}) P_{\tilde{A},\tilde{B}}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) \Pi_a \otimes \Pi_b \otimes \Pi_{e,a,b},$$

where  $x$  ( $y$ ) corresponds to  $X$  ( $Y$ ) and  $\Pi_{e,a,b} = \Pi_e^{\text{Eve}} \otimes \Pi_{a,b}^{\text{Eve}}$ . Assume that Eve simply makes the measurement of operators  $\Pi_{e,a,b}$  on  $\rho_{\text{rk}}$ . The three parties are left with classical random variables. Since  $P_{X,Y,E} = P_{X|E} P_{Y|E} P_E$ , the probability mass function of  $A$ ,  $B$  and the random variables available to Eve, i.e.,  $\tilde{A}$ ,  $\tilde{B}$  and  $\mathbf{E}$ , is  $P_{A|\tilde{A},\tilde{B},\mathbf{E}} P_{B|\tilde{B},\mathbf{E}} P_{\tilde{A},\tilde{B}} P_{\mathbf{E}}$  and hence  $A$  and  $B$  are conditionally independent given Eve's variables. Consequently, Alice and Bob cannot generate a secret key [40].

#### APPENDIX D: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2

For any  $\mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{Q}$ , we define the family of distribution tuples  $\mathbf{P}_p = p\mathbf{P} + (1-p)\mathbf{L}$ , where  $\mathbf{L}$  is any Bell local distribution tuple and  $p$  varies from 0 to 1. They belong to  $\mathcal{Q}$  since  $\mathcal{L} \subset \mathcal{Q}$  and  $\mathcal{Q}$  is convex [26]. Clearly,  $\mathbf{P}_p$  is continuous with respect to  $p$ ,  $\mathbf{P}_1 = \mathbf{P}$ , and  $\mathbf{P}_0 = \mathbf{L}$ . Moreover,  $\mathbf{P}$  is not less nonlocal than  $\mathbf{P}_p$  for any  $p \in [0, 1]$  [36]. We denote by  $\mathcal{Q}_s$  the set of all  $\mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{Q}$  such that  $N(\mathbf{P}) = s$  and define the function  $f$ , on the set  $J'$  of the values of  $N$ , by  $f(s) = \inf_{\mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{Q}_s} M(\mathbf{P})$ . By construction,  $f \circ N \leq M$  on  $\mathcal{Q}$  and there is, for any  $s \in J'$ ,  $\mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{Q}_s$ , such that  $M(\mathbf{P})$  and  $f(s)$  are as close to each other as we wish. Since  $M$  and  $N$  vanish on  $\mathcal{L}$ , there is a set  $\mathcal{Q}_0$  containing  $\mathcal{L}$  and  $f(0) = 0$ .

As  $N \geq 0$ , the supremum  $N_{\text{sup}} = \sup J'$  is nonnegative. Define  $J = [0, N_{\text{sup}}]$  and consider any  $s \in J$ . There is  $\hat{\mathbf{P}} \in \mathcal{Q}$  such that  $N(\hat{\mathbf{P}}) > s$ . Define  $\hat{\mathbf{P}}_p$  as described above. Owing to the continuity properties of  $N$  and  $\hat{\mathbf{P}}_p$ ,  $N(\hat{\mathbf{P}}_p)$  is a continuous function of  $p$ . It is equal to 0 for  $p = 0$  and to  $N(\hat{\mathbf{P}})$  for  $p = 1$ . Thus, due to the intermediate value theorem, for any  $s' \in [0, N(\hat{\mathbf{P}})]$ , there is  $q$  such that  $N(\hat{\mathbf{P}}_q) = s'$ , i.e.,  $s' \in J'$ . In particular,  $s$  belongs to  $J'$ . As  $s$  is any element of  $J$ ,  $J$  is a subset of  $J'$ .

For any  $\mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{Q}_s$ ,  $N(\mathbf{P}_p)$  is a continuous function of  $p$  which is equal to 0 for  $p = 0$  and to  $s$  for  $p = 1$ . So, for any  $s' \in [0, s]$ , there is  $q$  such that  $\mathbf{P}_q \in \mathcal{Q}_{s'}$ . Moreover, since  $\mathbf{P}$  is not less nonlocal than  $\mathbf{P}_q$  and  $M$  is a nonlocality monotone, one has  $M(\mathbf{P}) \geq M(\mathbf{P}_q) \geq f(s')$ . Thus, for any  $s$  and  $s'$  in  $J'$  such that  $s' \leq s$ ,  $f(s')$  is a lower bound of  $M$  on  $\mathcal{Q}_s$ , which implies that  $f$  is nondecreasing.

#### APPENDIX E: UPPER BOUND ON THE THRESHOLD $\tilde{N}^*$

The rate  $R'(\rho_{\text{rk}})$  in Eq. (7) is lower bounded by the Devetak-Winter rate [22], i.e.,

$$R'(\rho_{\text{rk}}) \geq I(A : B) + \sum_a P_A(a) S(\omega_a) - S(\omega),$$

where  $I(A : B)$  is the mutual information between  $A$  and  $B$ ,  $S$  denotes the von Neumann entropy,  $\omega = \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{AB}} \rho'$ , and  $\omega_a =$

$\text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{AB}} (\rho' M_a \otimes I'_B \otimes I'_E) / P_A(a)$  with  $I'_B$  the identity operator on  $\mathcal{H}_B \otimes \mathcal{H}'_B$ . We consider  $m = n = 2$ , random variables  $A_x$  and  $B_y$  with values in  $\{-1, 1\}$ , and a raw key protocol in which Alice creates three equally distributed random variables,  $X$ ,  $Y$ , and  $E$ , and sends  $Y$  and  $E$  over the public channel,  $A = \nu(X, Y)EU$ , where  $\nu$  is a map from  $\{1, 2\}^2$  to  $\{-1, 1\}$  such that  $\nu(x, y) = -1$  for only one pair  $(x, y)$  and  $B = EV$ . The values of  $E$  are  $-1$  and  $1$ ;  $X$  and  $Y$  are the choice random variables for Alice and Bob, respectively, with alphabet  $\{1, 2\}$ . Consequently,  $P_A = P_B = 1/2$  and the above Eve's states are given by  $\omega = \sum_{y,e} \Pi_{y,e} \otimes \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B} \rho / 4$  and

$$\omega_a = \sum_{x,y,e} \Pi_{y,e} \otimes \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B} (\rho M_{x, \nu(x,y)e} \otimes I_B \otimes I_E) / 4,$$

omitting the superscript for the projectors.

Since  $m = n = 2$  and  $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{B} = \{-1, 1\}$ , these states can be rewritten as  $\omega = \sum_{y,e,\lambda} p_\lambda \Pi_{y,e} \otimes \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_2^2} \rho_\lambda / 4$  and

$$\omega_a = \sum_{x,y,e,\lambda} \frac{p_\lambda}{8} \Pi_{y,e} \otimes \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_2^2} [\rho_\lambda (I_2 + e\nu a \Sigma_{x,\lambda}^A) \otimes I_2 \otimes I_E],$$

omitting the arguments of  $\nu$ , where  $p_\lambda$  denotes probabilities summing to unity,  $\mathcal{H}_2$  the Hilbert space of dimension 2,  $\rho_\lambda$  density operators on  $\mathcal{H}_2^2 \otimes \mathcal{H}_E$ , and  $I_2$  the identity operator on  $\mathcal{H}_2$ . In some basis of  $\mathcal{H}_2$ , depending on  $\lambda$ , the diagonal elements of the operators  $\Sigma_{x,\lambda}^A$  can be expressed as  $\pm \cos \theta_{x,\lambda}$  and the nondiagonal ones as  $\sin \theta_{x,\lambda}$  [9]. In terms of the states  $\rho_\lambda$ , the distributions  $P_{x,y}$  read as

$$P_{x,y}(a, b) = \sum_{\lambda} \frac{p_\lambda}{4} \text{tr} [\rho_\lambda (I_2 + a \Sigma_{x,\lambda}^A) \otimes (I_2 + b \Sigma_{y,\lambda}^B) \otimes I_E],$$

where the operators  $\Sigma_{y,\lambda}^B$  are similar to the  $\Sigma_{x,\lambda}^A$ .

The above Eve's states can be further simplified into  $\omega = \sum_{\lambda} p_\lambda \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_2^2} \rho'_\lambda$  and

$$\omega_a = \sum_{x,\lambda} \frac{p_\lambda}{2} \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_2^2} [\rho'_\lambda (I_2 + a \Sigma_{x,\lambda}^A) \otimes I_2 \otimes I'_E].$$

The states  $\rho'_\lambda$  are given by  $\rho'_\lambda = \sum_{y,e} \Pi_{y,e} \otimes \rho_{\lambda, \nu(x,y)e} / 4$ , where  $\rho_{\lambda,1} = \rho_\lambda$  and  $\rho_{\lambda,-1} = \sigma_\lambda^A \otimes \sigma_\lambda^B \otimes I_E \rho_\lambda \sigma_\lambda^A \otimes \sigma_\lambda^B \otimes I_E$  with  $\sigma_\lambda^A = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -i \\ i & 0 \end{pmatrix}$  in the basis in which the  $\Sigma_{x,\lambda}^A$  are real and similarly for  $\sigma_\lambda^B$ . The above expression for  $\omega_a$  results from  $\sigma_\lambda^A \Sigma_{x,\lambda}^A \sigma_\lambda^A = -\Sigma_{x,\lambda}^A$ . The reduced density operator on  $\mathcal{H}_2^2$  of  $\rho'_\lambda$  is  $\text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_E} (\rho_{\lambda,1} + \rho_{\lambda,-1}) / 2$ , which can always be taken to be a Bell diagonal state and hence

$$S(\omega_\lambda) - \sum_a S(\omega_{\lambda,x,a}) / 2 \leq h\{[1 + (N_\lambda + N_\lambda^2/4)^{1/2}] / 2\},$$

where  $\omega_\lambda = \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_2^2} \rho'_\lambda$ ,  $\omega_{\lambda,x,a} = \text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_2^2} [\rho'_\lambda (I + a \Sigma_{x,\lambda}^A) \otimes I \otimes I'_E]$ ,  $h$  is the binary entropy function, and  $N_\lambda$  is the maximum violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality [39] for the state  $\text{tr}_{\mathcal{H}_E} (\rho_{\lambda,1} + \rho_{\lambda,-1}) / 2$  [9]. As  $\sum_{a,b} ab P_{x,y}(a, b) = \sum_{a,b} ab P_{x,y}(-a, -b)$ , the value of  $\langle A_x B_y \rangle$  remains the same when  $\rho_\lambda$  is replaced by  $(\rho_{\lambda,1} + \rho_{\lambda,-1}) / 2$  and so  $\tilde{N}(\mathbf{P}) \leq \sum_{\lambda} p_\lambda N_\lambda$ , where  $\tilde{N}$  is defined by Eq. (3). Thus, due to the properties of the Holevo quantity and of  $h$ , the above inequality is valid with  $\omega_\lambda$ ,  $\omega_{\lambda,x,a}$ , and  $N_\lambda$  replaced, respectively, by  $\omega$ ,  $\omega_a$ , and  $\tilde{N}(\mathbf{P})$ .

Since  $P_A = P_B = 1/2$ , one has  $I(A : B) = 1 - h(1/2 + |\langle AB \rangle|/2)$ , where

$$\langle AB \rangle = \langle v(X, Y)UV \rangle = \frac{1}{4} \sum_{x,y} v(x, y) \langle A_x B_y \rangle,$$

and thus  $\max_v I(A : B) \geq 1 - h[3/4 + \tilde{N}(\mathbf{P})/8]$ . The above results show that  $R \geq g' \circ \tilde{N}$ , where  $g'$  is given by

$$g'(s) = 1 - h\left(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{s}{8}\right) - h\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{s + \frac{s^2}{4}}\right).$$

As  $R$  is nonnegative, the right side of the above inequality can be replaced by zero when it is negative and hence  $R \geq g \circ \tilde{N}$ , with  $g(s) = \max\{0, g'(s)\}$ . The value  $g'(s)$  is positive for  $s \geq 0.652$ . So, the nonlocality monotone  $\tilde{N}$  has a threshold value  $\tilde{N}^* \leq 0.652$ .

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